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Introduction 
 
Wenzel Matiaske, Hauke Brunkhorst, Gerd Grözinger, and Marcelo Neves 
It is rarely questioned that the European Union can be considered a model for other 
world regions. Marvelled around the world is the fact that it has clearly been 
possible in Europe to create 'an area of freedom, security and justice' (Preamble, 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) to which no region outside 
the OECD can compare. Even within the OECD, the EU represents an evolutionary 
innovation. Comparable initiatives in other world regions are much less integrated, 
and up until now less successful, even if like Mercosur they are oriented based on 
the European model.  
The success of the EU is directly dependent on the economic prosperity of the 
European region. But comparable prosperity exists in other countries of the OECD 
and some Southeast Asian countries as well. But what is lacking in these cases is a 
transnational or even supranational organisation of states and peoples that as a 
whole, that is, also between the member states and beyond them, has been able to 
achieve a high level of social security and the rule of law. The freedom and 
freedom of mobility, but also the legal and social security of the individual 
European citizen are in all of Europe greater and more multifaceted than in all 
other regions of the world. 
The model character of the EU consists quite clearly in the unique character of 
a closely interwoven, supranational legal order produced by the EU organs and 
independent organisations, which goes just as unquestioned and is as effectively 
implemented by the member states as the law generated by national parliaments, 
administrations, governments, and courts. Within individual national states, 
European law today makes up far more than half of the legal norms, and its spread 
into other legal realms goes much further than the ever denser, mutual 
interpenetration of national and supranational law.  
But not just in comparison to other world regions: the EU has realized more 
elements of the rule of law, even internal organisational democracy, than all 
another post-national, international, and transnational legal associations, also in 
comparison to supranational legal orders and organisations as they today exist 
globally in the area of economics and trade (WTO) or human rights and 
international law (United Nations, global and regional human rights pacts), 
Nowhere else has an international court for human rights achieved such a strong 
position as it has in Europe, and not only in the European Union but (with 
weakened power) in the entire former KSZE. 
By way of treaty law and its interpretation and extension in the conferences of 
the heads of government (European Council) and the European Court, law, politics, 
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and economics in Europe have become increasingly more closely networked, and 
the exchange among subsystems has been subjected to thorough regulation. For 
already long before the constitutional convention – whose draft of course failed in 
France and the Netherlands – the notion of a European 'constitution' having existed 
in a material sense since the Treaties of Rome has been a commonplace in the 
expert discourse. Even the German Federal Constitutional Court already referred to 
the treaties as the 'constitution' of the community in the 1960s, albeit with the 
reservation of its being 'virtual'. The notion of a European constitution is also 
justified from the perspective of systems theory. Higher-level law (constitutional 
law) ensures the cultural interlinkage of law, economics, and politics in Europe. 
The EU not only links processes of market deregulation (disembedding) with new 
forms of re-regulation in the world of business and labour (reembedding); by way 
of its strong standing in the outside world it also protects the citizens of Europe 
from the negative effects of globalisation, more than the individual member states 
would be able to. Of course, it also insures the easy implementation of global 
norms across the Union, norms that the European Union itself has played a part in 
negotiating. But in each case, quite apart from the eternal peace of the union, its 
'model character for other parts of the world' (Dieter Grimm) seems well founded.  
But the 'effectiveness' (Fritz Scharpf) of the Union comes at no small price. The 
astonishing advancements in terms of juridification, the spread of rights and the 
rule of law, correspond to no less significant trends toward the loss or rights and 
dejuridification if we compare the law created by the Union with that demanded by 
the constitutions of the member states. This includes not just the many exceptions 
in European law, the virtually uncontrolled growth of executive authority in 
securing Europe's outer borders and in the struggle against the new threats of 
global terrorism, or in the shaping of the EU's penal code. If legal interventions in 
the freedoms of the citizen are no longer subject to parliamentary approval, and in 
the end even the foundational norm of the democratic penal code, nullum crimen 
sine lege parlamentaria, is substituted by gubernatorial legislation in the coming 
European penal code, the rule of law will be massively destabilized by the non-
egalitarian nature of its emergence. 
These tendencies towards dejuridification strengthen the oft-bemoaned 
democracy deficit of the union, in particular because they create significant leeway 
for the formation of informal executive power that is being used freely and with 
growing effectiveness by the European governments. An especially good example 
is the European Council, called into existence by Helmut Schmidt and the former 
French president Giscard, which brought heads of government and state presidents 
together with their foreign ministers and the president of the European 
Commission in a single power that sets all decisive tracks in Europe. Legally 
speaking, the Council is hardly existent: it is only mentioned in a few places in the 
treaties and outfitted with vague powers. The unified executive power of Europe 
thus largely eludes all control by European and national parliaments and courts. 
Undoubtedly the council functions highly effectively, and has promoted European 
integration in large steps. But it also has marginalized democracy in Europe 
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nationally and internationally, and despite the significant increase in the power of 
the European Parliament. 
The daily, indeed hourly production of legal norms on the European level 
without adequate democratic legitimacy in combination with the constitutionally 
fixed, massive limitation of the national political room to manoeuvre already leads 
to a structural weakening of national democracies. Over the long term, it is quite an 
open question whether the symptoms of de-democratisation and dejuridification 
that in the course of the formation and stabilisation of supranational organisations 
like the EU exhibit through new kinds of citizen democracy (deliberative 
democracy) a reparliamentarisation – by strengthening the EU parliament, national 
parliamentary associations, etc. – or the integration of elements of direct 
democracy into the union structure can be compensated for or not. If not, the gains 
in terms of the political union of Europe would in fact lead to an 'end of 
democracy' (Guéhenno). And what kind of rule of law would that be, if it is not 
democratic? Rights alone do not make up a 'space of freedom' (Preamble, Human 
Rights Charta) for 'slaves can be outfitted with rights and legal means. But the 
guarantee of basic rights that are lent to us from others and from above does not 
emancipate us; it is far from making us citoyens. Long before women and Jews 
became self-determined citizens, they could enjoy the direct exercise of their rights' 
(J.H.H. Weiler). 
Even if elements of the democratic rule of law in the EU are more developed 
than in all comparable projects and organisations, the model character of the EU is 
highly questionable in terms of democracy theory, and we should ask whether 
scholars concerned with the European Union (and the citizens affected by its law) 
might not be able to learn something from similar experiments in other world 
regions that are still much less integrated. Perhaps experience from the Mercosur 
countries with deliberative citizen democracy on the local level, the double 
perspective of the long finished transition from a 'nominalistic' to a 'normative' 
constitutional regime within nation states, and the simultaneous continental 
networking of law, economics, and policy could also be instructive for the current 
EU with its new problems in the realm of democracy and rights. Transcontinental 
social capital can only form if the learning processes are opened in both directions.  
Europeans should be proud of their great achievements in terms of permanent 
peace, securing human and citizen rights, and establishing the rule of law and 
democracy: but not all too proud, for there is no justification for arrogance. Peace 
has existed in Latin America between countries much longer than it has in Europe. 
The establishment of international human rights regimes and international human 
rights courts is a Latin American, not a European success story. The securing of 
human rights is in Europe indeed more effective than in almost any other region in 
the world, but this is especially thanks to the post-war development of the 
European nation state. Bonapartism, originally a European invention, did leave 
Europe and find a new home in Latin America, and the 'delegative democracies' 
(O'Donnell) are stronger in terms of populism and weaker in terms of 
implementation – and thus less amenable to reform – presidial regimes are its 
 
6 Wenzel Matiaske, Hauke Brunkhorst, Gerd Grözinger, and Marcelo Neves 
(post-dictatorial) legacy. But Bonapartism is also returning in a new form to 
Europe. The European Union has prepared its return at least to the extent that it has 
everywhere strengthened, transnationally bound, and autonomised executive 
powers to a 'gentle Bonapartism'. Its European basis is the 'silent development of a 
supranational administrative system in the shadow of the law' (Rainer Nickel). 
Perhaps not too far in the future, the models of postnational, transnational, 
international democracy developing in Latin America will be more attractive than 
those of today's Europe, even if at the moment the union of police and secret 
service functions still seems more evolved than democracy. 
The individual contributions to this volume move between the poles 
'effectiveness' and 'democracy', the poles in which years ago Fritz Scharpf already 
attempted to determine the European Union's perspective for the future. One of the 
most important reasons for EU's effectiveness is the relative smooth 
implementation of European law by the member states, which in turn weakens the 
democratic legitimacy of the respective national legal systems. The far lesser 
effectiveness of Mercosur can therefore be explained not on the basis of the much 
less dense organisation and the now still weak integration of the Latin American 
economic community, but also due to the incapacity of nominalistically 
constitutional regimes to implement treaties, agreements, decisions, laws with 
national or international sources in a juridically effective way. This problem 
becomes a vicious circle when compounded by Latin America's problems of 
economic development. This is at least the generalizable result of the contributions 
of Michelle Raton Sanchez and Arne Heise. The essay by Gerd Grözinger analyses 
tax policy in the EU under the aspects of deregulation and harmonisation. Wenzel 
Matiaske discusses the problems of integration in terms of 'social capital.'  
Even in the case of the problem of democracy, there is a fundamental 
difference between the EU and Mercosur. While Europe's problem is the growing 
imbalance of norms produced by the EU with insufficient democratic legitimacy,  
Mercosur's problem is the insufficient binding power of democratic constitutions in 
the member states. This problem and possible democratic alternatives (deliberative 
and participatory democracy) are at issue in the contributions by Marcos Aurelio 
Guedes de Oliveira, Hauke Brunkorst, Guilherme Figueiredo Leite Gosnçalve, and 
Rainer Nickel. The mediation between democracy and economy, and thus the fate 
of the European economic constitution is the subject of Christian Jörges' 
contribution, while Agustín Gordillo discusses the economic constitution of Latin 
America in a global context.  
As Rainer Nickel in particular shows, the EU is particularly problematic as 
model not just in terms of its nature as a supranational organisation, but also as an 
economic and political force that motivates the formation of corresponding 
counterpowers in other regions of the world. These new, expansive polities, that up 
until now exhibit no familiar pattern of classical state formation (and seem more to 
strengthen extant trends of society's degovernmentalisation) must not only position 
themselves in relation to one another, but also in relation to the all-surpassing 
power of the US and the large atomic powers China and Russia. The contributions 
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of Rüdiger Voigt and Agustín Gordillo are about the global relationship of power 
and space, the situation of the EU and Mercosur in the context of imperialism/neo-
imperialism/hegemony and cosmopolitan orders of equality. 
This volume is a result of an international workshop at Universität Flensburg 
and Fundação Getúlio Vargas in September 2004 in São Paulo. We would like to 
thank the organisation team of FGV Escola de Direito São Paulo and the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft for supporting this conference and this publication.  
 
Flensburg and Sao Paulo, October 2006 
 
 
Translated by Brian Currid 
 
 
Political Development and Comparative Issues 
with EU 
Marcos Aurelio Guedes de Oliveira 
In the last ten years Mercosur has become a viable instrument for the creation of a 
South American pole of economic development and integration as well as to 
enhance regional power in face of inter-regional and global negotiations. For many 
Europeans, Mercosur is a child of the EU process and structures and should closely 
follow its model of integration; for many North-Americans it is being portrayed as 
nothing more than a regional political arrangement in order to better negotiate with 
the US. They argue that Latin Americans do not have conditions to create a stable 
integration process. Surprisingly for everyone Mercosur is there and is growing 
despite all adversities. This essay discusses key aspects that Mercosur shares with 
the EU and stresses the particularities that once produced and maintain Mercosur 
as an original regional integration model. 
 
 
1. Origins 
It is undeniable that the project of the European common market, developed just 
after WWII, affected tremendously Latin America views on the need to link 
economic development to a free trade arrangement. Of course the European case 
was related to security implications not found in Latin America.  
To understand that, we have to look at the historic context of European states. 
Its birth was during the 14th and 15th centuries where the Holy Roman domination 
started to fade away and Europe lived a succession of empires under leadership of 
different European states.  From the 17th Century onward Europe entered a period 
of continuous and growing warfare among its main states. This situation produced 
a concern with the future of the continent that indicated unification as a way out of 
the anarchic system based on war. The Congress of Vienna (1814-15) was a 
breakthrough by forwarding the first relevant international system, the Concert of 
Europe, and its methodology, the balance of power. 
A counter-force to emerging integration ideas was a new wave of nationalism, 
particularly in Germany and Italy, states of late consolidation. Their leaders’ 
actions together with the fear and aspirations of small national groups spread 
suspicious and produced an arms race in Europe, pre-conditions for break out of 
the First and the Second World Wars.  By the end of the Second War there were 
two dominant ideas: one on the declining of European states and a second that a 
federal Europe was a next and needed step for the survival of the continent. The 
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terrible consequences of the two world wars have ended the European condition as 
center of power, science, culture and civilization. It had become a frontier area of 
disputes between two superpowers, had lost its scientific and cultural hegemony 
and was put under the constant menace of nuclear destruction. What could have 
been worse? In this unforeseen context, Europeans with the support of the US 
begun to take seriously the road towards integration. 
South and Central Americas were not involved in a global  war and they were 
not bound to be in the center of a bipolar Cold War. Latin America was never so 
well protected under US umbrella than in the aftermath of WWII.  Regional 
integration has become for European nations a matter of life or death; for Latin 
America it was seen as a facilitator to overcome backwardness. 
The Latin America project looks back to colonial exploitation, to the backward 
heritage of European domination and indicates a way to overcome this past and to 
foster economic and social development. Differently, the European project is 
associated to the historic crisis of their powerful states, to the undeniable need to 
stop waves of European destructive wars that created global crisis and fostered US 
projection towards world hegemony, to the desire to rebuilt Europe as the center of 
civilization, power and hope. 
The European states can look at themselves as decaying political structures in 
need of a common economic framework while the Latin Americans look at 
themselves as building up economic structures based on industry, urban life and 
thus creating and enhancing newly-independent states. Europe was at the center of 
US attention and worry about its future position as hegemonic power, not Latin 
America. 
This perception is the key to understand the slow development of integration in 
the south. The decades following the end of the war were marked by a wish for a 
father-like US support followed by frustration with US denial to recognize the 
region as strategic in face of its growing involvement on conflicts in Asia and 
Europe. Gradually as a result of this dilemma Brazil, as well as Argentina, started 
moving in the direction of creating national development strategies that would 
depend less in the US will and more in state-oriented guidelines. 
The United Nations became in the 1950s instrumental for Latin America cries 
for economic support. The creation of United Nation’ s CECLAC (Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) represented its most important 
step. By the end of the 1950s development was at last gaining momentum in 
regional politics. Industrialization had firmly started in Brazil and President 
Kennedy – after the Cuban revolution – admitted the need for a response to 
regional cries. It was created the Alliance for Progress. 
The assassination of Kennedy and the reemergence of military dictatorships in 
Latin America stopped this development for two decades. The military were good 
in cooperating in intelligence and torture, but kept the feeling of secrecy, 
suspicious and national competition that transformed economic development in a 
national security and nationalistic matter. 
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As a common market arrangement the European Economic Community was 
doing well. The power of its democratic institutions and its economic superiority to 
Eastern Europe were visible. Differently to this, ALALC (Latin American Free 
Trade Association) was powerless and its methods unrealistic. This situation 
changed only in the 1980 e 1990s with the decline and fall of the Cold War. A new 
global reality demanded new strategies. Europe felt secure to move towards a more 
daring structured union. In Latin America the creation of ALADI (Latin American 
Integration Association), in 1980, permitted more flexibility in regional 
negotiations. The general perception that the new global economic reality would 
reduce even more South America importance gave a new flow of energy to the 
existed free trade initiatives.  
The decline of state-orientated development, the emergence of the debt crisis 
and the fear of negative consequences of globalization forced Brazil and Argentina 
into cooperation. One can establish a comparison on two common sources of 
origins between the European (the sources behind the creation of the Coal and 
Steel Community are quite different from these behind the EU) and Mercosur 
projects: security and infrastructure (energy and communication). 
(a) If one sees the conflict over the construction of Parana hydroelectric as a 
problem of regional security, one can affirm that in the case of Mercosur, the first 
drive was a matter of security. Very much as it was in the European case. (b) But if 
the fear of loosing economic importance in the emerging globalized world is to be 
seen as a main force then Mercosur is a product of a post-Cold War and 
globalization era. Thus it corresponds to the concerns that fostered lately the 
European Union. (c) Last but not least, if  the need by Brazil and its partners to use 
common natural resources in order to enhance regional infrastructure is seen as a 
first drive then the forces behind Mercosur are similar to the force behind the Coal 
and Steel community and not the forces of globalization that lately drove the EU. 
One can clearly argue that the origins of Mercosur reflect a combination of 
challenges and problems that were dominant in different moments of the European 
integration history. Democratic stability, security and infrastructure development 
are faced at the same time as the search for adaptation to global economy and to 
deal with new problems brought by the XXIth  century agenda. To a certain extent 
I agree with that. I think there is one main driving force in it connecting and giving 
directions to all initiatives to deal with these challenges. 
The concerns with regional security and infrastructure development date back 
to the 1940s and 1950s and were never sufficient relevant to provoke a common 
initiative towards integration. Until this date the United States was conceived as an 
unchallenged and solid leader for the whole region in terms of economic 
development and an ally in security issues. This changed after the Malvinas war 
when, at last, regional elite realized that they could not count on the US for both 
development and security. Although there were surely security aspects behind  the 
emergence of  Mercosur, its main drive was and still is the fear to be left behind in 
economic development and to become unimportant to international economy due 
to the negative consequences of the debt crisis and globalization.  
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The view of South America as a system or as a sub-system within the 
international system –and not as an extension of US power- was enhanced and the 
elements that characterize it have since the end of the Cold War become more 
significant. They are shared believes about: belonging to a region with a common 
identity; a need to increase interaction and integration among states in order to 
achieve common strategic goals. Regionalization was perceived as a processes that 
could remake relations within the region and give it broader room for common 
economic and political action; in other words to follow the regional strategic move 
towards economic and political independence from the powerful developed 
countries; to enhance the South American economic and political pole or sub-
system.   
 
 
2.  The Nature of Political Institutions 
Quite often one criticizes Mercosur for not having political structures that resemble 
those of the EU. It is depicted as not being supranational, being weak and bearing 
powerless institutions common to intergovernmental political arrangements. These 
views are product of readings of Mercosur from the dominant  theories made to 
understand  European integration. As it is being argued so far, historic background 
and context are key factors for understanding any integration process. Views that 
undermine regional context do not acknowledge the important progress of 
Mercosur through its intergovernmental structures and mechanisms as well as the 
constraints of the slow but steady transition that regional countries undertake 
towards democracy, economic stability and global insertion. 
In the early 1990s a debate was in progress about the shape of Mercosur 
political mechanisms. On one hand the defenders of a supranational power 
supported their view very much from a functionalist perspective. For them, the 
need of such  institutional form would give a independent dynamic to Mercosur as 
well as provoking a spill over process. On the other hand a less ambitious view 
supported that corresponding to the level of development and to the regional 
external and internal economic and political limitations, a prudent and pragmatic 
set of intergovernmental structures should be sufficient and certainly functional to 
the challenges Mercosur had ahead. 
From the Iguaçu Declaration in 1985 to the Assunçion Treaty in 1991 the 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil moved rapidly from security to 
economic concerns. In seven years both countries together with Paraguay and 
Uruguay were convening for the creation of a common market. The immediate 
effect was a renewed international interest on the region and an enhancement of the 
democratic transition.  
The 1994 Ouro Preto protocol  represented the consolidation of former 
agreements and it gave Mercosur international legal status. It created an 
intergovernmental Council composed by ministers and high-level officials of all 
sides empowered with a decision-making process that would accommodate 
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national interests and a set of technical  committees specialized on economic areas 
aiming at finding solutions to forward integration in the direction of a common 
market. Two other important intergovernmental bodies created were: Mercosur’s 
Joint Parliamentary Commission and the Social and Economic Forum, a space for 
the participation of non-governmental actors. (see chart on last page). 
Though it could be argued that Mercosur institutions resemble that of the 1949 
statute of the Council of Europe, it is undeniable that since its heyday the nature of 
institutions in the EU have been a combination of intergovernmental and 
supranational while in Mercosur it is only intergovernmental.  
The declining European states demanded such structures due to their need  to 
move towards a more interconnected unity and enhance their particular cultural 
interests as well as economic and social standards already achieved through social 
democractic means. The guarantee of regional and global security; the need to 
attract by economic and political advantages a growing number of European 
countries to a unifying project were grounded on issues and interests different from 
that Mercosur institutions emerged. 
Differently from the European case, Latin American countries still see their 
states as “under construction” or as young states in need to achieve its economic 
and political aims. The economic situation facing these states is a problematic one. 
They face debts; social exclusion; corruption; lack of social security network; 
poverty; uneven internal economic development and need to enhance a democratic 
and entrepreneurial culture.  The reemergence of democratic governments have 
brought these issues to the center of political concerns. 
 A succession of neoliberal economic policies during the 1990s proved to be 
insufficient to deal with most of the problems above and to foster the progress of 
Mercosur. One could say that the challenges that South American countries face 
demand a long and persistent set of policies. They are basically related to three 
points. First, the stabilization of economic structures by reducing the burden of the 
debt and orienting externally the economy. Secondly, by creating a sustainable 
growth that would spread benefits all over South America. Lastly, the demise of an 
aristocratic and unfair state, and the shaping of a democratic and less partial one. 
The privatization of state companies and the initiatives on developing a social 
network for the very poor were positive steps taken in this decade. Nevertheless 
these policies were still national-centered, transitional and the region was hit by a 
series of international economic crises that undermined major changes.  Only in 
2003-04, Brazil and Argentina have begun to see first results on their move on the 
direction of an export-oriented model. Due to the importance of internal reforms, 
for a decade not much was done in order to forward common macroeconomic 
policies in Brazil and Argentina. In spite of a set of concrete initiatives, during 
nearly a decade, Mercosur was taken by a neopopulist discourse in favor of 
unrealistic proposals such as immediate monetary unification. Mercosur agenda 
was also during this period limited to a debate on the growth of inter-bloc trade and 
the increase of trade among South American countries. 
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At that time commentators were quite skeptical on the continuity of regional 
integration and for many Mercosur was a dying and mistaken initiative. Mercosur 
supporters were not silent. They reminded these critics that the EU resulted from a 
process of ups and downs and in Europe an even deeper skepticism was present in 
many moments.  On the side of Mercosur, this was a period of maturation in which 
common business interests were consolidated, such as in the agriculture sector. 
The new century brought renewed combination of soft brands of neopopulism 
to the region with new leftist governments. Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay are 
upgrading their commitment to regional integration. As a leading country, Brazil 
took the step to enhance Mercosur links to the Andean Pact countries and proposed 
negotiations for the integration of the two blocs. It also invited Peru and Venezuela 
to join Bolivia and Chile as associated members. One even daring step, what 
appeared for some as an unrealistic initiative, was the launch of the South 
American Community, a renewed version of the South American free trade 
initiative taken by former President Sarney and that represents an additional move 
to keep the debate on the need for regional integration at the center of South 
American countries concerns.   
Mercosur negotiations with the EU and with the US for the establishment of a 
free trade area gained a new impetus. It also took important steps towards Africa, 
Asia and North-America. There are ongoing negotiations with Australia, Canada, 
Mexico and with Arab countries. There are recent successful trade agreements with 
India and South African countries, the result of which will prove how a priority 
Mercosur has become for the present governments of Brazil and Argentina.  
Perhaps the most important initiative has been directed to the region’s infra-
structural projects, some of which are depending on financing for decades. Being 
able to reduce its debt and enter into a period of sustainable development, Brazil 
directed the brazilian development bank, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Economico e Social, (BNDES), to finance projects that would create and develop 
the integration of communications (roads, railroads, waterways and ports) the 
common production of energy (dams, the use of natural gas and other common 
natural resources such as water). This initiative is of uttermost importance for the 
region because it deals with the issue of  intra-regional asymmetries. 
In August 2003, 23 projects for the integration of South American infra-
structure were presented by 12 South American countries worth US$ 5,5 billion. 
Most of these projects are near the frontier of Mercosur countries and they aim at 
transforming what used to be a security issue into an area of economic prosperity. 
The growing investments from big regional enterprises as well as multinationals 
are about to consolidate a new pole of economic growth at the heart of South 
America. Only in 2004 foreign investment from brazilian business was US$ 9,5 
billion and most of it went to Mercosur area (Valor Econômico 03/28/2005).  
There has been a continuous growth on small and middle-sized regional enterprises 
as well as on investment from Europe, North-America and Asia. A proposal for the 
creation of structural funds and rules for regional governmental purchase have 
been approved. 
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On the political side it was created COREPER a committee directed by former 
Argentine President Eduardo Duhalde to support  members initiatives towards third 
parties. The formation of a dispute-resolution tribunal, the establishment in 2006 of 
a parliament for Mercosur and the newly-created Mercosur Forum of Federative 
States and Cities, point out that for the time being new intergovernmental 
mechanisms are the region’s reply to growing integration demands. 
Obviously a waited consequence of this is an increase of common regional 
pressure groups in favor of more Mercosur political institutions. This would 
represent a spillover that still depends on intergovernmental action but that has 
already involved non-governmental actors. Thus, frontiers in South America will 
be less and less a matter of security and more and more a matter of development, 
integration and growth. 
If the stability and the positive economic framework of recent years is kept, 
then the discussion on more effective political institutions and mechanisms will 
naturally emerge and the intergovernmental institutions created 15 years ago in a 
very hostile and uncertain environment will be replaced by more functional ones.    
 
 
3. Two Meanings of Deepening and Widening 
The European Union has set the processes of deepening and widening as the two 
main challenges to consolidate itself. This fits well to the economic level and the 
strategic ambition Europe search for itself. The context of Mercosur indicates two 
other meaning for deepening and widening. The first can be translated into creating 
an infra-structure of communication, transport and energy to enhance economic 
links among South American countries, attracting the non-Mercosur members to 
join-in a common integration and regional development process. The second as 
establishing as much as possible free trade agreements and common strategies with 
countries and blocs of countries all over the globe. 
The aims of Mercosur are to deal with regional economic development in a way 
that in the end the region will become more relevant and integrated into the global 
economy than it is now, to avoid being swallowed by the two huge blocs and to 
keep relative interdependence in order to be capable of having options for 
increasing its international economic and political power. Mercosur has lived 
through different governments –five only in Brazil- and is undoubtedly a strategic 
project for its member countries.  
Critics argue that in order to achieve its aims, Mercosur must enhance its 
institutional structures. So far all important decisions taken are by the presidents 
and ministers of the countries involved. This breaks and limits the institutional 
dynamics of  integration. Firstly, because presidents and ministers cannot meet 
frequently. And when they do, instead of discussing a positive agenda, they are 
forced to deal with problems that where once small ones and that could have been 
solved at the level of Mercosur’s lower bodies. Secondly, all intergovernmental 
arrangement needs a dispute-solution mechanism empowered and capable to deal 
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with conflicts in a way that creates a pattern that is acceptable by all sides and that 
is able to remove the obstructions to the flow of conflict and conciliation proper of 
growing integration. There are hopes that the newly-created tribunal will 
accomplish its mission. 
Thirdly, there is a concern that Brazil as the most powerful partner might be 
tempted to adopt an hegemonic stand and instead of enhancing regional regimes 
and institutions as a mean to face regional problems, act unilaterally focusing on its 
own economic and political interest and at the expenses of its neighbors. This 
would increase asymmetry and in a long run would jeopardize the very precious 
gains associated to the transition for democracy and the emergence of regional 
integration, gains that are so fundamentally dear to all South American countries 
today, Brazil included.  
Finally a number of critics and supporters of supranationalism poses the 
following question: can Mercosur continue to exist within its limited intergovern-
mental institutions and mechanisms and be functional? My reply is yes. Inter-
governmentalism has been for centuries a viable mechanism for dealing with 
international issues. It can present itself in different forms from a modest set of 
periodical meetings of national leaders or policy-makers to discuss common 
problems to a well-defined and bureaucratically dominated institutional body. The 
option taken in favor of minimum institutions for Mercosur avoided the creation of 
a large and expensive set of organizations that would not have political power. 
Organizations that would conflict with national institutions that already have 
special bodies dedicated to international issues. It was a concern not to create 
organizations that would not be functional. The transformation of national states, 
the search for economic stability and adaptation to a export-oriented model are 
preconditions still to be met and necessary for more substantial an concrete inte-
gration initiatives such as common macroeconomic policies. 
The above must not be interpreted as Mercosur does not need to change. The 
functions of its intergovernmental institutions are not fully explored and many 
ongoing conflicts would not exist if these institutions were active. 
Mercosur has a long way ahead in order to accomplish its ambitions. So far it 
has been very successful in offering a framework for responding to the region’s 
challenges without conceding to the temptations of adopting automatically other 
models. Taking into consideration the historic and political contexts of the region 
and taking a pragmatic approach instead of an ideological one, Mercosur project 
maintains alive the dream of an independent, democratic, politically and economi-
cally strong Latin America in a world increasingly asymmetrical.  
 
              
 
 
 
What is Left of the European Economic 
Constitution?* 
Christian Joerges 
1. Introduction: The Many Faces of an Historical Event 
“What is Left?” was the title of a series of articles in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, which the social philosopher Stephen Lukes, then Professor at the Euro-
pean University Institute in Florence, had inspired after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
on 9 November 1989. The contributors to the series reflected on this event, and its 
historical dimensions and repercussions. Did the breakdown of the Soviet empire 
and the end of the Cold War also signal the end of the critique of capitalism and of 
the political left in the West? The title of the series was, indeed, a question. The 
authors were all from the West, all from the Left, and were concerned with the 
future of their political affiliations and the various facets of Social Democracy. The 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung appreciated these scrupulous questions and opened 
its Feuilleton, translating everything, without, however, finding a German equiva-
lent for Stephen Lukes’ melancholic leitmotiv. 
The title of this essay insinuates that the queries raised in 1989 are still very 
much on the European agenda. This is certainly a discomforting message, one 
which is not in harmony with the recent seminal accomplishments of the integra-
tion progress, in particular, the deepened constitutionalization of the European 
Union and the Union’s enlargement towards Eastern Europe. But it is, at the same 
time, an unsurprising observation. Can the welfare state survive globalisation?1 
Can “the” European social model survive Europeanization?2 The intensity of the 
debate on these issues is an indicator of their importance and this importance is 
uncontested. Does this imply that the efforts to cure the “democracy deficit” of the 
integration project will remain deficient if they fail to overcome Europe’s “social 
deficit”? It is one thing to agree with such a suggestion: it is quite another to iden-
                                                          
*  Elaboration of the introductory lecture of the Academy European Law – Session on 
European Union Law – at the European University Institute in Florence delivered on 5 
July 2004. I am indebted to Marc Amstutz, Milena Büchs, Damian Chalmers, Philip 
Manow, John McCormick, Rainer Nickel, Tommi Ralli, Florian Rödl and Stephen 
Weatherill for their encouraging comments and constructive suggestions.  
1  For a recent systematic overview, see St. Leibfried and M. Zürn, “The Unravelling Gol-
den Age State”, in St. Leibfried and M. Zürn (eds.), Transformations of the State?, 
Cambridge University Press 2005 [European Review 2005 (13) 1], available at 
http://www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de/transformations/.  
2  Cf., among many, C. Offe, “The European model of ‘social’ capitalism. Can it survive 
European integration?” Journal of Political Philosophy 11 (2003), 437 ff. 
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tify an adequate theoretical framework in which the constitutional discourse can, 
and should, address it. The effort that this essay undertakes rests upon three inter-
dependent (bundles of) premises. 
The first: constitutionalism must reach down into the economic system and the 
social fabric of society. If it fails to do so, it loses its democratic credentials. This 
strong statement needs much explanation. Three references need to be given: one 
historical precedent is the debate within the Staatsarechtslehre of the Weimar Re-
public3 Not at the core, but significant, too, were the ideas of Wirtschaftsdemokra-
tie (economic democracy) and Sozialverfassung (social constitution) as promoted 
by Franz Neumann, Hugo Sinzheimer, and Ernst Fraenkel.4 All this was taken up 
after World War II under the new German constitution.5 Just a Sonderweg of Ger-
man constitutional theory? Certainly more than that. The tensions between law and 
social justice and its “juridification” are of general importance.6 And to take the ar-
                                                          
3  Particularly well documented in English by P.C. Caldwell and W.E. Scheuerman (eds.), 
From Liberal Democracy to Fascism: Legal and Political Thought in the Weimar Re-
public, Boston 2000; A.J. Jacobsen, and B. Schlink (eds.), Weimar. A Jurisprudence of 
Crisis, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 2000; J.P. McCormick (ed.), Mass Democracy 
and Industrial Technology. Political and Social theory from Nietzsche to Habermas, 
Durham, NC-London 2002. 
4  See, on Franz Neumann, recently, M. Iser and D. Strecker (eds.), Kritische Theorie der 
Politik. Franz L. Neumann – eine Bilanz, Baden-Baden 2002. On Fraenkel, see W.E. 
Scheuerman, “Social Democracy and the Rule of Law: The Legacy of Ernst Fraenkel” 
(ibid.), 74 ff. 
5  P.C. Caldwell, “Is a Social Rechtsstaat Possible? The Weimar Roots of a Bonn Contro-
versy”, (ibid., note 4), 136 ff. 
6 Cf., the Special Issue of the Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence on Social De-
mocracy (Guest Editor: Colin Harvey); to cite just one contributor: R. Burchill, “The EU 
and European Democracy – Social Democracy or Democracy with a Social Dimen-
sion?”, 185 ff, 186 argues: “In addressing the ‘wider issues’ of democracy, we are taken 
beyond the political sphere to engage with the social and economic organisation of so-
ciety. Once we move in this direction, agreement about the nature, scope and content of 
democracy becomes very contentious. If the overall purpose of democracy is “to provide 
the conditions for the full and free development of the essential human capacities of all 
the members of the society” [referring to M Loughlin, “Rights, Democracy, and Law” in 
T. Campbell, K. Ewing and A. Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights, Ox-
ford 1992, 42 ff.]. He goes on “.…[D]emocracy needs to be something more than the 
existence of a few basic political procedures. By bringing the idea of ‘social’ into the 
frame, we then begin to address the wider issues by incorporating the social and econo-
mic aspects of society into our understanding of democracy. However, as this involves 
making normative claims in relation to democracy, it is widely felt that this stretches the 
understanding of democracy too far”. And there is even more continuity with Weimar 
scholarship: “Constitutionalisation” has become a quest which affects ever more spheres 
of “secondary” law, including private law and under the label of “societal constitutiona-
lism”. See G. Teubner, “Societal Constitutionalism. Alternatives to State-centred 
Constitutional Theory?”, in Ch. Joerges, I.-J. Sand and G. Teubner (eds.), Transnational 
Governance and Constitutionalism, Oxford 2004, 3 ff. Continuity in the discussion of 
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gument a step further into an uncharted sea: this debate is linked to the project of 
modernity itself: to the tension and conflict “between the project of political mo-
dernity defined as collective self-determination, and economic modernity defined 
as the autonomous determination of the ways in which human needs are satisfied”.7  
The second premise can be explained by a reference “Economy and Society”, 
Max Weber’s famous notion and project of a social theory which includes socio-
logy of law. This type of a sociologically informed jurisprudence is under-repre-
sented the agenda of European constitutionalists. The law of the economy, of in-
dustrial relations, and the ever deeper involvement of the European Union with 
social policy8 did not, of course, go unnoticed. But these matters were handed over 
to the experts of the fields that were under scrutiny.9 The Theory of the European 
Economic Constitution to which the title of this essay alludes is a great exception. 
This theory is a truly constitutional response in its crafting of the interdependence 
of the Rechtsstaat, the ordering of the European economy, and the assignment of 
social policy to the nation states. In this way, the Theory of the European Econo-
mic Constitution has contributed to the decoupling (Scharpf)10 of social policy 
from the European project.11 This normative objection is, however, linked to a 
                                                                                                                                      
the tensions between the political objectives of social democracy and the rule of law in 
liberal democracies seems particularly relevant in the context of this paper. However, it 
is clear that it does not cover the relationship between constitutionalism and society 
comprehensively and that it fails to specify the reasons for the deepening of the interest 
in a “European social model”.  
What is true for both these traditions and the notion of an “economic constitution” ap-
plies, of course, also to “economic law”. This term cannot be adequately translated into 
English, as neither its ordo-liberal nor its critical understanding – represented by titles 
such as Wirtschaftsrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts (“economic law as critique of pri-
vate law”), H.-D. Assmann, G. Brüggemeier, D. Hart and Ch. Joerges, Königstein/Ts. 
1980) have an equivalent in the English speaking world; cf., very briefly, Ch. Joerges, 
“Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty”, in R. Dehousse (ed.), Eu-
rope after Maastricht: an Ever Closer Union?, Munich 1994, 29 ff., 30-32.  
7  F. Block, Towards a New Understanding of Economic Modernity, in Ch. Joerges, B. 
Stråth and P. Wagner (eds.), The economy as a polity. The political construction of mo-
dern capitalism – an interdisciplinary perspective, London (GlassHouse) 2004, ch. 1 
(forthcoming). 
8  “Creeping Europeanization” in the analysis of C. Offe (note 2).  
9  Cf., the Review Essay of J.P. McCormick, “Democratic Theory Confronts the European 
Union. Prospects for Constitutional and Social Democracy in a Supranational Sektoral-
staat” (forthcoming in Political Theory).  
10  F.W. Scharpf, “The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2002), 645 ff., at 646. 
11  A political science version of this thesis is Fritz Scharpf’s well-known contention that 
democracies which prove to be unable to resolve problems of economic and social sta-
bility risk the loss of social legitimacy [e.g., “Democratic Policy in Europe”, European 
Law Journal 2 (1996), 136-155], a thesis closely linked to Scharpf’s famous analysis of 
Europe’s “political deficit”: “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federa-
lism and European Integration”, Public Administration 86 (1988), 239-278 (“Die Poli-
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more “sociological” critique. The theory’s potential to guide the European project 
is exhausted, and the efforts to revive it have failed or are bound to be unsuccess-
ful. 
In an important sense, however, the exhaustion of the economic constitution is 
a mixed blessing. To anticipate the thesis which Section IV of this essay will de-
fend: the erosion of the economic constitution did not pave the way to “social Eu-
rope” or to the reconstruction of a European social democracy. Neither the com-
mitments of the Constitutional Treaty to a “social market economy” nor the new 
social rights or the turn to “new modes of governance” are really trustworthy and 
highly ambivalent. In particular, the “Open Method of Co-ordination” threatens the 
very idea of constitutionalism, namely, the idea of law mediated, and rule-of-law 
bound governance. This argument is based on a third premise which is “conserva-
tive” in that it insists that European “governance” practices must not take the rule 
of law lightly. 
In the elaboration of this three dimensional theoretical framework, this essay 
will take a reconstructive approach. The following section will first point to the 
origins of the theory of the economic constitution, and explain its specific notion of 
constitutionalism (II.1). It will then deal with the transformation of this theoretical 
heritage in post World War II Germany into the “social market economy” (Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft) (II.2). The concluding part of this section will seek to explain 
why the theory of the economic constitution provided such an attractive design for 
the formative era of the European integration project. It will, however, be added 
that the importation of this theory into the European project came at a price. It pre-
pared the ground for Europe’s “social deficit”, which remains so difficult to over-
come (II.3).  
The leading proponents of this approach had fundamentally renewed their theo-
retical basis by the 1960s and 1970s, in such a way that they seemed well prepared 
for the new dynamics of European integration in the 1980s (Section III.1). Howe-
ver, the new dynamics and the striving for an “ever closer Union” in the Maastricht 
Treaty led to a strengthening of European regulatory policies and a broadening of 
their scope, both of which were no longer compatible with the traditional and the 
renewed theoretical design (III.2). The support of the theory of the economic 
constitution which the German Constitutional Court’s Maastricht judgment provi-
ded has proved to be a pyrrhic victory. The political constraints which this judg-
ment confirmed damaged the economic viability of Europe and deepened the 
schism between national social models striving and institutionalized Europe (Sec-
tion III.3). 
The turn to new modes of governance presents itself as the most important re-
medy, which, thanks to the European Convention, even became a candidate for 
                                                                                                                                      
tikverflechtungs-Falle. Europäische Integration und deutscher Föderalismus im Ver-
gleich”, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 26, 1985, 323-356); for an update, cf., “The Eu-
ropean Social Model” (note 10) and “Problem-Solving Effectiveness and Democratic 
Accountability in the EU”, Ms. Cologne 2004. 
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constitutionalization. However, the account submitted in Section IV will not be so 
positive. 
There is not much left of the Economic Constitution and there is not much of it 
which is Left, either. But, this resume is not to announce an exercise in de-
construction. Throughout the whole essay a background agenda will be pursued in 
each of its sections, which seek to reveal another dimension of the integration pro-
cess. To indicate at least the perspective: markets, so the theory of the economic 
constitution argues, are not self-sustaining, they need institutional backing. Yes, 
but markets are social institutions which cannot be governed through some objec-
tive mechanism and do not simply respond to some functional needs – they are, in 
the last instance, “polities”. The opening of our national economies (Volkswirt-
schaften) requires responses, on the one hand, to the erosion of the political powers 
of the nation state, and, on the other, to the risks of unaccountable transnational 
governance arrangements. It is the great merit of the theory of the European eco-
nomic constitution to have addressed this challenge. Its responses, however, re-
mained one-dimensionally restricted to an institutionalization of economic rationa-
lity criteria at transnational levels of governance. The post-national constellations 
in which we find ourselves require more complex and socially more sensitive res-
ponses to the tensions between the opening of formerly national economies and the 
pre-requisites of social solidarity. Such answers are not readily available. They 
need to be discovered  in reflective practices – and Europe’s constitutionalization 
need, therefore, to be conceptualized as a process, in which Law has to supervise 
and to discipline the practices of governance. 
 
 
2. What is an Economic Constitution? 
It is – or should have become – impossible to use the term constitutional law with-
out reflecting the theoretical yardsticks which are invoked to assign specific func-
tions and justify specific validity claims of “constitutional” norms. It is hence in-
sufficient to point to the supremacy doctrine, direct effect, or the resistance to 
change on the part of core elements of European law, to characterize them as con-
stitutional.12 This kind of definition is particularly popular among European law-
yers, because it allows them to talk about a European constitution without dis-
cussing discrepancies with the juridification of political processes, institutional 
states, or the democracy deficits of European governance practices. The use of the 
word constitution in relation to European economic law is, then, nothing spectacu-
lar. But it is also empty because such a notion does not inform us about the validity 
                                                          
12  See Ch. Möllers, “Verfassungsgebende Gewalt – Verfassung – Konstitutionalisierung”, 
in A. v. Bogdandy (ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht. Theoretische und dogmatische 
Grundlagen, Berlin-Heidelberg-NewYork 2003, 1 ff.  
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claims of the economic constitution, let alone, its (normative) legitimacy.13 This, 
and nothing less, is the promise and the aspiration of the theory of the economic 
constitution, and only because of these ambitions can it claim constitutional status. 
In order to understand these ambitions, we have to take a detour and a glance, 
first, at the origins, and, then, at the development of our notion.14 The “economic 
constitution” originated in the social turmoil and intellectual laboratory of Weimar 
– and this is so for very transparent reasons.15 It was not so absurd, and was, at any 
                                                          
13  “Economic constitutional law consists of the constitutional rules that deal with economic 
matters”. This definition from J. Baquero Cruz, Between competition and free move-
ment: the economic constitutional law of the European Community, Oxford 2002, 29 is 
not simply self-referential, because the author has first laid out a meta-positivist “notion 
of constitution” which is “inscribed within the Western legal tradition” (ibid., at 12). But 
it seems not sufficiently substantiated to provide a basis for determining the recognition 
which the internal market, European competition law and the four freedoms deserve.  
14  The literature in German is abundant, in English less so [recent analyses: D.J. Gerber 
“Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the 
‘New’ Europe”, American Journal of Comparative Law 42 (1994), 25 ff.; W. Sauter, 
Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the EU, Oxford 1997, 26 ff.], comprehensi-
vely, albeit with only scarce references to the legal “branch” of Ordo-liberalism and 
Ordnungstheorie Ch. Mantzavinos, Individuals, Institutions, and Markets, Cambridge 
2001. There seems to be little available in French (but see L. Azoulay, “L'ordre concur-
rentiel et le droit communautaire”, in M.-A. Frison-Roche (ed.), L'ordre concurrentiel, 
Mélanges en l'honneur d'Antoine Pirovano, ed.), Paris 2003, 277-310. 
15  In the account of J. Baquero Cruz (op. cit., note 13, at 26) the meaning that this tradition 
gave to the concept is “creating confusion and turning, as it were, against certain basic 
conceptions and functions of constitutionalism”. This harsh judgement is directed only 
at “the original ordo-liberal version defined in The Ordo Mainfesto of 1936” (signed by 
Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken, Hans Großmann-Doerth), in which he finds a “strong 
Schmittian flavour”. It is difficult to understand, however, why we should assign the 
status of a foundational document to the 1936 Manifesto and neglect other, often more 
famous, writings (see notes 18-19 below). It seems equally problematical not to take into 
consideration how generations of scholars have developed the theory further and adap-
ted it to the various phases of the European integration process. J. Baquero Cruz’s note 
made “more in passing” on the Schmittian flavour does, however, concern an interesting 
affinity (see note 25 below), although it is also problematical for two reasons. First, be-
cause it is for obvious historical reasons likely to evoke the wrong political and moral 
connotations. The Ordo-liberals were an opposition group in Nazi Germany. Their 
common – religious – concern over the Reichskristallnacht had brought the group to-
gether. Franz Böhm and Walter Eucken were members of the Bekennende Kirche. Some 
Members of the Freiburg School risked their lives in the resistance against Hitler. 
Großmann-Doerth, 42 years old in the Manifesto year of 1936, and drafted into the 
Wehrmacht in July 1939, died in 1944. Alexander Rüstow and Wilhelm Röpke had left 
Germany. On all this, see D. Haselbach, Autoritärer Liberalismus und Soziale Markt-
wirtschaft. Gesellschaft und Politik im Ordoliberalismus, Baden-Baden 1991, and, more 
recently, Ph. Manow, “Ordoliberalismus als ökonomische Ordnungstheologie” Levia-
than 2001, 179 ff. and his unpublished Habilitationsschrift on “Social Protection and 
Capitalist Production. The Bismarckian Welfare State and the German Political Eco-
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rate, a widely held view that the economic crises and social tensions of post-First 
World War Germany were becoming out of control and that the Republic was 
threatened by strong and bitter opponents both from the radical right and from the 
radical left. Ordo-liberalism sought a liberal answer to this crisis. This answer had 
to distance itself from the laissez-faire ideas which Alexander Rüstow, which were 
discredited as “paleo-liberalism”.16 Two famous manifestos, often characterized as 
the foundational manifestos of Ordo-liberalism, were published at the peak of the 
crisis in 1932: Walter Eucken’s “staatliche Strukturwandlungen und die Krise des 
Kapitalismus”,17 and Alexander Rüstow’s “Interessenpolitik oder Staatspolitik”.18 
Other subsequently famous protagonists followed suit in the same year:19 Franz 
Böhm’s seminal monograph on Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf followed only one 
year later.20 The answer was liberal in its rejection of the two state-focused 
contemporary competitors, the Historic School of Economics on the one side, and 
                                                                                                                                      
nomy, 1880-1990”, Cologne 2004, 76 ff., 93 ff.); and second, Baquero Cruz seems to 
misinterpret the “Schmittian flavour”. The “strong state” that the Ordo-liberals asked for 
was certainly not a pluralist democracy (see K.W. Nörr, Die Leiden des Privatrechts. 
Kartelle in Deutschland von der Holzstoffkartellentscheidung bis zum Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, Tübingen 1994, 174). But this does not mean that they 
were striving for the same type of “qualitatively strong” state which Carl Schmitt had 
called for in his famous 1932 speech [“Starker Staat und gesunde Wirtschaft. Ein Vor-
trag vor Wirtschaftsführern“ (“A Strong State and a Healthy Economy. A Lecture for 
Business Leaders”), held on 23 November 1932, published, for example, in Volk und 
Reich. Politische Monatshefte 1933, 81 ff.]. Schmitt’s strong state claimed the political 
primacy of politics over the economy, whereas the Ordo-liberals sought to impose a 
stable legal framework on the economy which the political system, for its part, was to 
respect (cf., R. Wiethölter, “Franz Böhm (1895 - 1977)”, in B. Diestelkamp and M. 
Stolleis (eds.), Juristen an der Universität Frankfurt a.M., Baden-Baden 1989, 208 ff. – 
No economic theory remains the same over decades, however. On the development of 
the economic theory side of Ordo-liberalism cf., very lucidly, for example, Ch. 
Mantzavinos, Wettbewerbstheorie. Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung, Berlin 1993 and 
more recently his Individuals, Institutions, and Markets, Cambridge 2001. 
16  “Paläoliberalismus, Kollektivismus und Neoliberalismus in der Wirtschafts- und Sozial-
ordnung”, in K. Förster (ed.), Christentum und Liberalismus – Studien und Berichte der 
Katholischen Akademie in Bayern, Vol. 13, 149-178; see, also, his “Interessenpolitik 
oder Staatspolitik?” in Der Deutsche Volkswirt 6 (1932), 169 ff.; idem, “Freie Wirtschaft 
– starker Staat”, in Franz Bosse (ed.), Deutschland und die Weltkrise (Schriften des Ver-
eins für Socialpolitik 187). Munich 1932, 62 – 69. 
17  In Weltwirtschaftkliches Archiv 36, 297-321, reprinted in Ordo 48 (1997), 5-25.  
18  In Der Deutsche Volkswirt 6 (cited from the reprint in W. Engels and H. Froels (eds.), 
Querschnitte, Düsseldorf 1986, 66-71.  
19  A. Müller-Armack, Entwicklungsgesetze des Kapitalismus. Ökonomische, 
geschichtstheoretische und soziologische Studien zur modernen Wirtschaftsverfassung, 
Berlin 1932. – On Müller-Armack’s biography and work, see D. Haselbach, Autoritärer 
Liberalismus und Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Gesellschaft und Politik im Ordoliberalis-
mus, Baden-Baden 1991, 117 ff. 
20  Berlin 1933. 
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socialist ideas as propagated by the labour movement on the other.21 It was post-
laissez-faire in that it assigned the task of ensuring the ordo of the economic sphere 
to the state. Walter Röpke used the oxymoron “liberal interventionism” to charac-
terize this function.22 The old paleo-liberal Nachtwächterstaat (laisser-faire state) 
was to be replaced by a “strong state”.23 And the intellectual primus of the 
constitutionalist Weimar Left immediately understood this: Ordo-liberalism is an 
authoritarian liberalism, Hermann Heller responded.24 His response hit a nerve. 
Only recently, William E. Scheuerman has taken up Heller’s line of argument and 
applied it to the institutional suggestions of the master-mind of the second genera-
tion of Ordo-liberals, the paleo-liberal economist and social philosopher Friedrich 
von Hayek.25  
 
2.1 The Social Market Economy: An Economical Christian Project 
But this is an anticipation of some of the aspects and developments to which we 
will have to return.26 More important for the impact of Ordo-liberalism in post-war 
Germany is another dimension, which Philip Manow has carved out in a series of 
fascinating studies.27 The social question which generated so much unrest in early 
capitalism was a challenge to the Christian churches, and the institutional varieties 
of European welfarism mirrored religious affinities. This is not major news con-
cerning political Catholicism. But the story which Manow recounts about the im-
                                                          
21  W. Abelshauser, Kulturkampf. Der deutsche Weg in die neue Wirtschaft und die 
amerikanische Herausforderung, Berlin 2003, 158 ff. 
22  See W. Röpke, German Commercial Policy, London 1934, 40 ff.; see, also, Die Lehre 
von der Wirtschaft, Vienna 1937; on Röpke, cf., M. Glasmann, op. cit., 52 ff. 
23  A. Rüstow in 1932 before the Verein für Socialpolitik: “Einen starken Staat, einen Staat 
oberhalb der Wirtschaft, da, wo er hingehört” (“a strong state, a state situated at a level 
above the economy, as appropriate”), note 16 above; cf., W. Abelshauser, op. cit. (note 
21) 159. 
24  H. Heller, “Autoritärer Liberalismus”, Die Neue Rundschau 44 (1933), 289 ff. 
25  W.E. Scheuerman, “The Unholy Alliance of Carl Schmitt and Friedrich A. Hayek”, 
Constellations 4 (1997), 172 ff.; see note 57 infra. 
26  Infra Section III.  
27  Ph. Manow, “Modell Deutschland as an interdenominational compromise”, Minda De 
Gunzburg Centre for European Studies, Working Paper 003/2001; idem, “Ordolibera-
lismus als ökonomische Ordnungstheologie” Leviathan 2001, 179 ff.; idem, “‘The 
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’. Esping-Anderson’s Sozialstaatstypologie und die konfes-
sionellen wurzeln des westlichen Wohlfahrtsstaats”, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie 
und Sozialpsychologie 54 (2002), 203 ff. (English version at http://www.mpi-fg-
koeln.mpg.de/people/pm/download_de.html) and his unpublished Habilitationsschrift 
on “Social Protection and Capitalist Production. The Bismarckian Welfare State and the 
German Political Economy, 1880-1990”, Cologne 2004.  
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portance of social Protestantism is new,28 and this is of particular importance for 
the students of the “economic constitution”. “Ordo” is a Catholic notion. Yet, the 
Ordo-liberals who embraced it – Walter Eucken, Alexander Rüstow, Wilhelm 
Röpke – were all strongly linked to Protestantism.29 What both the Protestants and 
the Catholics sought was a third way between capitalism and socialism – and this 
alliance was the underpinning of Germany’s post-war social market economy; this 
was their ecumenical project and became the common project of the Protestants 
and the Catholics in the Christian Democratic Union.  
 
2.2 The Economic Constitution: “Authoritarian Liberalism” Revisited? 
The alliance of churches, political Protestantism and Catholicism in the early post-
war years extended itself to the trade unions – Germany’s social market economy 
was their common project and became a political, social and economic success.30 
But this alliance was not to last for long. Germany had neither overcome seculari-
zation nor the political factioning which it had cultivated ever since the 
Kaiserreich. As Manow documents, the heritage of mistrust of Social Catholicism 
against economic liberalism resurfaced, and the old alliances between Catholicism, 
economic corporatism and Bismarckian welfarism were rebuilt.31  
The Protestant Ordo-liberals did not appreciate this restoration of patterns 
which looked all too similar to what they had tried to overcome back in the 1920s. 
And now, in the new Bonn Republic, they had another prestigious standing. The 
group had grown and its views dominated a good deal of academic life, public opi-
nion, and the officious communications of the Christian Democratic government. 
Confidently and coherently, Ordo-liberalism revitalized its programme. A core 
element of its constitutional messages and perspectives was the theory of the “eco-
nomic constitution”, the thesis that the constitution should respect the interdepen-
dence of a system of undistorted competition, individual freedoms and the rule of 
law – and protect this precious balance against discretionary political influence.32  
                                                          
28  “New” is, of course, a relative concept. In the core Chapter 3.5 on “Social Protestantism 
and the Redefinition of Social Reforms”, Manow points not just to primary sources but 
also to an impressive range of historical studies.  
29  Ph. Manow, “Social Protection” (op. cit.), at 76, note 5. So was the great spokesman of 
the Social market economy in the Early Bonn Republic, Alfred Müller-Armack; on his 
religious background, see D. Haselbach, Autoritärer Liberalismus (note 19), 119.  
30  For a concise analysis, see M. Glasman, Unnecessary Suffering. Managing Market Uto-
pia, London-New York 1996, especially at 50 ff. (on Ordo-liberalism) and 56 ff. (on 
post-war Germany).  
31  Ph. Manow, “Social Protection”, 84 ff.; W. Abelshauser, Kulturkampf (note 23), 93 ff.  
32  Cf., out of a rich literature, for example, G. Brüggemeier, Entwicklung des Rechts im 
organisierten Kapitalismus, Vol. 2, Frankfurt a.M. 1979, 322 ff. (the reasons for the be-
nign neglect of this book by Germany’s Rechtswissenschaft are one of its well-kept sec-
rets); F. Kübler, “Wirtschaftsrecht in der Bundesrepublik – Versuch einer wissen-
28 Christian Joerges 
The return of political Catholicism and Ordo-liberalism to their distinct rou-
tes/paths renewed an old schism – as well as other historical controversies. In his 
studies on the history of German private law in the Weimar and Bonn Republic, 
Knut Wolfgang Nörr33 distinguishes two concepts in the (German) history of 
economic law: the “organized economy” and the “social market economy”. He 
downplays the tensions within the second camp, but rightly underlines that the co-
existence of the “organized economy” tradition, on the one hand, and Ordo-libera-
lism, on the other, amounted to the institutionalization of a paradox: Germany cul-
tivated both the ordo-liberal credo and its concepts while the majority of its Staats-
rechslehrer (professors of constitutional and administrative law) did not take the 
ordo-liberal “constitutionalization” of the economy seriously.34 Nörr accordingly 
diagnoses “a basic phenomenon in the history of the emergence of the Bonn Re-
public … [a] dual line, in economic policy and economic constitutional law”.35  
Paradox or List der Vernunft? Yet, the dual structure which Nörr finds so 
contradictory in theory proved to be very successful in practice. The social dimen-
sion of Germany’s post-war market economy survived and flourished.36 This is 
well-known and explains why “a highly competitive social market economy” figu-
res now in Article I-3 of the Constitutional Treaty, and also figures as one of the 
objectives of the European Union.37 Its hopes for a prestabilized harmony between 
economic competitiveness and social solidarity are well-founded. In Manow’s 
account of the German example, the success of the social market economy resulted 
from the inability of both laissez-faire and authoritarian liberalism to determine the 
policies of the Bonn Republic. Instead, Germany institutionalized “a system of 
                                                                                                                                      
schaftshistorischen Bestandsaufnahme”, in D. Simon (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft in der 
Bonner Republik, Frankfurt a.M. 1994, 364 ff. 
33  Die Republik der Wirtschaft. Teil I: Von der Besatzungszeit bis zur Großen Koalition, 
Tübingen 1999, 5 ff.; cf., earlier his Zwischen den Mühlsteinen. Eine Privatrechts-
geschichte der Weimarer Republik, Tübingen 1988, and Die Leiden des Privatrechts. 
Kartelle in Deutschland von der Holzstoffkartellentscheidung bis zum Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, Tübingen 1994. 
34  And vice versa: The Ordo-liberals dominated economic law and private law. They 
remained unimpressed by mainstream Staatsrechtslehre; even the explicit rejection of 
the theory of the economic constitution by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Entscheidun-
gen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 7, 377 (1958) – Investment aids) did not irritate 
them. 
35  K.W. Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft (note 33), 84 (my translation). 
36  W. Abelshauser, Die Langen Fünfziger Jahre. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Deutsch-
land 1949 - 1966, Frankfurt a.M. 1987. 
37  See Ch. Joerges and F. Rödl, “The ‘Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Mo-
del?”, EUI Working Paper Law No. 2004-8 (https://www.iue.it.UB/law/04-8.pdf) on the 
Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 850/03, Brussels, 18 July 
2003; the amendment of Article I-3 by the EU Intergovernmental Conference on 22 June 
2004 (Annex 3, doc. 82/04, is accessible at  
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/jun/constitution-amendments-june22.pdf 
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decentralized and functional interventionism”.38 In Glasman’s brilliant summary: 
“No one ‘designed’ post-war Germany, it was hewn out of far more durable and 
sophisticated moral and ethical materials than those provided by economic theory 
or any other social science methodology”.39 
 
2.3 Ordo-liberalism in the European Community: the Decoupling of 
Economic Integration from the Welfare State and its Social Policy 
The real existing compromise, a Wirtschaftsverfassung with strong corporatist 
elements, the economic democracy aspirations in political Catholicism and the 
reconstruction of the Bismarckian welfare state under the Catholic Chancellor 
Adenauer were anathema to the leading Ordo-liberals. They saw Germany again 
“on the road to serfdom”. And, indeed, their institutional agenda, on which the 
quest for strong bodies dedicated to the defence of free competition and insulated 
from both the pluralism of interest groups and governmental political insinuations 
ranked so highly, was very often frustrated in Germany’s Verhandlungsdemok-
ratie.40 Thus, it is small wonder that they embraced the integration project, support-
ing its establishment with all their considerable energy – and crafted their views 
into this emerging institution.  
The formative phase of the European Economic Community has often been re-
counted in many languages and in various disciplines – especially by lawyers, po-
litical scientists, and historians.41 The history of the European economic constitu-
tion is well documented.42 I myself have published short versions of it on many 
                                                          
38  Ibid., Ch. 3.6, at 96. 
39  Op. cit., 55. 
40  The Kartellgesetz was enacted only in 1957 under the chancellorship of Konrad Ade-
nauer with Ludwig Erhard, the strongest political ally of the Ordo-liberals, acting as its 
promotor; it was presented as “the Basic Law of the Social Market Economy”, but did, 
by no means, realize the ordo-liberal ideals comprehensively. See the reconstruction of 
the whole process in G. Brüggemeier, Entwicklung des Rechts im organisierten Kapita-
lismus, Vol. 2, Frankfurt a.M. 1979, 383 ff.  
41  Masterly by J.H.H. Weiler for law [see his “Transformation of Europe”, Yale L.J. 100 
(1991), 2 ff.; The Constitution of Europe. “Do the new Clothes have an Emperor?”, 
Cambridge 1999, 10 ff.], by A. Moravscik for political science (The Choice for Europe. 
Social Purpose/State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, NY 1998, 86 ff., for 
history by Alan S. Milward (The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2nd ed., London-
New York 1999). Interestingly enough, legal history has treated Europe with un-benign 
neglect, and equally revealing, none of the master tales cited takes note of Ordo-libera-
lism and its “economic constitution” (for an explanation, see note 42). 
42  M.E. Streit and W. Mussler, “The Economic Constitution of the European Community. 
From ‘Rome’ to ‘Maastricht’”, European Law Journal 1 (1995), 5-30; W. Mussler, Die 
Wirtschaftsverfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft im Wandel. Von Rom nach 
Maastricht, Baden-Baden 1998; P. Behrens, “Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Europäi-
schen Gemeinschaft”, in G. Brüggemeier (ed.), Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa, Ba-
30 Christian Joerges 
occasions.43 Let me repeat this much here: the affinities between Ordo-liberalism 
and the integration project of 1958 were manifold - for a series of reasons. As a 
concept, Ordo-liberalism appeared particularly appropriate for the legitimization 
and orientation of the integration project. The freedoms guaranteed in the EEC 
Treaty, the opening up of national economies, and anti-discrimination rules and the 
commitment to a system of undistorted competition, were interpreted as a “deci-
sion” which supported an economic constitution that matched the ordo-liberal con-
ceptions of the framework conditions for a market economic system (at least to the 
degree that the many departures from the system might be classified as exceptions, 
                                                                                                                                      
den-Baden 1994, 73-90; for a recent summary, see A. Hatje, “Wirtschaftsverfassung”, in 
A. v. Bogdandy (ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht., op. cit. (note 12), , 683 ff. – Va-
luable reconstructions in English include W. Sauter, Competition Law and Industrial 
Policy in the EU, Oxford 1997, 26 ff.; D.J. Gerber, “Constitutionalizing the Economy: 
German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the ‘New’ Europe”, American Journal of 
Comparative Law 42 (1994), 25 ff. – “But how does all that relate to the real World?”, 
Damian Chalmers (London) commented: “One point I have always thought is that 
France, Belgium, Italy were unconcerned by Ordo-liberalism, because of Article 86 (ex 
Article 90 EC) which they saw as a derogation from its structures (particularly the se-
ocnd paragraph) for all their public sector. Of course, that interpretation was shattered 
by Höfner, but a plausible interpretation of the first 15 years of integration was that it 
did follow the French model. None of the Treaty provisions were directly effective. 
Agriculture, external commercial policy, transport, coal and steel – huge parts of the tra-
ding regimes of the 6 – all proceeded on legislative harmonisation. It was only for a pe-
riod from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s, I would argue that an ordo-liberal model– 
with the development of Article 30 EC and Article 86 EC – began to get hegemony. Of 
course, during that period there was only limited harmonisation. Moreover, in the late 
1970s, it was offset by substantial legislation in the labour and environmental law fields. 
My point is that there have been competing visions of the EC Treaty which have swap-
ped predominance at different times”. A good question which can be complemented: if 
Ordo-liberalism is so important, why did hardly anyone outside Germany and hardly any 
political scientist become aware this? [Philip Manow, in the work cited in notes 15 and 
27, is not covering Europe; but, see recently, Ph. Manow, A. Schäfer and H. Zorn, “Eu-
ropean Social Policy and Europe’s Center of Gravity, 1957-2003”, Cologne 2004; see, 
also, Ph. Genschel, “Markt und Staat in Europa”, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 39 
(1998), 55 ff.]. The easy answer would be: so few people read German. A more complex 
answer is: political scientists do not take normative theories seriously enough. Ordo-
liberalism itself, however, was always unimpressed by such benign neglect. After all, in 
Germany’s advisory boards and institutions, lawyers and economists rank higher than 
political scientists. What is true for German economists working and advising in the 
ordo-liberal tradition is, of course, not true for economists in general. Important books 
such as that of M. Motta, CompetitionPolicy. Theory and Practice, Cambridge 2004, 
make no mention of the first or second or third generation of Ordo-liberals, nor of the 
legal or of the economic proponents.  
43  Ever since “Markt ohne Staat” [The Market without the State? The ‘Economic Constitu-
tion’ of the European Community and the Rebirth of Regulatory Politics, European 
Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 1 (1997) No 19; 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-019a.htm]. 
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and a blind eye could be (had to be!) turned to the original sin of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The fact that Europe had started its integrationist path as a 
mere economic community lent plausibility to ordo-liberal arguments – and even 
required them: in the ordo-liberal account, the Community acquired a legitimacy of 
its own by interpreting its pertinent provisions as prescribing a law-based order 
committed to guaranteeing economic freedoms and protecting competition by sup-
ranational institutions. This legitimacy was independent of the state’s democratic 
constitutional institutions. By the same token, it imposed limits upon the Commu-
nity: discretionary economic policies seemed illegitimate and unlawful.44 
Thus, the prospects for institutionalizing an ordo-liberal style economic 
constitution looked bright. But what about Germany’s social market economy? In 
one of his recent pertinent analyses, F.W. Scharpf hypothesises about “the road not 
taken” back in 1950s. “Where would we now be”, he asks, “if, in the 1956 negoti-
ations leading to the Treaties of Rome and the creation of the EEC, the French (So-
cialist) Prime Minister Guy Mollet had had his way? Mollet, supported by French 
industry, had tried to make the harmonization of social regulations and fiscal bur-
dens a precondition for the integration of industrial markets. Could attempts to 
harmonize social policies have succeeded or would they have blocked European 
integration altogether?”45 An interesting question, but, as Scharpf himself adds, an 
unanswerable one. 
We can only know what was actually accomplished, namely, the “decoupling” 
of the social dimension from the institutionalization of the Europeanized “system 
of undistorted competition”. This was quite to the liking of the Ordo-liberals. In 
their view, the European level of governance could not, and, indeed, should not, be 
burdened with political tasks that required the legitimation provided by the institu-
tions of constitutional democracies. Regardless of one’s affinity for the argument, 
it is coherent and compatible with the institutional order of the European Economic 
Community as it was originally conceived.46 The ordo-liberal European polity has 
                                                          
44 Significant, here, is A. Müller-Armack, “Die Wirtschaftsordnung des Gemeinsamen 
Marktes”, in Wirtschaftsordnung und Wirtschaftspolitik, Freiburg i.Br. 1966, 401 ff. For 
a topical restatement, see J. Drexl, “Wettbewerbsverfassung”, in A. v. Bogdandy, op. cit. 
(note 12), 747-802. 
45  F.W. Scharpf, “The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2002), 645-670, at 645 ff.; see, also, Ph. 
Manow, A. Schäfer and H. Zorn, “European Social Policy and Europe’s Centre of Gra-
vity, 1957-2003” (note 42), 16 ff., and their reference to A. Milward, The European 
Rescue (note 41), 213 ff. 
46 E.-J. Mestmäcker is the uncontested and outstanding intellectual head of the ordo-liberal 
tradition. He has recently published his most important essays on the constitutionaliza-
tion of the economy in the EU Wirtschaft und Verfassung in der Europäischen Union. 
Beiträge zu Recht, Theorie und Politik der europäischen Integration, Baden-Baden 
2003. The time span ranges from 1965 to 2001. All the stages of the integration process 
are considered and all grand issues discussed. Less impressive in terms of theoretical 
grounding, however, is the new edition of his Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht, Munich 
32 Christian Joerges 
a twofold structure: at supranational level, it is committed to economic rationality 
and a system of undistorted competition. At national level, re-distributive (social) 
policies may be pursued and developed further. 
To summarize: Europe was constituted as a dual polity. Its “economic constitu-
tion” was un-political in the sense that it was not subject to political interventions. 
This was its constitutional-supranational raison d’être. Social policy was treated as 
a categorically distinct subject. It was a/the? domain of political legislation and, 
thus, had to remain national. The social embeddedness of the market could, and 
should, be accomplished by the Member States in differentiated ways – and, for a 
decade or so, the balance seemed stable. 47 
 
 
3. The Ambivalences of the post-1985 Developments 
The Delors Commission’s “White Paper on Completion of the Internal Market” of 
198548 is widely, and with good reason, perceived as a turning point and break-
through. After years of stagnation, the integration project developed a new dy-
namic – thanks to the well-chosen focus of all political energies. The evaluations of 
the Commission’s initiative and of the processes it triggered are, of course, contro-
versial. The protagonists of a European “economic constitution” responded very 
positively at first (1). However, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which was to trans-
form the Community into an “ever closer Union”, met with strong critique pre-
cisely because of the broadening of the European ambitions (2). Monetary Union, 
as agreed upon in Maastricht and then interpreted affirmatively by the German 
Constitutional Court, opened up yet another page (3).  
 
3.1 “Invasions of the Market”? 
The Commission’s Internal Market initiative could be interpreted as an effort to 
strengthen and prioritize the institutionalization of economic rationality in the inte-
gration project.49 This interpretation was, of course, shared and promoted by 
observers committed to the ordo-liberal tradition. The reasons were explained in 
                                                                                                                                      
1974: E.-J. Mestmacker and H. Schweitzer, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht, 2nd ed., 
Munich 2004. 
47  It may be worth noting that the whole construct has structural affinities, or is at least 
compatible with, J.H.H. Weiler’s analysis of the co-existence of, and interdependence 
between, legal supranationalism and political intergovernmentalism in the EEC (see note 
41 above) and pathbreaking “The Community system: the dual character of supranatio-
nalism”, Yearbook of European Law 1 (1981), 257 ff.  
48  Commission of the EC, “Commission White Paper to the European Council on Comple-
tion of the Internal Market”, COM(85) 310 final of 14 June 1985. 
49  Ch. Joerges, “Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty” (note 6), 37 
ff. 
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pertinent publications of ordo-liberal strongholds, such as the Advisory Board of 
the German Ministry of the Economics50 and the Monopolies Commission.51  
The White Paper had presented its rejection of traditional harmonization poli-
cies as a consequence of the – at the time already legendary – Cassis de Dijon 
judgment,52 and the new emphasis on the principle of mutual recognition. In 
conjunction with the strengthening of the four freedoms, this legal background 
could be interpreted as providing a framework which would further processes of 
regulatory competition and hence expose national legislation to economic rationa-
lity tests. The ECJ’s readiness to supervise national legislation under Article 30 
(now 28) was complemented by new developments in competition law and policy. 
The attention shifted from market failures to regulatory failures, from the control 
of the anti-competitive practices of private actors to anti-competitive regulation 
and state aid. And from such premises, the plea for de-regulation and privatization 
followed with a compelling logic.  
How did this re-orientation fit into the ordo-liberal economic constitution? It 
did not fit into it at all. But traditional Ordo-liberalism had already been thoroughly 
revised by its leading exponents in the late 60s. Their theoretical allegiance shifted 
from Walter Eucken to Friedrich A. von Hayek. The latter’s “Wettbewerb als Ent-
deckungsverfahren”53 became the new manifesto and credo of a new generation of 
scholars working in the ordo-liberal tradition.54 The legal and policy implications 
of the revised theoretical framework were spelled out in great detail, first at natio-
nal, but soon also at European level. However, these implications cannot be dealt 
with here. The second generation is, at any rate, in one important sense, faithful to 
the ordo-liberal tradition. The framework within which the integration project is 
supposed to develop further is un-political in that it is not subjected to political 
debate or deliberation. This framework again seeks to institutionalize economic 
liberties and economic rationality. It does so more flexibly, but also more compre-
                                                          
50  Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Stellungnahme zum 
Weißbuch der EG-Kommission über den Binnenmarkt (Schriften-Reihe 51), Bonn 1986. 
51  Monopolkommission, “Achtes Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission 1988/1989”, 
BT.-Drucksache 11/7582 of 16. July 1990, 401  
52  Case 120/78, ECR [1979] 649 - Cassis de Dijon. 
53  (Competition as discovery procedure) Kiel 1968, reprinted in F.A. von Hayek, Freibur-
ger Studien. Gesammelte Aufsätze, Tübingen 1969, 249-265. 
54  The leading economist of the Freiburg school in that period was Erich Hoppmann. The 
most important and fascinating among the many lawyers is Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, 
a disciple of Franz Böhm (see notes 17, 48); also noteworthy in the present context is his 
submission to the European Convention: see the “Report to the European Convention on 
Economic Liberties”, submitted by E.-J. Mestmäcker on 29 October 2002, which is 
available on the Convention Website (but did apparently not come to the attention of the 
Working Group VI on Economic Governance/Ordnungspolitik; see Section V.1 below).  
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hensively than was originally envisaged by the ordo-liberal school. It therefore 
deserves to be called an “economic constitution”.55  
The hopes that leading exponents of the school articulated corresponded to the 
expectations that many critics had retained of the new orientation of the integration 
project. This schism between proponents and opponents forms part of a wider de-
bate concerning the benefits and the costs of market governance.56 This debate is, 
of course, relevant for an assessment of the 1992 project. But it is not “directly 
applicable”, simply because the implementation of this project disappointed the 
hopes of its proponents as much as it did not confirm the anxieties of its critics. 
What had started out as a collective effort to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness 
and accomplish this objective through new (de-regulatory) strategies soon led to 
the entanglement of the EU in ever more policy fields and the development of ever 
more sophisticated regulatory machinery.57 It was, in particular, the concern of the 
European legislation and the Commission with “social regulation” (health and sa-
fety of consumers and workers, and environmental protection) which proved to be 
irrefutable. The weight and dynamics of these policy fields had been thoroughly 
underestimated by the proponents of the “economic constitution”.58  
                                                          
55  The turn from Walter Eucken to Friedrich A. von Hayek, and, in particular, the shift of 
emphasis from private to public distortions of competition affects the role of the state 
and state institutions. W.E. Scheuerman argues in a recent essay [Carl Schmitt and 
Friedrich A. Hayek, Constellations 4 (1997), 172 ff.], that the differences are not as 
significant as most observers assume. Indeed, von Hayek shared the ordo-liberal, and, 
for that matter, the Schmittian mistrust in the institutions of pluralist polities and their 
performance. But this convergence in the analysis does not extend to the consequence. 
Both may share the view that welfare interventionism leads into a “qantitatively” strong 
state (see C. Schmitt, note 17 supra). But Hayek certainly did not opt for the “qualitati-
vely” strong state Carl Schmitt welcomed after 1933. This is not what Scheuerman insi-
nuates. He is instead concerned with the chain of events that a radical dismantling of the 
welfare state, and the social and political risks of von Hayek’s “curious institutional 
proposal” in Law, Legislation and Liberty (Scheuerman is referring to vol. 3, Chicago, 
Ill. 1979, 113) entails. 
56  For a recent summary of the “case against the market, see S. Lukes, “Invasions of the 
Market”, in R. Dworkin et al. (eds.), From Liberal Values to Democratic Transition: 
Essays in Honor of János Kis, Budapest-New York 2004, Ch. 4. 
57  For a comprehensive account, see V. Eichener, Entscheidungsprozesse in der regulati-
ven Politik der Europäischen Union, Opladen, 1997. 
58  “Underestimated” is an empirical concept and hence not a sufficient basis for an evalua-
tion of the neo-ordo-liberal agenda. It would also be too simplistic to suggest that eco-
nomic theories might in principle be incapable of addressing and dealing adequately 
with the problems of the “risk society” (cf., K.-H. Ladeur, Negative Freiheitsrechte und 
gesellschaftliche Selbstorganisation, Tübingen 2000, especially at 171 ff.; A. Arcuri, 
“The Case for a Procedural Version of the Precautionary Principle Erring on the Side of 
Environmental Preservation”, in D. Mortimor (ed.) Frontiers on Regulation and Liabi-
lity, Aldershot: Ashgate (forthcoming). What remains true, however, is that the protago-
nists of the “economic constitution” have remained silent and thereby contributed to the 
devaluation of their approach. 
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3.2 Erosions of the Market?  
The praise of the Internal Market Programme was not to last long: the preparation 
and adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, widely perceived as a deepening 
and consolidation of the integration project, met with fierce criticism.59 The rea-
sons are manifold and – within the (neo)-ordo-liberal theoretical framework – are 
comprehensible and conclusive. How can one continue to assign a constitutive 
function to the “system of undistorted competition”, when the promotion of that 
system is only one among many other competing objectives, and its relative weight 
has to be determined in political processes?60 How can one reconcile the commit-
ment to competition as the discovery procedure in economic affairs with the 
acknowledgement of industrial policy as a constitutionally legitimated concern? 
The Maastricht Treaty was the end of the “economic constitution”. From then on-
wards, the ordo-liberal school redefined itself as an oppositional movement.61 This 
is not to say that its adherents would have given up their cause. Quite to the con-
trary. They continued to develop the approach further and to explore all the possi-
bilities of strengthening its (now relative) weight and impact.62 The turn was one 
from self-confident identification with the integration project to a critique of its 
course. 
 
3.3 Rules versus Politics? Monetary Union, the Maastricht Judgment and 
the Stability Pact 
A grand opportunity to promote the ordo-liberal cause seemed to arise in the con-
text of the objections against the Maastricht Treaty, which were brought to the 
Constitutional Court in Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht).63 Their legal fram-
ing was interesting, if not elegant, and fits well into the first set of premises named 
                                                          
59  See W. Mussler, op. cit (note 42), 166 ff.; M. Streit and W. Mussler, “The Economic 
Constitution …” (note 42).; P. Behrens, “Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft”, in G. Brüggemeier, op. cit. (note 41), 73 ff.; W. Mussler, Die Wirt-
schaftsverfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft im Wandel. Von Rom nach Maast-
richt, 1998, 166 ff.; most elegantly, E.-J. Mestmäcker, “On the Legitimacy of European 
Law” (1993), reprinted in idem (note 46), 133 ff. 
60  See Article 2 ad 3 (g) of the Treaty as amended by G (2) and (3) TEU. 
61  See, particularly clearly, M.E. Streit and W. Mussler; P. Behrens (as cited in note 59).  
62  P. Behrens, “Das wirtschaftsverfassungsrechtliche Profil des Konventsentwurfs eines 
Vertrags über eine Verfassung für Europa”, forthcoming in Festschrift Ulrich Immenga 
2004, is somewhat more cautious with the tone of his assessment of the Convention’s 
Draft Constitution than he was with the Maaastricht Treaty (note 61 above). But the gist 
of the argument is the same. The multiplicity of constitutional commitments read in 
conjunction with the consistency postulate of Article III-1 renders the weight of the 
system of undistorted competition indeterminate.  
63  Judgement on the Maastricht Treaty of 12 October 1993, Entscheidungen des Bundes-
verfassungsgerichts 89, 155, [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
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in the Introduction:64 the competences of the European Community, now the Euro-
pean Union, are enumerated and thus limited. They were, nevertheless, consider-
able and entailed, so the plaintiff argued, a disempowerment of the nation state. 
Was such a disempowered state still a democratic constitutional state under its own 
constitution? In its response to this query, the Bundesverfassungsgericht promised 
to defend Germany’s constitutional democracy against the erosion of ever more 
statehood. But the judgment ended up legalising European integration, confirming 
the constitutional legitimacy of ordo-liberal institutional ideas and curtailing the 
control that Member States had over their economies. 
How was this achieved and why did hardly anybody notice it? The essential pa-
radox in the Court’s reasoning is readily apparent. True, the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht called it a constitutional “must” that the German Parliament retained “es-
sential” competencies. But then the Court took an argumentative turn which was, 
in its substance, strictly ordo-liberal: economic integration was qualified as a non-
political phenomenon occurring autonomously outside the Member States. All 
Monetary Union needed was a functional legitimacy based upon the institutionally 
guarantied commitment to price stability and provisions against excessive fiscal 
deficits. With such an institutional design, the Court concluded, economic integra-
tion would not be exposed to further questioning of its democratic legitimacy. To 
put it slightly differently: Europe could remain a “market without a state” while its 
sub-units, once called the “Masters of the Treaties” (Herren der Verträge) would be 
downgraded to “states without markets”.65 
This reading is obviously inspired by the interpretative framework used in this 
essay. Outside Germany (and also inside Germany in the public law factions of 
European scholarship), the paradoxical side of the Court’s argument went unnoti-
ced. Instead, the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s defence of nation state democracies 
was blamed as echoing Schmittian ideas.66 Even if this were so, the point underli-
ned here seems more critical. The Court’s reasoning implied that Germany was, as 
a matter of its constitutional law, barred from joining the monetary union, unless 
all of Europe subscribed to Germany’s monetary philosophy.  
                                                          
64  Text accompanying notes 2 ff.  
65 Ch. Joerges, “States without a Market. Comments on the German Constitutional Court's 
Maastricht-Judgment and a Plea for Interdisciplinary Discourses”, NISER Working-Pa-
per, Utrecht, 1996, also at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-020.htm. Clearly, one has to 
ask how serious the Court wanted to be taken when imposing these restraints. “Not too 
literally” is the answer one can infer from the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s response to 
the subsequent complaint against the entry into the third pase of Monetary Union: The 
competent political institutions can rely on a prerogative in the assessment of the eco-
nomic and monetary situation. See Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 97, 
350 – Euro. 
66 See J.H.H. Weiler, “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos 
and the German Maastricht Decision” in European Law Journal 1 (1995), 219 ff. (also 
in O. Due, M. Lutter and J. Schwarze, Festschrift für Ulrich Everling, Vol. 2, Baden-
Baden 1995, 1651 ff.). 
  What is Left of the European Economic Constitution? 37 
There is little reason to be proud of the imposition of ordo-liberal concepts on 
the rest of Europe. There is much more reason to believe that this was only, and at 
best, a pyrrhic victory. In terms of economic policy and political democracy, the 
most problematical aspect of the 1992 amendments concern fiscal policy. They 
seek to ensure a budgetary reasonableness/rationale? not through a political process 
but through “juridification”, namely, the rules laid down in Article 104 and in the 
Protocol “On the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Monitoring of these provisi-
ons by the European Commission”. The replacement of fiscal policy with pre-
fabricated, albeit, in many respects, indeterminate rules, mirrors the precarious 
political legitimacy of the whole construct. Fiscal policy is economic policy. And if 
it is nevertheless political, some actors, identifiable to the citizen, should be ac-
countable for it. Framework rules and their “implementation” through the Euro-
pean Commission constitute the typical pattern. Wherever Europe needs to orga-
nize a policy field in which the legal powers and/or administrative resources at the 
European level of governance are insufficient, it will (have to) resort to such tech-
niques. 
This indicates that the Member States are neither able and nor willing to 
comply with an institutional compromise, which was born out of the need to find a 
non-political supranational answer to a policy area which was once a core area of 
national sovereignty and parliamentary control. Not only Germany, once the self-
confident promoter of rule-bound stability, but also France, the Netherlands, and 
six out of the new Member States are exceeding the 3% deficit limit. Could it be 
that the assumptions on which these rules of the Stability Pact builds, are shaky? 
Barry Eichengreen, an American observer of Europe’s monetary policy during the 
negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty,67 holds such an opinion. One of the mild 
formulae he uses is that the 3% “numerical threshold is not well grounded in the-
ory”.68 At times, his language is stronger.69 However, he is just one economist 
among many. What is uncontroversial, however, is the “fact” that there is contro-
versy about the reasonableness/rationale? of the rules that the Member States have 
signed. 
Lawyers are not supposed to examine the reasons, but are supposed to obey 
authorities, Immanuel Kant once remarked somewhat sarcastically.70 In a field so 
strongly infiltrated by non-legal expert knowledge and so difficult to programme in 
advance by sound and stable criteria, there are other reasons for being cautious 
                                                          
67  See his “Should the Maastricht Treaty be Saved?” (Princeton studies in international 
finance no. 74), Princeton, NJ 1992. 
68  In his Working Paper PEIF-6 on “Institutions for Fiscal Stability”, which he prepared 
for the Munich Economic Summit of 2-3 May, 2003. 
69  A harsher one: the “3 percent ceiling is at best silly and at worst perverse” – which he 
wrote in a contribution to DIE ZEIT of 20 November 2003. 
70  Immanuel Kant, “The Contest of Faculties”, in Kant: Political Writings (Hans Reiss, ed., 
2nd ed. 1991). 
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about taking decisions qua law.71 Would institutional actors be well advised not to 
search for legal answers? 
That is a question which the ECJ had to deal with in a recent judgment.72 On 27 
January 2004, the European Commission had brought an action against the Council 
of the EU before the ECJ.73 The Commission asked the Court to declare inter alia 
that the (economic and financial affairs) Council’s refusal, in its “conclusions” of 
25 November 2003, “to adopt the formal instruments contained in the Commis-
sion’s recommendations pursuant to Article 104(8) and (9) EC … are unlawful and 
should be annulled”. The Commission had initiated an excessive deficit procedure 
in relation to Germany in November 2002, and the Council had confirmed, by a 
decision of 21 January 2003, that an excessive deficit existed. An excessive deficit 
procedure had also been initiated in relation to France in April 2003 and the 
existence of an excessive deficit been confirmed by the Council on 3 June 2003. 
The Commission then recommended the Council on 8 October “to establish that 
the French Republic had undertaken no effective action”, and on 21 October “to 
decide, under Article 104(9) EC, to give notice to the French Republic to take mea-
sures to reduce its deficit”;74 Germany was treated likewise.75 The Council took a 
vote on the requests without achieving the majority required in Article 104(13). It 
also took votes on the Commission’s recommendations under Article 104(9) EC. In 
its conclusions, the Council explained that it had “decided not to act, at this point 
in time, on the basis of the Commission Recommendation for a Council decision 
under Article 104(9)” and “agreed” to hold the Excessive Deficit Procedure “in 
abeyance for the time being”.76  
What could one expect the ECJ to do? Go by the books? To be cautious with 
powerful Member States?77 The ECJ did not indicate what it thought about the 
controversy on the soundness of the Stability Pact. Instead, it underlined the high 
                                                          
71  M.J. Herdegen, “Price Stability and Budgetary Restraints in the Economic and Monetary 
Union: The Law as Guardian of Economic Wisdom”, Common Market Law Review 35 
(1968), 9 ff. 
72  On the following cf. R. Streinz, Ch. Ohler and Ch. Herrmann, “Todgesagte leben länger 
– oder doch nicht? Der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt nach dem Beschluß des Rates 
vom 25. 11. 2003 über das Ruhen des Defizitverfahrens gegen Frankreich und Deutsch-
land”, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 57 (2004), 1553 ff. and the reconstruction of the 
events in para.s 7 ff. of the ECJ Judgment (Full Court) of 13 July 2004 in Case C-27/04 
- Commission v. Council (nyr). 
73  Case C-27/04; cf., OJ C 354 of 7 February 2004. 
74  Case C-27/04, paras. 9-10.  
75  Case C-27/04, paras. 11-12. 
76  Case C-27/04, para. 20. 
77  Cf., the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s cautious, if not evasive, response to the “four 
professors” asking it to examine the legality of the Community’s allegedly much too lax 
application of the Maastricht convergence criteria (see Entscheidungen des Bundesver-
fassungsgerichts 97, 350 and note 65 supra). 
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importance that all institutional actors had attached to it.78 It observed that it was 
simply not legally foreseen in the pertinent provisions to hold procedures “in abey-
ance” and concluded that “the Council’s conclusions adopted in respect of the 
French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany respectively must … be 
annulled in so far as they contain a decision to hold the excessive deficit procedure 
in abeyance and a decision modifying the recommendations previously adopted by 
the Council under Article 104(7) EC”.79 It also underlined, however, that the Coun-
cil has “a discretion” and that “it may, in particular on the basis of a different as-
sessment of the relevant economic data, of the measures to be taken and of the ti-
metable to be met by the Member State concerned, modify the measure recom-
mended by the Commission…”80 Hence, the Commission’s “action is inadmissible 
in so far as it seeks annulment of the Council’s failure to adopt the formal instru-
ments contained in the Commission’s recommendations pursuant to Article 104(8) 
and (9) EC”.81  
Could the Court have done more? Should it have indicated that the restraints 
that the Stability Pact imposes on democratically legitimized governments should 
be reconsidered in the light of Europe’s current efforts to address its democracy 
deficit? It is worth noting that the ECJ exercised more prudence than most of the 
commentators on the Draft Constitutional Treaty, who simply defended the views 
which the Maastricht rules had incorporated, and warned against any softening of 
that discipline. Thus, Paul Kirchhof, co-author of the Maastricht judgment,82 won-
ders whether the expectation, expressed in Article I-29(2), that the Central Bank 
should support general economic policies in the Union, might weaken its dedica-
tion to the price stability objective.83 Peter Behrens, in his careful textual analysis, 
appreciates that the pertinent provisions have not significantly changed.84 The wi-
dely articulated85 concern about the wording of Article 1-3(3) in the Draft Treaty 
found its resonance: after the amendment by the Intergovernmental Conference of 
June 2004, “price stability” is now named among the objectives to which that pro-
vision assigns constitutional dignity. Can we sleep well again? “The stability pact 
is dead and gone”,86 argued Barry Eichengreen at the beginning of the controversy. 
Compliance with it would further damage the German economy, in particular. This 
would not be in the European interest. Who knows that? Maybe, we lawyers 
should not take responsibility for decision-making in which we risk discrediting 
                                                          
78  Case C-27/04, paras. 67 ff. 
79  Case C-27/04, para 97. 
80  Case 27/04, para 80. 
81  Case 27/04, para 36 
82  Supra note 63. 
83  P. Kirchhof, “Europa auf dem Weg zu einer Verfassung?”, Zeitschrift für Staats- und 
Europawissenschaften 2003, 358 ff. at 379. 
84  Supra note 62 (in Section V.4). 
85  Most prominently by the ECB: Opinion of the European Central Bank of 19 September 
2003 on the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (CON/2003/20), para. 8. 
86  Hence the title of his contribution in DIE ZEIT (note 69). 
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the law.87 The constitutional risk inherent in a misconceived “juridification” of 
monetary and fiscal policy responsibilities is to create a vacuum in which political 
actors cannot be held accountable and the very idea of law-mediated legitimacy 
gets destroyed.88 The sad concluding message is that the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Maastricht judgment were a pyrrhic victory for a twofold reason: (1) Maastricht 
confirmed the decoupling of the social from the economic constitution thereby 
deepening Europe’s social deficit. (2) Rather than establishing the supremacy of 
law over monetary and fiscal policy, Maastricht has “de-juridified” the economic 
constitution – and now it seems that the effort to cure the social deficit has run into 
the same trap.  
 
 
4. Are we About to Bring the Law to Trial? Some Queries with 
the Open Method of Co-ordination 
What, then, is left of the European Economic Constitution and what is Left of it? If 
we think about the “l” in small letters, we might conclude: not very much! An ab-
stract normative idea losing ground in conceptual debates and in European political 
arenas. But when we take a capital letter “L”, a widespread reaction is that there 
are prospects for a new mode of governance which seems tailored to overcome 
Europe’s social deficit, namely, the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC).  
 
4.1 The Career of the Concept 
Like everything else in this world, the OMC has its precursors.89 But it is cum 
grano salis safe to take the Lisbon Council of 2000 as the birthday of the OMC.90 
This Council was primarily dedicated to knowledge society issues and to setting 
very ambitious goals for Europe in pertinent industries. However, it also renewed 
                                                          
87  See M.J. Herdegen, op. cit. (note 73). 
88  See F. Snyder, “EMU Revisited: Are we Making a Constitution? What Constitution are 
we Making?”, EUI Working Paper Law 98/6 (abbreviated version in P. Craig/G. de 
Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford 1999, 417 ff.); M. Everson, “The 
Constitutional Law of the Euro? Disciplining European Governance”, in P. Beaumont 
and N. Walker (eds.), Legal Fframework of the Single European Currency, Oxford 
1999, 119 ff.  
89  One could name here the co-ordination of economic policies under Article 99. The 
Stability Pact is of another quality, however, because it restricts the ways leading to 
sustainable budgetary policies quite strictly. Much more important, however, is the more 
general “turn to governance” in the EU (cf. extensively Ch. Joerges, “The Law in the 
Process of Constitutionalising Europe”, EUI Working Paper Law 4/2002 and Ch Joerges 
and M. Everson, “Law, economics and politics in the constitutionalization of Europe”, 
in E.O. Eriksen, J.E. Fossum and A.J. Menéndez, Developing a Constitution for Europe, 
London-New York 2004, 162 ff., 173 ff. 
90  Http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/mar2000/index.htm.  
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the agenda of “social Europe” and tried to turn what, until then, had been perceived 
as a deficit, namely, the lack of genuine European competences and the unavail-
ability of the traditional “Community method”, into a virtue. The OMC, so Jona-
than Zeitlin argues, promises to be:  
“an attractive model of how a non-coercive form of policy co-
ordination emphasizing mutual learning and exchange of good practi-
ces could be applied to a politically sensitive field such as social pro-
tection which is characterized by wide institutional variations across 
EU Member States, where harmonization is considered by many to be 
neither practicable nor desirable”.91 
A European Employment Strategy was the first objective. Employment is a 
pressing problem in so many European states. At the European level of gover-
nance, it cannot be directly addressed with the means that the Union has at its 
disposal. But it can be discussed, non-binding objectives substantiated, and guide-
lines offered. These recommendations can then be adapted in the Member States to 
their specific contexts. This type of implementation cannot be subjected to the 
controls through which the Community seeks to ensure compliance with its legis-
lative frameworks and policies. But the activities at Member State level can be 
“benchmarked” and evaluated. The accompanying hope is that this will open chan-
ces for mutual learning and better performance.92 
The OMC approach has since been applied to other areas, such as social inclu-
sion and pensions. It has even become something like a Leitbild on the political 
Left.93 It has also attracted much attention in the Convention Process. The final 
report of Working Group VI on “Economic Governance” stated: “The Working 
Group considers that the Open Method of Co-ordination has proved to be a useful 
instrument in policy areas where no stronger co-ordination instrument exists.”94 
                                                          
91 J. Zeitlin, “Comments on Jacobsson and Vifell, Employment Policy Co-ordination: Bet-
ween Deliberation and Discipline?”, Ms. Madison,WI 2004. 
92  As was underlined on the Lisbon summit, the OMC procedure is “a fully decentralised 
approach” which can be applied “in line with the principle of subsidiarity”; the Union, 
the Member States, the regional and local levels, as well as the social partners and civil 
society can and should be actively involved, using variable forms of partnership’. Presi-
dency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, March 23-24, 2000 
(http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/mar2000/index.htm).  
93  Most prominently: Maria João Rodrigues, Professor at the University of Lisbon and 
Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, Coordinator of the Lisbon Council (see her edited 
The New Knowledge Economy in Europe, Cheltenham 2002), and Frank Vandenbrou-
cke, Minister for Employment and Pensions in the Belgian Federal Government; cf., his 
lecture on “Promoting active welfare states in the EU” at the University Of Wisconsin, 
Madison of 30 October 2003 (on file with author); see, also, his “Foreword”, in G. 
Esping-Andersen et al. (eds.), Why We Need a New Welfare State, Oxford 2003, viii-
xxiv. 
94  CONV 516/1/03 Working Group XI on Social Europe: 18, 19; cf., “Tomorrow Europe”, 
July 2003, no. 17, at 3: “Those opposed to including such a reference had advanced 
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Such positive evaluations were shared by other Working Groups. The quest for 
“constitutionalization” through the Constitutional Treaty was but a logical step.95 
There has never been unanimity, however, in the evaluation of the OMC within 
the Convention or elsewhere. Milena Büchs,96 in a comprehensive and particularly 
thoughtful analysis of pertinent debates, distinguishes between three types of is-
sues: (1) one concerns the efficacy of the OMC. What made Working Group VI 
believe that the OMC had proved to be a useful instrument? (2) Such primarily 
empirical enquiries are complemented by analyses of the relations between the 
political structures of the EU, the dilemmas of European social policy and the 
search for explanations of why the OMC may overcome, or fail to overcome, these 
impasses. (3) The third debate concerns the legitimacy of the OMC in both senses 
of this term: will the OMC find acceptance, e.g., because of the beneficial outcome 
it generates for the majority of Europeans? Do the OMC practices deserve re-
cognition because they strengthen democracy and enhance  the normative quality 
of EU governance?  
 
                                                                                                                                      
three sets of arguments: the fear of incorporating an intergovernmental method liable to 
compromise the definition of hard-won competences; a lack of transparency and democ-
ratic control; but also a lack of legitimacy owing to the involvement of a large number 
of experts in the process”.  
95  See G. de Búrca and J. Zeitlin, “Constitutionalizing the Open Method of Co-ordination. 
A Note for the Convention”, Florence-Madison, WI 2002; Ch.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, 
“Networked Governance and Pragmatic Constitutionalism: The New Transformation of 
Europe”, New York-Madison,WI 2003. See http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/index.htm . 
96  Dilemmas of post-regulatory European social policy co-ordination. The European 
Enployment strategy in Germany and the United Kingdom”, Berlin 2004 – Are the 
Germans taking a Sonderweg in the assessment of the OMC?  
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4.2 Output Legitimacy?97  
Uncertainty about the effects of the OMC is unsurprising and statements which 
present it as something like a Wunderwaffe that will win the battle against 
Europe’s social model are not to taken literally. David M. Trubek, however, one of 
the Method’s most eloquent exponents, stresses that we should understand the 
emergence of the OMC as a potentially workable response to the dilemmas of na-
tional welfare state politics, and design our research agendas accordingly. We 
should analyse its potential to “re-calibrate” social policies in a more flexible, par-
ticipatory, experimental mode and to accomplish this objective as a multi-level 
governance system.98 The OMC, we read in a recent paper, will “create transna-
tional expertise networks that: transmit new ways of thinking about social policy 
across borders; broaden participation in such transnational policy networks to en-
sure legitimacy and effectiveness; merge technical insight with practical knowl-
edge and new normative visions; combine a problem-solving technical approach 
with participatory deliberation; facilitate lower level experiments; produce learning 
through decentralized experimentation, wide-spread bench-marking, exchange of 
best practices, and peer review; bring various policy worlds together; foster public-
private co-operation; and avoid a race to the bottom via multi-lateral surveillance 
                                                          
97  The distinction between output and input legitimacy is as widely used as it is problema-
tic (see B. Peters, “Public Discourse, Identity, and the Problem of Democratic Legiti-
macy”, in E.O. Eriksen (ed.), Making the Euro-Polity. Reflexive Integration in Europe. 
London (forthcoming). The use in the text refers to distinctions between objections 
against the efficacy of the method and its recognition as a legitimate alternative to law-
bound governance. For a strong critique of output-oriented defences of the OMC cf. A. 
Schäfer, Zwischen internationalen Zielen und nationaler Politik: wirtschaftspolitische 
Koordinierung in der Europäischen Union, der OECD und dem internationalen Wäh-
rungsfonds, Frankfurt a.M.(forthcoming). He insists that we should first seek to explain 
why and in which institutional and political context OMC was adopted and argues that 
the softness of the Method reflects the divergence of national views and strategies as 
well as the unwillingness to commit national systems to policy changes. In his analysis, 
OMC complements the turn from Keynesianism to Monetarism as institutionalized in 
the harder Monetary Union and the Stability Pact, it thus confirms the old schism bet-
ween the welfare state(s) and economic integration.  
98  D.M Trubek and J. Mosher, “New Governance, EU Employment Policy, and the Euro-
pean Social Model”, in Ch. Joerges, Y. Mény and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), Mountain or 
Molehill?, Symposium on the Commission White Paper on Governance, New York Uni-
versity School of Law 2001, accessible at www.iue.it/RSC/e-texts/WPgovernance.pdf/ 
[also in J. Zeitlin and D. Trubek (eds), Governing Work and Welfare in a New economy: 
American and European Experiences, Oxford 2003, 51 ff.]; D.M. Trubek and L. Trubek, 
“Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method 
of Co-ordination”, Center for World Affairs and the Global Economy, European Union 
Center and Law School, University of Wisconsin-Madison 2004.  
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and shaming”, adding , however, that such claims must be “subjected to rigorous 
testing”.99  
 
4.3 Normative Queries 
It is difficult not to agree with such an understanding of the OMC. And yet, we 
must consider the risks that we run once this machinery is set in motion. This is, in 
particular, Claus Offe’s disquieting objection:100 The OMC has effects, but not the 
promised ones. It will instead destroy the non-Anglo-Saxon modes of welfarism in 
Europe. How should the Law know? But it is by no means exceptional for lawyers 
and law to be confronted with contests over issues they do not understand and with 
uncertainties over the implications of their decisions. They should, therefore, un-
derstand their task of designing responses to such difficulties. The OMC is an in-
stitution designed to find, not to implement, solutions. Is it a good design? 
 
4.3.1 Democratic Experimentalism? 
The theoretical background on which the advocates of the OMC rely has been de-
veloped outside European frameworks.101 The have then be tried out in American 
administrative law,102 before they were presented in Europe103 and the merger with 
OMC occurred.104  
                                                          
99  Not so rigorous but with some reserves: B. Bercusson, “Social Rights in the European 
Constitution”, Ms. London 2004: “It remains to be seen whether the OMC, hitherto cri-
ticised as to its effectiveness when implemented by Member States’ administrations in 
the field of employment policy, is appropriate for the Work Programme of the Social 
Partners on Employment. If joint opinions and other non-regulatory instruments conti-
nue to be ineffective, their failure may imply other, more rigorous steps towards effecti-
veness, including regulatory agreements and/or legislation” (at 21).  
100  Note 7; similarly, D Chalmers and M. Lodge, The Open Method of Co-ordination and 
the European Welfare State ESCR Discussion Paper 11, London (LSE) 2003.  
101  Cf., the reconstruction by W.E. Scheuerman, “Democratic Experimentalism or Capita-
list Synchronization? Critical Reflections on Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy”, Cana-
dian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 17 (2004), 101-127, 108 ff.; cf. earlier Ch.F. 
Sabel, “Bootstrapping Reform: Rebuilding Firms, the Welfare State, and Unions” Pol. & 
Soc. 23 (1995), 5 ff.; J. Cohen and Ch.F. Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and 
US”, in J. Zeitlin and D.M. Trubek (eds.), Governing Work and Welfare in a New Eco-
nomy: European and American Experiments, Oxford 2003, 345-375.  
102  M.C. Dorf and Ch.F. Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism”, Colum. 
L. Rev. 98 (1998)267 ff.  
103  J. Cohen and Ch.F. Sabel, “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy”, European Law Journal 3 
(1997), 313 ff. 
104  Cf., J. Scott and D.M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance 
in the European Union, European Law Journal 8 (2002), 1-18O. Gerstenberg and Ch.F. 
Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, An Institutional Ideal for Europe?, in Ch. 
Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market, 
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It is important to remember that the whole approach of democratic experimen-
talism received its inspirations from a societal sphere, which European constitutio-
nalism tends to treat with (un)benign neglect, namely, the organizational practices 
of private business. In a daring and fascinating move,105 Charles Sabel and his 
followers have applied the lessons to be learnt from the Japanese variety of capita-
lism about their practices of benchmarking, the need to adapt to incessant 
change,106 the commitment to permanent experimentation, an interest and a readi-
ness in mutual learning from independent monitoring, the establishment of systems 
of measurement and evaluation, etc., to administrative bodies, and argued that their 
regulatory practices should follow these examples from economy and society. De-
mocratic experimentalists promise that “a successful institutionalization of the 
principles of benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and independent monito-
ring allows us to tackle volatility and diversity best” – not just within firms.107  
At first sight, this message might look like a strange loop which begins in the 
public sphere, then goes into the private realm, and then brings messages from 
there to its point of departure. Have we not all been taught to use all sorts of legal 
instruments – company law, antitrust, and economic regulation – to tame private 
enterprise? Why is there such a widely felt need to extend the reach of fundamental 
rights into the private sphere if private governance develops superior qualities, 
anyway? Are all the quests for a constitutionalization of the sub-constitutional 
spheres of the legal system and the search for a “societal constitutionalism” su-
perfluous.108 In an ironic sense, democratic experimentalism can be called a metho-
dological heir to first generation Ordo-liberalism. It invokes qualities inherent in 
the economic sphere as a yardstick that public governance should respect and in-
ternalize; and the affinities with the Hayekian discovery procedure may seem even 
stronger because von Hayek has substituted the strong state of the ordo-liberals by 
the smoother governance of general legal rules.109 These affinities are, however, 
                                                                                                                                      
Oxford 2002, 289-341; J. Zeitlin and D.M. Trubek (eds.), Governing Work and Welfare 
in a New Economy: European and American Experiments, Oxford-New York 2003. 
105  See, in particular, Ch.F. Sabel, “Learning By Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic 
Development” in N. Smelser and R. Swedberg (eds.), The Handbook of Economic Soci-
ology, Princeton, NJ 1994, 137 ff. 
106  “High-speed capitalism” is the category Scheuerman uses referring to David Harvey, 
Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, Oxford 1996) when explaining his 
own analytical basis and normative perspectives; see, also, W.E. Scheuerman, “Refle-
xive Law and the Challenges of Globalization”, J. Pol. Phil. 9 (2001), 81 ff.  
107  W.E. Scheuerman (note 105), at 111. See O. Gerstenberg, “Law's Polyarchy: A Com-
ment on Cohen and Sabel” European Law Journal 3 (1997), 343 ff.; also, R. Schmalz-
Bruns, “Deliberativer Supranationalismus. Demokratisches Regieren jenseits des Natio-
nalstaats” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 6 (1999), 185 ff., at 236-38. 
108  On this notion, see note 6 supra. 
109 See, for a systematic analysis, H.-G. Graf, “Muster-Voraussagen “und Erklärungen des 
Prinzips” bei F.A. von Hayek, Tübingen 1978; M. Amstutz, Evolutorisches Wirtschafts-
recht, Baden-Baden 2001, 30 ff., 219 ff.; Ch. Mantzavinos, “Das institutionenökono-
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very limited. Whereas Ordo-liberalism sought to protect the ordo of the economy 
through a strong state which would rigorously enforce laws against restrictive bu-
siness practices and abuse of private power, democratic experimentalism is relying 
on political processes, softer modes of co-ordination and the subtle power of 
transparency and exposure to public critique. And, in contrast to the Hayekian dis-
covery process, the proposals to “institutionalize” democratic experimentalism 
invoke the imagination not just of entrepreneurs and market participants but also of 
deliberating political citizens, and trust in their readiness to engage in problem-
solving and in their interest to learn from one another. 
“Sweet melodies”, to be sure. The question, however, of whether we should 
listen to them and trust “a law so ‘soft’ to be no law at all”?110 This soft supranatio-
nal power may not be so innocent, opines Alexander Somek. The “new modes of 
governance”, he observes, “are marked by two characteristics: first, they are infor-
mal in that they are based on information-gathering, the drawing up of ‘action-
plans’, the allocation of public praise for ‘best practice’ and the shaming of under-
achievers; second, even though they have been designed for special policy areas, 
they are nonetheless ‘holistic’, which means, in the words of the European Com-
mission, that they commit ‘Governments as a whole, as well as a wide range of 
stakeholders’. A diffuse soft power is exercising its hold without being constrained 
by the norms which govern competence allocation.111 Similar concerns have been 
articulated by Marc Amstutz on a systems theory basis. His concern is the law’s 
proprium, namely, its function and task to respond to conflicts which cannot be 
resolved in the societal sub-systems in which they originate.112 In a discourse the-
ory version, what may function at the level of local “government councils” will be 
much more difficult to achieve when experimentalists meet with national, Euro-
pean and international standardization bodies,113 or face administrators who are 
keen to promote the institutional prestige and power of their organisations, or wel-
fare bureaucracies which seek to defend their own practices and/or the political 
interests of their superiors. Can we really believe that arrangements will be found, 
implemented and sustained, in which stakeholders engage with sufficient intensity 
and continuity in the definition and discussion of their concerns so that legitimacy 
can be said to rest on the deliberative processes of all the affected parties. Democ-
                                                                                                                                      
misch-evolutionäre Wettbewerbsleitbild“, Preprints des Max-Planck-Instituts für öffent-
liche Güter, Bonn 2004/1. 
110  M. Everson, “The Constitutional Law of the Euro?” (note 88), 120. 
111  A. Somek, “The age of constitutional law. Decline and fall of an empowering idea”, Ms. 
Iowa 2004, 9. 
112  M. Amstutz, “Zwischenwelten. Zur Emergenz einer interlegalen Rechtsmethodik im 
europäischen Privatrecht”, in Ch. Joerges and G. Teubner (eds.), Rechtsverfassungs-
recht, Recht-Fertigung zwischen Privatrechtsdogmatik und Gesellschaftstheorie, Baden-
Baden 2003, 213 ff, #. 
113  An interesting exception is the interpretation of the “New Approach” offered by J. Scott, 
“International Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating Rules (and Standards) in 
the EU and the WTO”, European Journal of International Law 15 (2004), 307 ff. 
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ratic experimentalism asks us to take the traditional virtues of the rule of law 
lightly. It asks us to loosen the ties between law and enforcement, and, instead, to 
trust that our societies will manage with much less governmental powers. But it 
does not tell us how we might find the post-national criteria that will enable and 
legitimate a “benchmarking” of national experiences, histories, and aspirations. It 
fails to explain how the insights that the exposure to the experiences of others 
might lead to co-ordinated policies and how they might be implemented against 
unconvinced opponents. More importantly, it fails to address the risks that its own 
implementation in the EU entails. There is nothing wrong with bureaucracies and 
experts exchanging experiences and learning about new possibilities. There is a 
great deal wrong with building up opaque networks which get entrusted with the 
task of seeking to carry through what they have learned or agreed upon in democ-
ratic societies. Such a model of governance may be soft because it no longer relies 
on mandatory provisions. It is, for the same reason, strong because it risks empo-
wering the executive and removing the virtues of democratic accountability, of 
rule-bound public governance and its judicial control.114 Should we, by taking the 
rule of law so lightly, promote but executive governance instead of deliberate po-
lyarchy? 
W.E. Scheuerman has complemented these sceptical queries by a sociological 
observation. He summarizes one key assumption of democratic experimentalism as 
the assertion “that we increasingly encounter evidence of diversity in terms of local 
conditions and regulatory needs”. He confronts this claim with the tendencies of 
“high-speed” capitalism “to compress and even ‘annihilate’ geographical space or 
distance. High-speed social activity dramatically heightens the possibilities for 
interaction across both geographical and the existing political divides, opening the 
door to historically unprecedented opportunities for simultaneity and instantane-
ousness in human experience”.115 Democratic experimentalists, he continues, fail 
“to provide an adequate place in their theory, in both normative and institutional 
terms, for those facets of contemporary social experience poorly captured by its 
repeated references to local diversity in social conditions”.116  
 
                                                          
114  Similar objections have been raised by democratic experimentalists, and, in a similar 
vein by E.-J. Mestmäcker [“Wandlungen in der Verfasstheit der europäischen Gemein-
schaft”, in idem, Wirtschaft und Verfassung (note 46), 49 ff., 69 ff.] against comitology 
and the idea of “deliberative supranationalism” as defended by this writer. Why the 
OMC should be a democratically superior mode of governance than comitology is diffi-
cult to understand. Comitology operates in much narrower and better defined realms. Its 
social and legal embeddedness is more intense. Its successful “constitutionalization” is 
imperfect but seems at least conceivable; cf., Ch. Joerges, “‘Comitology and the Euro-
pean model?’ Towards a Recht-Fertigungs-Recht in the Europeanisation Process”, in 
E.O. Eriksen, Ch. Joerges and J. Neyer (eds.), European Governance, Deliberation and 
the Quest for Democratisation, EUI-RSCA/Arena (Arena Report 2/2003. Oslo), 501 ff. 
115  “Democratic Experimentalism” (note 101), 119 ff. 
116  Ibid., 120. 
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4.3.2 Bringing the Eighties Back In? 
The turn to soft governance in the EU and the turn away from the very idea of law-
mediated governance are risky. And it seems that this risk is not really necessary. It 
may be an all too hasty disregard of the alternatives that were elaborated decades 
ago. The intense debates of the 1970s about the failures of welfare-state juridifica-
tion strategies were guided by normative concerns about the intrusion of bureau-
cratic machineries into the economy and the life-world. It was the broadly experi-
enced disappointment with “purposive” legal programmes and a new sensitivity 
towards “intrusions into the life-world” through a juridification of social policy 
goals that triggered the search for models of legal rationality that would fill the 
gaps left open by formalist legal techniques, and, at the same time, cure the failures 
of the law’s grip on social reality on the basis of some “grand theory” (such as 
economic theories of law, systems theory or discourse theories).117 “Proceduralisa-
tion” and “reflexive law” were, at the same time, concerned with very practical 
matters, namely, the problems of implementation and compliance. Discrepancies 
between legal programmes – especially between “purposive” legislation designed 
to achieve specific objectives and the actual impact of such laws on society – were 
a core concern of legal sociology, of effectiveness and implementation research.118 
The normative and the pragmatic critique of purposive programmes and of com-
mand-and-control regulation have motivated a search for alternatives such as self-
regulation and soft law. Such strategies responded to the same concerns that the 
proponents of the OMC now invoke. But they sought to keep the rule of law alive.  
 
 
                                                          
117  See G. Teubner, “Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law”, Law and So-
ciety Review 17 (1983), 239-285; R. Wiethölter, “Materialisation and Proceduralisation 
of Law”, in G. Teubner (ed,), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, Berlin-New York 
1986, 221 ff.; “Proceduralisation of the Category of Law”, in Ch. Joerges and D.M. 
Trubek (eds.), Critical Legal Thought: An American-German Debate, Baden-Baden, 
1989, 501 ff.; J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge, MA 1999 427 ff; 
idem., “Paradigms of Law”, in M. Rosenfeld and A. Arato (eds.) On Law and Democ-
racy: Critical Exchanges, Berkeley-Los Angeles, CA, 13 ff. Earlier German contributi-
ons include R. Wiethölter, “Entwicklung des Rechtsbegriffs”, in V. Gessner and G. 
Winter (eds.), Rechtsformen der Verflechtung von Staat und Wirtschaft, Opladen 1982, 
82 ff; Ch. Joerges and G. Brüggemeier (eds.), Workshop zu Konzepten des postinterven-
tionistischen Rechts, Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik, Materialien 4, Bremen 
1984, 25-64. 
118  Famously summarised and analysed by G. Teubner, “Juridification – Concepts, Aspects, 
Limits, Solutions”, in idem (ed.), Juridification of Social Spheres, Berlin-New York 
1987, 3 ff. 
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5. A Resumé 
So much for the critique. And what has the critic to offer instead? The law is a 
normative exercise; the whole discipline is engaged in the production of valid an-
swers which distinguish between the legal and the illegal, and equate this distinc-
tion with justice as opposed to injustice. Ambivalent messages are not particularly 
welcome and are difficult to endure.  
And yet, the uncertainties of the state of the (European) Union may require 
exactly that – at least, if lawyers seek to take up the three issues denoted in the 
introduction:119 Does the constitutionalization of Europe reach out into the “Eco-
nomy and Society”? Are there alternatives to the OMC alternative to the exhausted 
economic constitution? Can we ensure that European governance remains rule-
bound and its legitimacy continues to be meditated by law?  
 
5.1 The Constitutional Treaty  
The obvious first object is to look for answers to these questions in the new Con-
stitutional Treaty as amended on 22 June 2004,120 in particular, in the provisions 
that prmise to reach out into “Economy and Society”: the “social market economy” 
has become a constitutional objective,121 and access to services of general eco-
nomic interest is recognised and respected122 by Article II-36, which  incorporates 
the new “social rights”.123 Last but not least, elements of the OMC can be seen in 
various places.124 We find a first reference in Article I-1(4) which states: “the Un-
ion may adopt initiatives to ensure the co-ordination of the Member States’ social 
policies”; Part III (Policies and Functions) refers to the OMC four times, once in 
                                                          
119  Section I, text accompanying notes 4 ff. 
120  Note 37. 
121  According to Article 1-3 (3) CT the “Union shall work for … a highly competitive so-
cial market economy”. 
122  Article II-36; this is an important signal, because it confirms the right of Member States 
to pursue distributional objectives. The compatibility of such policies with the opening 
of national or regional markets to “foreign” competitors is a complex issue of constituti-
onal importance. It is one of the many fields where “constitutionalisation” has to occur 
incrementally. 
123  The Rights’ Charter as solemnly declared in Nice was incorporated into the Constitutio-
nal Treaty which now contains social rights especially in Title IV on solidarity. 
124  Article I-14 (4): “the Union may adopt initiatives to ensure co-ordination of Member 
States’ social policies”; Part III, section on Social Policy (Article III-107 CDT), on Pub-
lic Health (Article III-179 CDT). The assignment of a competence “to promote and co-
ordinate the economic and employment policies of the Member States” has been repea-
led. Article I-11(3) as amended on 22 June 2004 (note 37) reads: “The Member States 
shall co-ordinate their economic and employment policies…”  
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the section on Social Policy (Article III-107), and once in Chapter V Section 1, on 
Public Health (Article III-179). 125 
Most of these topics have already been mentioned and those not mentioned are 
too big to be dealt with en passant. Suffice it to restate here that the invocation of 
the “social market economy” in the Constitutional Treaty is conceptually flawed, 
and is, politically, an all too risky promise, because it may raise expectations which 
it will subsequently fail to deliver. Instead of saying “flawed”, one might also say 
“empty”: the historical compromise that the concept once embodied is no longer 
alive. Not even the ordo-liberal component of this legacy was present in the delibe-
rations of the Convention. However, one linguistic detail does deserve a particular 
mention here: “Ordnungspolitik” was the German name of Working Group VI. The 
English name was “economic governance”. Was this an innovative translation? 
Not really. It was the Convention Secretariat who was responsible for the intro-
duction of the term, in which someone remembered the fierce controversies bet-
ween “Ordnungspolitik” and “industrial policy” in the Maastricht Intergovern-
mental Conference. A case of “linguistic-discursive path-dependency”, according 
to Andreas Maurer,126 which became definite when Joschka Fischer and Domini-
que de Villepin submitted a common position on Ordnungspolitik just before 
Christmas 2002,127 after/when Working Group VI had already closed its files.128 
Will the “social rights” serve as an Ersatz? The easy answer is that this is diffi-
cult to predict and that we should wait and see what the ECJ tells us. This answer 
sounds easy but is not trivial. It is not trivial because it implies that we, the citi-
zens, should entrust the Court with the shaping of a “social Europe”. Should the 
Court take over where the citizens’ representatives in the Convention and elsew-
here failed to produce clear constitutional guidance? These are puzzling and, to a 
certain extent, worrying consequences, which are hardly reconcilable with the in-
herited notions of democracy and of the normative weight of constitutional norms. 
In addition, we have to assume that the Constitutional Treaty could serve as a suf-
ficiently stable basis for daring activism. This is a somewhat heroic assumption 
with regard to the social rights in the light of Article II-52 (5) which provides:  
“The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented 
by legislative and executive acts taken by Institutions and bodies of the Union, and 
by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise 
of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpre-
tation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality”.129  
                                                          
125   See the following section. 
126  In a letter to the author; A. Maurer is Head of the Research Group on European Integra-
tion of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin.  
127  CONV 470/02. 
128  A detail, but a noteworthy one after decades of disagreement between the German 
proponents of Ordnungspolitik on the one hand, and the French defenders of planifica-
tion on the other. 
129 See G. de Búrca, “Fundamental rights and Citizenship”, in B. de Witte, 10 Reflections on 
the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, RSCAS 2003, 11 ff., 22 ff. 
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5.2 Constitutionalization as Process 
“L’éssentiel est invisible pour les yeux”, is comfort that Antoine de Saint 
Exupéry’s Petit Prince give us. What is not so visible, because it seems so unex-
citing and trivial, is the performance of the European machinery, the innumerable, 
small and not so small, indicators of good European governance. Europeanization 
is an instigator of countless innovative projects. Directly behind or lying in the 
shadow of grand designs, such as that of the theory of the economic constitution or 
directly-deliberative polyarchy, there is another Europe at work. It is not so easy to 
discover, not so coherent, and often ambivalent. But we can approach it in three 
steps: (1) one is analytical and interdisciplinary. We have some well-discussed and 
elaborated hypotheses about the structures of the European multi-level system of 
governance and the conceptualisation of this system in legal categories; (2) the 
second step concerns our experiences with and insights into the Europeanization 
processes. Nobody can claim to know and understand the complex processes of 
Europeanization in their entirety. But if one studies some of them in some depth, 
one will discover patterns of change in both successful learning processes and in 
failures.130 The “law of the European economy” which becomes visible in such 
endeavours is very different – and much more interesting – than the law in the 
books. Europeanization functions as an instigator of change and learning. It is an 
exercise in transformation, and modernization; (3) there is a theoretical background 
to this kind of cautious optimism. One, underestimated, virtue of law is its con-
creteness, the need to take decisions and give reasons for them to actors, litigants, 
experts and to the wider public; the chance/opportunity and, indeed, duty to recon-
sider what once seemed settled. Law is a Product guided by reasoning, it is Recht-
Fertigung which reflects the justice and fairness of its production processes.131 In 
such perspectives, “constitutionalization” can be conceived not as merely being the 
writing of a text and its formal acceptance by those who govern us and/or us the 
people.  
Can we expect “constitutionalization as process” not only to ensure the compa-
tibility of open markets with regulatory concerns and preserve the social dimension 
of private law, but also to overcome Europe’s social deficit? This seems highly 
unlikely but is not unconceivable. “All political projects are inherently unrealistic, 
in that they strive for a not yet realized objective”. This was Wolfgang Streeck’s 
                                                          
130 I refrain from an effort to elaborate the following remarks in the abstract. They need to 
be substantiated and concretized in the context of much more detailed analyses of speci-
fic fields. For a recent attempt cf. Ch. Joerges, “The Challenges of Europeanization in 
the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline”, forthcoming in Duke 
Journal for Comparative and International Law. 
131 Cf., R. Wiethölter, “Recht-Fertigungen eines Gesellschafts-Rechts”, in Ch. Joerges and 
G. Teubner (eds.), Rechtsverfassungsrecht. Recht-Fertigung zwischen Privatrechts-
dogmatik und Gesellschaftstheorie, Baden-Baden 2004, 13 ff.; cf., the analysis by G. 
Teubner, “Dealing with Paradoxes of Law: Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter”, in O. Perez 
and G. Teubner (eds.), On Paradoxes and Self-reference in Law (forthcoming 2004). 
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response132 to the lecture which Jürgen Habermas delivered in Hamburg on 26 
June 2001.133 The philosopher argued that a European constitution could help to 
defend the “European social model”. Streeck substantiated his response: too much 
voluntarism will downgrade a project to mere wishful thinking. This is why it 
should be accompanied by empirical research. And, at some point, we should be 
prepared to take the discrepancies which we find between our aspirations and our 
observations seriously. But when and how? “Constitutionalization as process” is no 
answer to these questions. Nevertheless, it is a response to the state of the integra-
tion project which seeks to take the core idea of constitutionalism seriously.  
                                                          
132  “Das ‘soziale Europa’ und seine Verfassung: Fragen zu einem politischen Projekt”, Ms. 
Cologne 2001. The paper has not been published. But W. Streeck has explained his 
position more comprehensively elsewhere. Cf., e.g., “From Market-Making to State-
Building? Reflections on the Political Economy of European Social Policy”, in Stephan 
Leibfried and Paul Pierson (eds.), European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and 
Integration, Washington, DC 1995, 389 ff. : “The Internationalization of Industrial 
Relations in Europe: Prospects and Problems”, Politics and Society 26 (1998), 429 ff.  
133  “Warum braucht Europa eine Verfassung? Nur als politisches Gemeinwesen kann der 
Kontinent seine in Gefahr geratene Kultur und Lebensform verteidigen”, first published 
in DIE ZEIT of 29 Juni 2001, reprinted in J. Habermas, Zeit der Übergänge, Frankfurt 
a.M. 2001, 104 ff.; English translation (“Why Europe Needs a Constitution”) in E.O. 
Eriksen, J.E. Fossum and J. Menéndez (eds.), Developing a Constitution for Europe, 
London 2004, 19-34. 
European Democratic Legitimation after the 
Failure of the Constitution 
Hauke Brunkhorst 
Introduction 
 
The European Constitution has been rejected in France and Netherlands a few 
weeks ago. Has Europe no constitution now? – No, it has a constitution. The trea-
ties are the constitution of Europe, the jurists tell us, and they are right. There are a 
lot of differences between the structures of the European Treaties (ET) and the 
constitution of Germany, France, USA or Serbia, which are all of the same type. 
But there are also a lot of essential conincidences between the ET and democratic 
state constitutions. The ET are full fledged functional equivalents of a constitution 
of a state: 1. The ET are higher level or reflexive law (law to produce law). 2. The 
ET secure the normative priority of European law over the law of the member-
states (“European Law Supremacy”). In cases of conflict European law breaks 
national law, including posterior parliamentary legislation and constitutional 
norms.1 Even the German Constitutional Court has given up its claim to be the last 
interpreter of basic rights concerning German citizens and German territory.2 They 
now interpret even the German constitution in cooperation with the ECJ and vice 
versa: There still exists a European “Verfassungsgerichtsverbund”.3 3. The ET 
constitute independent legal bodies of the Union who make law by their own po-
                                                          
1  Hans Peter Ipsen, “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den Europäischen Gemeinschaf-
ten”, in: Josef Isensee/ Paul Kirchhof, ed., Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepu-
blik Deutschland, Heidelberg: Müller 1987, § 181, RN 32; D. Grimm, Braucht Europa 
eine Verfassung?, 229f; A. Augustin, 253; Fritz Scharpf, „Regieren im europäischen 
Mehrebenensystem – Ansätze zu einer Theorie“, in: Leviathan 1/ 2002, 65-92, 76; C. 
Joerges, „Rechtswissenschaftliche Integrationstheorien“, in: Beate Kohler-Koch/ 
Wichard Woyke, Hg., Die Europäische Union. Lexikon der Politik, Bd. 5, 
München:Beck 1996, 229-232, 230; Marcel Kaufmann, „Permanente Verfassungs-
gebung und verfassungsrechtliche Selbstbindung im europäischen Staatenverbund“, in: 
Der Staat 4/ 1997, 521-546, hier: 522, 526f, 534; Marcus Heintzen, „Die ‚Herrschaft’ 
über die europäischen Gemeinschaftsverträge“, in: Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts119/ 
1994, 564-589, 574ff, 585ff; Claus Dieter Classen, „Europäische Integration und demo-
kratische Legitimation“, in: Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 119/ 1994, 238-260, 240f; 
C. D. Claessen, „Einführung“, in: Europa-Recht, München: dtv 2001, XIVf. 
2  Bverf G 2 Bvl 1/97, June 6/2000; Scharpf, 76 
3  Udo DiFabio, Der Verfassungsstaat in der Weltgesellschaft, Tübingen: Mohr 2001, 76, 
78f, 96. 
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wer. 4. The ET create new rights for European Citizens which are directly related 
to the citizens of the EU, and no longer mediated through the law of the member-
states. 5. Even the word “constitution” regularly has been applied to the ET by the 
highest European Courts (like ECJ or BverfG, the Spanish Supreme Court etc.). 
The European court has called the Roman Treaties a charté constitutionelle.4 
The naming of the ET as a charté constitutionelle might be taken as a hint on 
the very problem of the existing ET as well as with the new (and now rejected) 
Treaty for a Constitution of Europe. The first time in history the expression charté 
constitutionelle was used, was in 1814 for the counterrevolutionary constitution of 
the French restored monarchy. This was a constitution in the modern meaning of 
this word but not a constitution for the people. It was a constitution for the ruling 
social classes. The ET are much different from the charté constitutionelle from 
1814 (as well as from the later one from 1830), but in one respect we have the 
same situation as in 1814 or 1830 on the European level in 2005. The word 
“constitution” used for the new Treaty for a Constitution of Europe does not add 
any new constitutional meaning to the former ET. The new constitution is still a 
treaty, and the old treaties were already a constitution. The problem now is that the 
voters did not know that and could not know it. The existing treaties are a constitu-
tion in the self-description of legal scholars, they are a constitution for the courts 
and other legal bodies of the EU and it’s member states: national and European 
parliaments and governments, the Commission and the Council, national and trans-
national administrations etc, in short: They are a constitution for the political class 
who revealingly are called and describe themselves as a social class. But the Euro-
pean constitutions old and new are not, and up to now never were a constitution in 
the public opinion of the European people, and this is the very problem with the 
EU constitutional system that came to the fore dramatically the last weeks. 
The existing European constitution is a constitution without a state. The Euro-
pean existing constitution constitutes a clearly supranational organisation.5 After 
the revolutionary Treaty of Amsterdam there exists a single European Unity of 
civic rights, of budget, of political action, of organisation, an internal and external 
legal personality, an order of legal steps and competences and the ECJ claims the 
                                                          
4  ECJ RS. 294/83 Les Verts / Europäisches Parlament 1986, 1357 (1365); Dieter Grimm, 
„Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?“, in: D. Grimm, Die Verfassung und die Politik. Ein-
sprüche in Störfällen, München: Beck 2001, 215-254, 215f (note 1), 229f; D. Grimm, 
„Vertrag oder Verfassung?“, in: D. Grimm/ J. J. Hesse/ R. Jochimsen/ F.W. Scharpf, ed., 
Zur Neuordnung der Europäischen Union, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1997, 9-31, 9; see 
further: Angela Augustin, Das Volk der Europäischen Union, Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot 2000, 249, 274 (note 248); Joseph H.H. Weiler, „The Transformation of Eu-
rope“, in: The Yale Law Review, vol. 100, 1991, 2403-2483, 2407; Jürgen Schwarze, 
„Die Entstehung einer europäischen Verfassungsordnung“, in: J. Schwarze, ed., Die 
Entstehung einer europäischen Verfassungsordnung, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2000, 463-
570, 464f. 
5  Heinhard Steiger, Staatlichkeit und Überstaatlichkeit, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1966; 
Armin von Bogdandy, Supranationaler Föderalismus als Wirklichkeit und Idee einer 
neuen Herrschaftsform, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1999. 
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so-called ‘competence-competence’ for its judgements and in all matters concer-
ning the interpretation of European law.6 In legal terms there exists a clear hierar-
chy of subordination between European and the law of the Member-States, but in a 
realistic description it would be better to describe it as a mix of the law of subordi-
nation (“Subordinationsrecht”) and the law of cooperation (“Koordinationsrecht”). 
Anyway, if we apply Jellineks three criteria of a state (people, power, territory) 
then one thing becomes very clear: Europe is not a state. (1) People: Even if we 
accept as I do that there is a European people in the making, it is still not clear if 
this process of making will ever come to an end. Something what seems to be 
unique with the EU is that the now again posed question about the final destiny and 
final identity of Europe has no answer. May be it should be kept open because the 
European people are in a permanent process of defining again and again who be-
longs to this people and who they are, as they have done that during the last refe-
renda. Even today it is not so easy to answer the question: Who is a European citi-
zen? The European passport does not cover the whole number of European de 
facto citizens. Think on the Norwegians or even the citizens of Swizzerland? – 
They are completely (or close to be completely) under European law, and they 
have subjective rights and judicial remedies within the EU, and they have a com-
mon territorial order together with the European Union (Schengen-convention). 
But they have no European passport, and they have no status activus. (2) Power: 
What the European Union further completely lacks is any own power to enforce 
European law. It has only one court in Luxemburgs, and only 25000 officials 
(much less than the Frankfurter Stadtverwaltung) because there is no executive 
body in Brussels. This by the way shows that one objection against the EU is 
completely unreasonable, that there might be too much burocracy in Brussels (3) 
Territory: Even if it is every instant clear what the actual borders of the European 
Union are, the unique logic of permanent and peaceful enlargement does not really 
fit to the classical modern idea of a clear cut states territory, and even the mean-
while (since Amsterdam) legalized idea of a possible closer Union of some mem-
ber states does not fit to the concept of a states territory. In this respect the EU 
comes closer to a classical Empire or “Großraum” (Carl Schmidt) than to a nation-
state.7  
If there is a European constitution that is supranational, and not the constitution 
of a nation state, what kind of a constitution is it? To deal with this question I draw 
a distinction between three levels of constitutional integration: 1. functional integ-
ration, 2. Rule of law integration (what the German jurists of the 19th Century have 
called “Rechtsstaat” or “Konstitutionalismus”), and 3. foundational, grounding or 
revolutionary integration by a constitution. The first, functional level of constituti-
onal integration must be fulfilled by all constitutions that work, the second, rule of 
law level of constitutional integration has it’s paradigm cases in England since the 
18th and Prussia and Germany in the 19th Century, whereas the third, revolutionary 
level of constitutional integration has its paradigm cases in the French and Ameri-
                                                          
6  A. v. Bogdandy, 10, 32f, 38ff. 
7  Ulrich Beck / Edgar Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2004. 
 
56 Hauke Brunkhorst 
can Revolution of the 18th Century, and the constitutional traditions found by these 
two Revolutions. 
 
 
1. Functional constitutionalism 
There is no doubt that on the level of a functional constitution Europe has a 
constitution. European primary law (the law of the treaties) stabilizes the borders 
that separate the legal from the political system, and the borders that separate the 
legal from the economic system as well, and European primary law regulates a 
system of well ordered relationships between law, politics and economy. What 
European primary law precisely does is securing the autonomy of the legal, politi-
cal and economic systems by organising the reciprocal dependencies that connect 
law, politics and economy. This is what Niklas Luhmann calls structural coupling, 
and the structural coupling especially of law and politics is the functional achieve-
ment of all regimes that are constitutional.8 What a constitution (together with a 
system of basic rights9) in the functional meaning of this term enables, is the 
controlled explosion of all forces of productivity of functionally specialized com-
munication. For Luhmann the achievement of the constitutional law of check and 
balances (in German: “Staatsorganisationsrecht”) is in particular the structural 
coupling of law and polities, and that means that all law can be changed by politi-
cal power, and at the same time that all use of political power is under control of 
legal norms. The functional effect of constitutionalising the relation between law 
and polities is first a growing independency and a stable autopoietic closure of the 
legal system, and second the growth (and not the shrinking) of political power 
(with all its dangers and ambivalences, as for example Foucault has analysed 
them). That’s one of the reasons that usually democratic governments usually have 
much more and much more effective power than autocratic dictatorships. Third the 
specific function of individual rights (in particular if they are interpreted as “insti-
tutional guarantees”10) is to stabilize the borders between politics and law or eco-
nomy and religion or economy and politics, family and science and so on, in short: 
The function of a constitution is to stabilize the borders between functionally diffe-
renciated systems and to organize legally controlled exchange between them, so 
that the systems can support one another with their special achievements. 
The problem with a mere functionalist understanding of a constitution is that it 
fits as well to the constitution of the German Bismarck-Reich as to the present day 
constitution of France or the present constitution of the EU, and it fits even to the 
                                                          
8  N. Luhmann, “Verfassung als evolutionäre Errungenschaft”, in: Rechtshistorisches 
Journal 9/ 1990; N. Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1993, 
440ff; N. Luhmann., Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1997, 92ff; 
Marcelo Neves, Zwischen Themis und Leviathan: Eine schwierige Beziehung, Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2000, 80ff. 
9  N. Luhmann, Grundrechte als Institution, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1986 (1965). 
10  Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 170ff. 
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(by Carl Schmidt) so called constitution of the German “Third Reich”, even if the 
latter proposition is true only if we (for sake of the argument) extend the concept of 
law to what Schmitt called during the Thirties a konkrete Rechtsordnung (concrete 
legal order) which blurs the distinctions between law and justice, legalism and 
moralism as well as the distinction between law and power. Anyway, the problem 
with a mere functional understanding of a constitution is that it leaves us without 
any normative criteria to draw a categorical distinction between structurally diffe-
rent types of constitutions. As long as higher level legal rules order the relations 
between law and politics and secure the borders between some of the most impor-
tant functionally differentiated social systems we have a full fledged functional 
constitution. Such a functional or Hobbesian constitutional regime enables the 
more or less peaceful growth of legal decisions, political power, economic capital, 
scientific knowledge, popular education etc. But the peaceful growth of power, 
capital, knowledge etc. does not mean automatically the growth of individual and 
democratic freedom for all who are subject to law. 
 
 
2. Rule of law constitutionalism 
Rule of law limits the power that states or other legal bodies (like state govern-
ments or the EU-Commission or the SC) can enforce against the individual free-
dom of citizens and individual human beings, or other legal subjects like organisa-
tions or states (in international law). Written or unwritten, rule of law means that 
legal subjects have rights which limit not the growth but a particular use of political 
(and today even economic11) power. Different from mere functional constitutiona-
lism, law-of-rule-constitutionalism implies a normative idea, and this is the idea of 
the “self-binding of state power” (Jellinek). 
European citizens today have more rights than ever before, and this to a great 
deal is due to the emergence of the European Union which constitutes a new type 
of rule of law regime. But to collect rights and legal claims does not mean necessa-
rily that the rule of law or the “Rechtsstaatlichkeit” in Europe today in all respects 
is better off with than without the Union. There is the gain of some important new 
rights for European citizens (in particular the right to move) but also a loss or wea-
kening of some of the rights of state citizens (for example against transportation to 
another EU-country). 
Anyway, the existing European constitution is not only a first level functional 
constitution but as well a second level rule of law constitution. European law lega-
lizes state power12 and imposes constitutional constraints on the use of power. 
There exists a complex system of check and balances between the European legal 
and political bodies. The European Court has developed some important measures 
to secure basic rights of me as a European citizen even against the legal orders of 
                                                          
11  So the Drittwirkungslehre of the German constitutional court. 
12  D. Grimm, Braucht Europa eine Verfassung? 229. (“Verrechtlichung der Staatsgewalt”). 
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my own national sovereign.13 The EU today fulfils further as Hilf and Reuß write, 
a “Scharnierfunktion”, a function of mediation between global economic, commer-
cial and consumer norms on the one hand, and on the other the law of the member 
states.14 This protects the EU-citizens from an otherwise more unequal and ar-
bitrary implementation of WTO-norms etc. What constitutionalism on this let me 
say Lockean level enables is the peaceful growth of primarily private autonomy. 
The greatest evolutionary advance in Questions of rights within the EU was the 
construction and effective implementation of the new subjective right to move and 
transcend state borders, to have an unrestricted right to live and work everywhere 
in Europe, and to enjoy equal rights all over Europe. What is so new with this right 
or even a new dimension or generation of rights is first that I as a European citizen 
can go and stay everywhere in Europe (EU) and to take (nearly) all my rights 
(which I enjoy as a German citizen) with me, and second the right to move and all 
other rights I enjoy as a European citizen has the so called direct effect. That means 
that I can go to Court to enforce my rights as a European citizen everywhere in 
Europe. Our national courts are now European courts at the same time. This is – as 
the ECJ has shown already in 1963 – an important independent source of legiti-
mation of European law. The EU is latest since the ECJ´s famous decision on Eu-
ropean law supremancy and direct effect in 1963 no longer legitimated by the 
contracting states alone but at the same time by European (and in this respect no 
longer German, French…) citizens. Therefore the court concluded that European 
citizens must have direct effect as European citizens. 
The interesting question here is what does legitimation mean? Legitimation of 
law in democratic legal communities has one and only one meaning. It means 
democratic legitimation. But democratic legitimation of law is not only tested and 
implement at the input-side of the legislative processes (public discussion, party-
Building, free will formation, votings and elections etc.) – democratic legitimation 
means the whole process for concretizing and implementing law from the discus-
sion in a bar and television news through parliamentary legislation via govern-
mental administrative and judicial decisions towards the concrete action of a poli-
ceman,15 and latest here we, the people again come back to the fore as immediate 
decision makers. Using our private autonomy as single individuals we can go to 
court and compel the judges to open a judicial process which in the end has to 
implement a new norm or confirm an old one. 
                                                          
13  Christian Tietje, „Die Staatsrechtslehre und die Veränderung ihres Gegenstandes: 
Konsequenzen der Europäisierung und Internationalisierung“, in: Deutsches Verwal-
tungsblatt 17/ 2003, 1081-1146; C. Joerges, Zur Legitimität des Eurpäischen Privat-
rechts (FN 11), 10ff. On the Centros – judgement of the ECJ.  
14  Meinhard Hilf / Mathias Reuß, „Verfassungsfragen lebensmittelrechtlicher Normie-
rung“, in: Zeitschrift für das gesamte Lebensmittelrecht, 1997, 293ff, 296, 300. 
15  Hermann Heller, „Der Begriff des Gesetzes in der Reichsverfassung“ (1927), in: 
Gesammelte Schriften, Leiden: Sijthoff 1971, 225 ff; grundlegend: Adolf Merkl, Allge-
meines Verwaltungsrecht. Wien/ Berlin: Julius Springer 1927. 
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One can call this with Christoph Möllers in a broad sense “individual legitima-
tion”16, or better, as I would suggest, private legitimation – if one keeps in mind 
that this type of legitimation is part of the whole process of democratic legislation 
and implementation of law. Private legitimation is an indispensable aspect of de-
mocratic legislation which is as necessary as public legitimation to make law that 
is democratic. Just at this point we are confronted with the basic problem of Euro-
pean constitutionalism which now has become the constituional crisis of the 
Union. 
Thanks to the French and Dutch people this problem for the first time in the 
history of the elitist European project now has become the problem of an egalita-
rian public. The non-voters may have underestimated the small but real democratic 
progress with the new constitution, and their misunderstanding of the growth of 
private autonomy within the Union as being the execution of a mere neo-liberal 
political programme, even if not deeply wrong, was more than one-sided, at best 
the half of the truth. One has to draw a clear distinction between a rich concept of 
private autonomy that includes all individual basic rights,17 and which is indis-
pensable for any politics that is democratic on the one hand – and on the other hand 
the reduction of private autonomy to neo-liberal economic freedom. But the non-
voters were completely right to question the public autonomy of the Union.18 To 
support public autonomy a constitution that is worth this name in a non-expert 
discourse, needs a system of norms which enables the citizens to decide about 
political alternatives.19 As long as they are not clear with this point all treaties for a 
Constitution of Europe will and should never be understood by citizens as their 
constitution, and therefore the objections concerning the public autonomy of the 
European citizens were very well founded. With this point I come to the third level 
of revolutionary or democratic constitutionalism. 
                                                          
16  C. Möllers, Gewaltengliederung, Habilitationsschrift, Heidelberg 2003. 
17  See Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 
18  On the co-originality of private and public autonomy: Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und 
Geltung, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1992. 
19 This point is emphazised in: Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarität. Von der Bürgerfreundschaft 
zur globalen Rechtsgenossenschaft, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2002; H. Brunkhorst, „Verfas-
sung ohne Staat? Das Schicksal der Demokratie in der europäischen Rechtsgenossen-
schaft“, in: Leviathan 30/ 2002, 530-543; H. Brunkhorst, „Globalising Democracy 
Without a State: Weak Public, Strong Public, Global Constitutionalism“, in: Millenium: 
Journal of International Studies 31/ 2002, 675-690; H. Brunkhorst, “A Polity Without a 
State? European Constitutionalism between Evolution and Revolution”, in: Erikson, 
Fossum, Menendez, Hg., Developing a Constitution for Europe, London: Routledge, 
2003; H. Brunkhorst, „Demokratie in der globalen Rechtsgenossenschaft - Einige 
Überlegungen zur poststaatlichen Verfassung der Weltgesellschaft“, erscheint in: Son-
derheft Weltgesellschaft der Zeitschrift für Soziologie 2005. For a similiar point of view 
in direct reaction to the lost referenda in Europe: J. Habermas, “Über die Köpfe hin-
weggerollt” in: Süddeutsche Zeitung 6. Juni 2005. 
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3. Democratic Constitutionalism 
What the constitutional revolution adds to the social evolution of constitutionalism 
is more than “illusions of feasibility” and “celebratory explanations” (“Machbar-
keitsillusionen”, “Gesänge und feierliche Erklärungen”) as Luhmann once put it 
ironically.20 From the revolutionary or Rousseauean point of view constitutions are 
systems of egalitarian legal norms that enable democratic politics.21 The basic 
constitutional question and the very meaning of the modern idea of a constitution is 
not – as Hannah Arendt once nicely put it – how state power can be “limited” 
through rule of law, but how the power of the people can be “established”.22 
This is the very constitutional question because even the limitation of state po-
wer and other powers like that of private actors (“Drittwirkung” of basic rights) or 
that of supranational organisations has to be established by the democratic or 
communicative power of the people.23 If those who are concerned by legal norms 
(quod omnis tangit ...24) cannot understand themselves as their authors, rule of law, 
rights, judicial remedies of the famous direct effect of European law would not 
constitute well-ordered freedom but well-ordered and convenient slavery, or to 
quote Josef Weiler: “But you could create rights and afford judicial remedies to 
slaves. The ability to go to court to enjoy a right bestowed on you by the pleasure 
of others does not emancipate you, does not make you a citizen. Long before wo-
men and jews were made citizens they enjoyed direct effect”.25 
If supranational norms, created by independent supranational bodies bind states 
and states citizens, and if these norms impose legal supremacy and direct effect, 
then intergovernmental legitimation from the point of view of democracy is no 
longer sufficient. If supranational law has two sources of legitimacy, the states and 
the citizens then supranational rule of law regimes are sufficiently legitimised only 
if they have the public and democratic backing of the citizenship that still has 
rights within the particular organisation. 
                                                          
20  N. Luhmann Verfassung als evolutionäre Errungenschaft (FN 10). 
21  C. Möllers (note 2); Ingeborg Maus; Zur Aufklärung der Demokratietheorie, Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp 1992; Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarität. Von der Bürgerfreundschaft zur globa-
len Rechtsgenossenschaft, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2002 (english translation forthcoming: 
Solidarity. From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Comminity), Kap. I, 3. 
22  Hannah Arendt, Über die Revolution, München: Hanser 1974, 191, 193. 
23  J. Habermas, Fayktizität und Geltung, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 167 ff. 
24  Quod omnes tangit, omnibus tractari et approbari debet. (What everybody concerns has 
to be deliberated and accepted by evrybody). On the roman and christian history and 
transformation of this rule: Harold Berman, Recht und Revolution, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 
1991, 366; Graham Maddox, Religion and the Rise of Democracy, Londen: Routledge 
1996, 99; Peter Landau, „Die Bedeutung des kanonischen Rechts für die Entwicklung 
einheitlicher Rechtsprinzipien“, in: Heinrich Scholler, Hg., Die Bedeutung des kanoni-
schen Rechts für die Entwicklung einheitlicher Rechtsprinzipien, 23-47, 42. 
25  J.H.H. Weiler, „To be a European citizen – Eros and civilisation“, in: Journal of Euro-
pean Public Policy 4:4/ 1997, 495-519, 503. 
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This eventually is the reason why the EU-Treaties (TEU Art. 6 Para 1,4,; TEC 
Art. 19, 22) as well as the UN-Charter (Preamble), and implicitly even the foun-
ding conventions of the WTO (DSU Art. 3 para 2) refer (explicitly: EU, UN or 
implicitly: WTO) to peoples and citizens as an indispensable subject of legitima-
tion. This in a lot of cases is lip service but it demonstrates that even on inter- and 
supranational levels of constitutionalizing law and politics there exists no other 
idea of law that is legitimized than the idea of democratic legitimation. 
These references on democracy and popular sovereignty in the legal text books 
of supranational organisations are not only words but constitutional legal norms. 
Taken seriously, they can “strike back”.26 And there are people, social movements 
and non governmental organisations who take them seriously. In particular the 
NGO’s have got some important influence during the last years within the global 
public, the United Nations and the WTO-regime.27 
Some observers have described the increasingly important role of NGO’s 
within the still existing global civil society, together with some impressive new 
political phenomena like the EU-system of commitology as “deliberative democ-
racy”.28 To some observers the deliberative democracy of global NGO’s and Euro-
pean commitology now seems to be the realisation of communicative rationality on 
earth. But – if one wants to avoid a disaster like the last referenda on the European 
constitution – one should be careful, not to identify deliberative public and delibe-
rative administration with democracy too early, because there is no democracy at 
all without egalitarian procedures of decision making.29 We – or from the top 
down perspective of Schröder, Fischer, Girac, Junker, Verheugen and so on – they, 
the people (“Die Menschen da draußen…”) know that. They are not as stupid as 
the so called European “political elites” think they are.  
Democracy, they know, needs some “guarantee that each member of the society 
is only represented once”, and democracy needs some “guarantee that all members 
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Verfassungstheorie VI, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1997, 56. 
27  Andreas Fischer-Lescano, “Globalverfassung: Verfassung der Weltgesellschaft”, in: 
ARSP Vol. 88, 2002, Heft 3, 349-378.; Rahmatullah Khan, “The Anti-Globalization 
Protests: Side-show of Global Governance, or Law-making on the Streets?”, in: 
Zeitschr. f. ausl. öffentl. Recht und Völkerrecht Jg. 61, 2001, 323-355; Stephan Hobe, 
Global Challenges to Statehood: The Incrre4asingly Important Role of Nongovernmen-
tal Organizations, http:/www.globalpolicy.org/role/intro/def/2000/chaleng.htm. 
28  James Boman, Public Deliberation. Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy, Cambridge: 
MIT 1996; J. Bohman/ William Rehg, Hg., Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge: MIT 
1997; Joshua Cohen/ Charles Sables, „Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy“, in: European 
Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4/ 1997; Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, „Deliberativer Supranationa-
lismus“, in: Zetschr. F. int. Bez. 2/ 1999, 185-243; Christian Joerges/ Jürgen Neyer, 
„From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Democracy“, in: European Law 
Journal, 3/ 1997, 274-300; C. Joerges/ Ellen Vos, Hg., EU Committees: Social Regula-
tion, Law and Politica, Oxford: Hart 1999. 
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of the society are actually represented.”30 The referenda in France and Netherlands 
have justified the truth of the sentence that inclusive deliberation is a necessary 
condition for egalitarian decision-making but never can be a substitute. Without a 
real chance of the people to decide about programmatic alternatives in Europe 
(and not only sometimes in some countries about the yes and no of the legal voli-
dity of 500 pages) there even will be no inclusive deliberation, and there will be no 
serious public discussion with public impact on politics at all. This still is the very 
difference between the constitutions of the member states and the European 
constitution of the treaties. What the EU-treaties or the EU-Constitution urgently 
needs are democratic reforms which make it harder for the politicians in power to 
avoid any egalitarian public discussion about European politics, as they have done 
in the past so long. Europe needs a strong public and a strong parliament because 
the only body of state power that has been constitutionally implemented by the 
European treaties are legislative bodies without a government and a burocracy 
(executive bodies) and even without a court-system (judicative bodies not only on 
the supreme court level)), and there is no democratic legislation without a parlia-
ment (or some real functional equivalent which up to now has not been found) that 
allows to pose political alternative (left/right, government/opposition). The rejec-
tion of the Treaty for a Constitution of Europe by the French and Dutch people 
who for the first time acted as the anticipatory representative of a single European 
people was the last wake up call to take democracy seriously. 
                                                          
30  Krajewski, M., 2001: Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO 
Law. Journal of World Trade 35: 166-186. 
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1. Generalization of the inclusion principle in the economic 
system and its effect on politics and law 
The recent discussion involving the elaboration of a Constitution for Europe is the 
result of a lack of linearity in the regional integration process that began with the 
Treaty of Paris in 1951. Originally created for essentially economic purposes – to 
allocate the losses produced by the Second World War and the funds generated by 
the Marshall Plan –, the process has gradually extended into the domains of politics 
and law. The accomplishment of objectives set by various supranational 
commissions for liberalizing the market produced effects which overcame 
economic limits, but were also transformed into operational problems for other 
social systems, especially the legal and political systems. The free circulation of 
goods and capital, for example, unleashed an unprecedented set of tribulations for 
the tax laws and public reserves of the member States. As with all planning 
processes, the greatest obstacle for the European Union has been uncertainty about 
the future, generating undesired and sometimes harmful results that could not be 
foreseen at the time of making the plans. Faced with this reality, what is needed is 
a new project able to act in the face of present problems and renew the contingency 
of the future. The efforts of the European Convention are moving in this direction: 
seeking to correct the legal-democratic deficits produced by the European regional 
integration process (ZAGREBELSKY (Org.) 2003). 
The advent of regional integration created disturbances and rearrangements in 
the relations between politics, law and economics. In modern society, these three 
spheres can be defined as differentiated partial subsystems, each exercising a 
specific and un-interchangeable function. This presupposition is not compatible 
with the totalizing or universal conceptions of pre-modernity, which tended to 
concentrate social action and limit differences through a religious or moral identity. 
Contemporary high-contingency conditions require less-simplified forms that are 
more appropriate to organizing the hypercomplexity of the environment. Modern 
social subsystems are endowed with a reproductive recursiveness that allows them 
to reach a closure where politics only refers to politics, law only to law and 
economics only to economics. This closure emerges from the structures and 
operations of the systems: a legal decision can only occur within the legal system. 
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Be that as it may, this does not mean that the systems are autistic or closed to each 
other. To the contrary, each system can observe its respective environment, be 
“irritated” by it and offer contributes to other systems. Paradoxically, the operative 
closure of the system is a condition for its cognitive opening. The relations 
between the legal, political and economic systems illustrate this definition rather 
well: higher taxes, for example, could result in a drop in profits for the economy, 
questions of constitutional rights laws and greater income for politics. Each system 
is differentiated and each appears to the other as part of its respective environment. 
External demands are processed by the system according its internal structures: 
there is no determination or causality. Due to environmental inflow, the system 
produces irritations – in truth, self-irritations – which are operationalized in a self-
referential fashion. In other words: the systems open to their environment without 
losing their identity, or better yet, they maintain their differences.  
Due to the preeminence attributed to economic questions, the regional 
integration process created requirements, demands and interferences that could 
lead to a questioning of the system/environment distinction. Regionalization 
signified a generalization of the inclusion principle in the functional ambit of the 
economic system. Differently to pre-modernity, when the inclusion/exclusion 
distinction was resolved with natural criteria – birth defined who was noble or 
plebeian –, modern society is characterized by the inclusion of all individuals in the 
social systems.1 Exclusion is not the consequence of an external universal 
determination anymore, but rather self-referential criteria produced by the social 
systems: criteria internal to the educational system, for example, determine a good 
or bad student. In economics, this operational change in the inclusion/exclusion 
distinction first occurred with the transition from collective feudal property to 
private property and its subsequent monetarization. In other words: the acquisition 
of a movable or immovable good (inclusion) through the medium of money 
necessarily entails the non-ownership (exclusion) of the seller, who, with the 
amount obtained, is able to regenerate his purchasing capacity. The 
inclusion/exclusion duality constrains the economic system to constant dynamism 
and circularity. If, during the pre-monetary phase, the dependence of property on 
power limited the inclusion capacity of the economy, this gradually became 
reverted: first through the process of monetarization and then from generalized 
inclusion via regional economic integration.  
Economic regionalization signifies the integration of the entire population into 
the functions of the economic system. The same end was attributed by Niklas 
Luhmann to the Social Welfare State within the political system (LUHMANN 
1997). Based on this strategy, the economic system seeks to eliminate social 
marginalization through generalized access to the wealth that is produced. In this 
sense, good examples are the social development obtained by peripheral countries 
like Portugal, Spain and Greece after entering the European Union, and the growth 
                                                          
1  For a critical view of this postulate, see NEVES 1992. 
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expectations emerging in Eastern European countries that have entered this 
institution.  
The task of the economy is to manage the problem of scarcity. The availability 
of many goods is restricted due to physical limitations. This reinforces the 
inclusion/exclusion distinction in the economic system: when one individual 
acquires a property, another is excluded from it. This shortage raises a temporary 
problem, which is to guard in the present against the possibility of scarcity in the 
future. On this is founded the paradox of the economy2: a reduction in scarcity 
through acquiring a good necessarily entails an increase in the shortage of what 
was not acquired which, however, endowed with money, has the capacity to 
eliminate its own scarcity. This is the operational circularity of the economic 
system. Regional integration tries to obscure this paradox and interrupt this 
circularity. Through attempting the generalized inclusion of all individuals in the 
economic functions, regionalism aims to substitute shortage for abundance and, 
therefore, interrupt the paradoxical “zero sum” circuit – if A has something, B does 
not – in favor of a “positive sum” solution – A has and B as well. It aims to 
suppress future scarcity by increasing the amount and circulation of wealth in the 
present. It is in this sense that we can consider the European Union the result of a 
project, a planning process. We ask, nevertheless: are the structural limits of the 
economic system compatible with this goal? Doesn’t the substitution of a shortage 
for abundance produce, to the contrary, excessive scarcity or the complete absence 
of goods in the future? If everyone is the owner, who sells and who buys? The 
economic difficulties currently facing the two principal countries of the European 
bloc – Germany and France – clearly illustrate the problems of trying to include a 
logic in the operations of a system that has a greater scope than the system itself.  
One cannot think of an economy without scarcity, since it is exactly that which 
assigns a value to a certain good, thereby continually reproducing the circularity of 
the system. A scarce good can be quantified. This permits, on the one hand, the 
creation of payment capacity and on the other, payment incapacity. As a result of 
this basic alternation, the economy is able to stabilize a forecast for the future – 
acquire a good to fulfill a need – but offers no certainty for the future because in 
supplying the shortage the scarcity of another good was generated, which in turn 
produces an alternation between payment capacity/incapacity. In short, scarcity is a 
permanent problem of the economic system. When economic integration seeks to 
suppress it, it blocks the passage from one side to the other of the have/have-not 
polarity: if everyone has, there is no incentive for production or innovation. 
Moreover, the attempts to establish abundance as a rule for economic operations by 
eliminating the problem of shortage and fixing an “a posteriori” certainty to trade 
relations actually increase the risk of producing an excess of scarcity greater than 
the normal levels of the system: when there is a situation of full abundance, there is 
no payment, no circulation of money. Evidently, the European economists are 
conscientious of the circularity of the scarcity in the economic system. 
                                                          
2  On the task and the paradox of the economic system, see LUHMANN 1988a; 
LUHMANN 1988b: 101-123 and ESPOSITO 1995a: 103-105. 
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Nevertheless, in the last years, the neoliberal ideology – which has deeply 
influenced the last stages of the European union process – seems to attribute the 
solution to the social needs to the market potential. It has therefore introduced a 
strong normative component in the distinction between wealth scarcity/abundance. 
By ignoring its structural limits, the economic system loses control over its 
operations: unexpected consequences emerge from the planning which are outside 
its own domain. The economic system begins demanding and pushing towards 
other social systems a complexity incapable of being processed by its self-
referentiality. These excessive requirements are especially forced onto politics and 
law, which in turn have become the means for accomplishing the regional 
economic integration. In other words: since the economy, in imposing the logic of 
abundance, burdens its own operations – because its structural limits are unable to 
absorb this type of program –, it begins making demands on the political and legal 
systems in order to accomplish its ends. As can be observed, supranational 
economic decisions provoked a rearrangement of existing legal institutions, which, 
based on classic notions of territoriality, population and sovereignty, thwarted 
greater trade cooperation among the member States. The imposition by the 
European Union of minimum rates of productivity and lower public deficits on the 
part of national governments, not to mention its adoption of the principle of the 
primoatè – the primacy of European legal norms over state law –, can be analyzed 
in this context of recomposing state political-legal functions so as to be guided by 
economic principles that are defined as indispensable to the unification process. 
 
 
2. Law and politics as means of regional integration 
In the idea of regional integration, the economic system employs political and legal 
power to accomplish its aim of widespread inclusion. These are the means by 
which the economy exercises its functions and activities. To a certain degree, they 
are efficient instruments for materializing the project of economic integration. 
Since they operate through rigid structures and institutionalized procedures, the 
organizations of the political system – the State – and the legal system – the Courts 
– have a high level of authority that facilitates decision-making under extremely 
complex conditions. Moreover: these systems are endowed with a series of 
mechanisms – legitimate monopoly of force, coerciveness of the law, res judicata – 
that can impose these decisions even if their effects are considered undesirable. 
The notion of ceding sovereignty behind the process of forming the European 
Union and community law, for example, is only possible thanks to political and 
legal decisions made on the State level. As affirms Sousa Santos, reforms 
implemented by the State beginning in the 1980s have been characterized by a high 
degree of transnationality (SANTOS 1997: 3). Only a strong State is capable of 
maintaining the financial goals stipulated by the European Central Bank, applying 
the principle of the primoatè even when the European norm contradicts 
constitutional precepts and implements reforms capable of adapting social 
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complexities to the new needs of the economy. The presumed theory that economic 
globalization presupposes a weakening of the State (BECK 1997: 52-56) is 
constantly refuted by the facts: “without a strong State,” argues Campilongo, “the 
chances of being inserted into the new economy are minimal” (CAMPILONGO 
2000: 120). The paradox of regional integration is that a reduction in the role of the 
State depends on its being strengthened. The same idea, obviously, applies to the 
Courts.  
If it is true that the means – political and legal – are fundamental for 
implementing the regional integration plan, it is no less certain that this strategy 
has its own limits, negative consequences and disadvantages. The economic ends 
stipulated by supranational organs depend on political and legal action, but their 
results cannot be controlled by these means. They expose the economy to the errors 
and deviations that their decisions necessarily acquire due to contemporary 
uncertainty. This forces the economic system to constantly change its strategies for 
accomplishing the goal proposed by regional integration – distributing abundance 
and eliminating scarcity –, which entails expanding the demands and claims on the 
legal and political systems. The new demands increase the exposure to new 
mistakes: this circularity destabilizes the regional integration process. On the one 
hand, the political and legal systems become overloaded due to the intensification 
of the economic demands, and on the other, economic action is limited exactly 
because of this overload.  
With respect to the political system, this overload presents itself in the form of 
excessive dissensus produced by regional integration, since supranational decisions 
transcend the representation formulas for interests exercised at the level of national 
governments: programs are applied which were not selected by the political 
process. On the other hand, the legal overload occurs through the practice of 
deconstitutionalization produced by the primoatè principle. This overloading 
blocks the functional and operative autonomy of the political and legal systems, 
which are determined by the economic interests of regional integration. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the rupture of political and legal unity 
creates difficulties and restrictions for the very economic system itself instead of 
producing the longing imposed by it. The process of political dissension and 
deconstitutionalization amplifies the damages produced by supranational decisions. 
It is sufficient to note, for example, the negative impact from implementing the 
unified European currency on the public opinion of each member country. In other 
words, it creates a legitimacy problem for the supra-state organizations. How can 
damages from a European Union decision be accepted if they are not directly in the 
interest of a national citizen and disrespect a country’s own Constitution? A 
supranational decision of an economic nature is applied through politics and law at 
the cost of not observing the democratic process: how to legitimate these decisions 
and absorb their consequences? 
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3. Crises of legitimacy and attachment to values: the notion of a 
“European people” as a solution? 
The use of politics and law as means for the economy – in other words, the attempt 
to colonize these two systems on the part of the economic system –, results in a 
legitimacy problem or, as it is called, a democratic deficit, for the supranational 
formal organization. National politics and law are submitted to an external logic 
that is arbitrarily imposed on procedures and institutions without considering two 
hundred years of democratic achievement. At first, the power of the European 
Parliament was increased in an effort to reduce its legitimacy deficit (Article 251 
of the European Economic Community Treaty). The formula was simple: if the 
supranational organ, which is founded on the principle of universal suffrage, 
interferes decisively in the deliberative process, the acceptance of a supra-state 
decision would become natural as much on the part of the population as the 
national organs, because the community norm would be formed in the same way as 
the state norm – that is to say, based on the congruence of interests between the 
representative/represented. It was thought that through this disposition the 
autonomy of the political system would be restituted. But is democracy resumed to 
political representation? To the contrary, democracy is synonymous with the 
maintenance of complexity, the reproduction of alternatives. The political system 
presupposes a series of procedures, parties, institutions, unions, bureaucracies and 
organizations that act in the selection of the policies that will be adopted. These 
structures antecede parliamentary choice and in the electoral process are 
fundamental in defining who will be the government or the opposition. Which are 
the European parties? Who is the government or opposition in the supranational 
Parliament? The democratic deficit persists: why should the same decision be valid 
for an Italian citizen who chose the conservative right and a German citizen who, 
for his part, voted for the progressive left? The Parliament was adopted as an ideal, 
a democratic value, but the values are not enough, nor very operative. Procedures 
and institutions are needed to ensure the rules of the game and to keep politics, law 
and the economy separate from each other as a way of producing legitimacy.  
From a legal standpoint, the solution to the democratic deficit decrease was 
equally a decision of valorative merit. It was believed that international human 
rights treaties ought to be respected in the decisions made by the European 
Community Court of Justice (PIOVESAN 2002: 54 and BAZO 2002: 242). This 
would allow the affirmation of rights in the ambit of supranational decisions and 
also legitimize deconstitutionalization, since the observance of personal dignity 
and human values would be present in each norm of community law. But which 
rights? What is the dignity of a human person? How can we establish priorities 
among human values? The European Community Court of Justice was created to 
ensure the adequate functioning of the European Union. A long list of laws without 
procedures and institutionalization are diluted in the exercising of this function.  
Whenever a complex reality arises that produces descriptive confusion, an 
appeal is made to benevolent values, as if all problems could be resolved in this 
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way. The current discussion over the European Constitution emerges in this 
context. Its elaboration or non-elaboration is connected to the production of a 
European identity. The debate is concentrated into two antagonistic positions 
(ZAGREBELSKY 2003: V-XIX). On the one side, as proposes Dieter Grimm, it is 
understood that the absence of a consolidated European public sphere constitutes 
an obstacle to affirming a Constitution. An attempt of this kind would entail an 
increase in irresponsible bureaucratic power. Grimm therefore conditions the 
political and legal structures on the necessity of a common cultural, linguistic, 
historical and economic identity. In other words: a European people is needed to 
sustain a European Constitution (GRIMM 2003: 5-21). On the other side, 
Habermas, in a famous article Why the Europe needs a Constitution?, understands 
the European people not as a pre-political community but the result of an act of 
will – that is to say, as the fruit of an artificial decision, a political decision. It is the 
choice of those who want to establish a unit motivated by the common good. In 
this sense, the “people” would be built through the constitutional process: the 
Constitution would motivate the public sphere (HABERMAS 2003: 94-118). Both 
postures are based on the concept of a European people, on the idea of identity. 
They diverge only insofar as the moment: in the first position, “people” is the 
starting point; for the second, it is the arrival point. But what does “people” mean 
for the political system? How does society and particularly its partial subsystems 
operate with the notion of identity? What is the value of identity?  
 
 
4. From bi-dimensionality to tri-dimensionality of power: 
overcoming the “people” value with the self-referentiality of 
the political system 
Identity is only one side of difference and is not an absolute value. On the other 
side of difference we have difference; in other words, identity appears in modern 
society as one side of the identity/difference distinction. This means that one does 
not exist without the other, or better said, difference is a condition for the existence 
of identity. Fixing an identity depends on the capacity of differentiation acquired 
by that which is not part of the identity. It is the fruit of a constant reference to 
itself, which is only possible because it is not the other. These identities, however, 
are defined negatively (LUHMANN 1990a: 14-30 and ESPOSITO 1995b: 122-
125). In this sense, society is an identity to the extent that it differs from the 
environment which surrounds it. Since the identity/difference distinction is not a 
static formula but susceptible to alternation, it is perfectly plausible that the 
condensation of an identity produces internal differences that can form into other 
identities and other differences. This is why subsocial system differentiates from 
society. These social subsystems, for their part, constitute an identity while 
differing among themselves. As can be observed, identity is neither – as is 
currently being discussed with respect to the European Union – a beginning nor an 
end in itself, but presupposes and is the product of differences. A European person 
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as an identity is a condition for eliminating its differences? What is a people: 
identity or difference?  
“People,” as Niklas Luhmann said, is a myth created in the 18th Century to 
justify political representation and the relations of power that formed at the 
inception of modernity (LUHMANN 2002: 333). People were considered the 
source, the guarantee of legitimacy and the foundation for the valid manifestation 
of political power. The formula was well known: “all power emanates from the 
people.” But since it was accepted that the people could not govern themselves, it 
became necessary, as Montesquieu said, that the people do everything they were 
not able to do through their representatives (MONTESQUIEU 1996: 170). In other 
words: the people chose who should govern them. The unity of power obtained in 
such a fashion revealed a paradox whereby the people were at the same time 
sovereign and subject (LUHMANN 2002: 257). In this way it gave continuity to a 
conception of bi-dimensional and hierarchical power that was predominant in the 
stratified society at the time, where the social structure was divided into an upper 
and lower part. The theory of power in late modernity has repeated and reinforced 
this upper/lower differentiation through modern political institutions (LUHMANN 
2002: 256). The stratification hierarchy was merely translated in to a hierarchy of 
orders in the political organizations: on the one side, representative; on the other 
side, represented (LUHMANN 1997: 61). 
Bi-dimensional in these terms means the possibility of distributing and 
restricting political communication to only two poles – people and representative –, 
which are in turn guided according to the principle of hierarchy (LUHMANN 
1997: 62). Such a perspective sees politics as something socially diffuse that is 
confused with other social spheres and not as an autonomous system of society. 
The power is extracted from a source – the people –, which then delegates the 
management of its interests to a political representative. The political power does 
not originate from politics but rather an external element (the people) which first 
acts as the order giver – upper stratum – so as to later obey – lower stratum – the 
representative. This hierarchy presupposes the identity, and not difference, between 
power and people. Under these conditions the political alternative are few and not 
very dynamic, since they are also limited to the upper/lower dichotomy. In other 
words, there is no level of complexity compatible with the contemporary structures 
of the political system. Identifying people with power is a simplification of the 
mechanism of modern power, which reflects political relations that are much closer 
to stratification than the modern concept of democracy.  
In the political system, the passage from stratified to modern society is reflected 
in the substitution of bi-dimensional with tri-dimensional forms for communicating 
power (LUHMANN 1997: 61 and LUHMANN 2002: 255-256). Modern political 
structures are not reduced to a congruence between command and obedience as in 
the domination relation between the upper and lower stratum. They are separated 
into a tripartite differentiation between public, political and administrative. In this 
way they expand the sources of power and increase the complexity of the political 
system, which, guiding in accordance with its own elements, departs from the 
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external reference produced by the upper/lower asymmetry and attains autonomy 
in relation to external sources of power. More dependence is generated on the part 
of internal communication and greater autonomy is created in relation to 
environment. Each of the spheres – public, political and administrative – are 
internal political communications, differing among themselves but reciprocally 
interdependent. In other words: the political system is transformed into an identity 
to the extent that it differs from the rest of society and, in referring to it as such, is 
reproduced in other differences. This is the manner by which the political system 
acquires its self-referentiality in modern society.  
Each of the levels of organization in the political system – public, political and 
administrative – play a relevant role in guiding the interaction of this system; that 
is to say, in forming its identity with respect to the environment. According to 
Luhmann, the public is not an organization per se but entails a process demanding 
a considerable organizational cost (LUHMANN 2002: 253) As can be observed 
during political elections, the public manifests itself as a vote; in other words, as an 
organized, reduced, procedural and self-directed complexity. It is not in fact 
organization, but it is also not chaos. It is an organized action capable of selecting 
the premises for politics, which, as an internal differentiation of the political 
system, prepares each decision that binds the collectivity. It characterizes itself as 
the political thought behind the decision. This influence in political procedure can 
only be exercised through an organization, such as, for example, political parties, 
associations and unions. It can also be present in the very administration, which, as 
the ultimate differentiated sphere, is the organization par excellence where binding 
decisions are made (LUHMANN 2002: 254-255). The great problem with the 
conception of power defined at the inception of modernity is that all this 
complexity was reduced to the “people” myth: it defined what was administration, 
what was political and what was public. There was no organizational separation 
among these spheres but an external determination of political power from the 
people through the figure of the representative (LUHMANN 2002: 256). Under the 
new conditions presented, political representation cannot serve anymore to 
legitimize political power through a non-political foundation for validity 
(LUHMANN 2002: 333). 
Under the aegis of the theory of popular power, even though no organizational 
differentiation exists, the public, political and administrative circuit can be seen as 
a circular movement that obeys a hierarchical direction: the public, once 
synonymous with the people, chooses the politicians – called Parliament –, which, 
in turn, produces the laws or means for the administration – or Executive – to make 
the decisions that will govern the people (LUHMANN 1997: 64). The perversity of 
this hierarchical circularity is that the people as an abstract identity defines the 
operations of both the Legislative and the Executive and as such, submits the 
decisions to the collectivity. The abstraction of the “people” concept as the source 
of power binds the people to the decisions without respecting popular differences 
of a cultural, historic, economic etc. nature. In modern power, on the other hand, a 
simultaneous countermovement is established to the described circular movement 
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(LUHMANN 1997: 64-66 and LUHMANN 2002: 258) the administration 
produces proposals for politics that in turn suggests to the public through the 
parties who should be elected. The circularity of the dual direction is the result of 
separating the spheres within the political system (CAMPILONGO 2002: 90). The 
circularity and counter-circularity block the hierarchical order, destroy the 
distinction of sovereign and subject and consider the people, in any circumstance, 
to be a multiplicity. 
 
 
5. People as an environment of the political system 
To be established as an identity, the political system cannot coexist with the idea of 
a people as long as absolute identity or abstract value determines political 
relations.3 “People” is difference, an excess of possibilities, hypercomplexity. 
There is no unity in people, but indetermination. Within “people” are many 
different points of view – rich and poor, educated and uneducated, healthy and 
sick. “People” is an environment of the political system4: it can irritate, disturb and 
influence the system but cannot conceive its internal structures. As we have 
already affirmed, popular political sovereignty paradoxically generates the 
submission of the people. The tri-dimensionality among public, politics and 
administration resolves this paradox because it allows the political system to form 
a network that refers only to its own elements and binds together all the 
information generated by the system itself. This does not mean that the operative 
closure of the political system produces cloistering. The system observes its 
environment and detects its demands, but only reacts to them according to its 
structures and operations. It is such that “people” should be interpreted: 
independently of politics. Only like this can there be no more subjects. If it is true 
that this perspective builds autonomous politics, it is also certain that it authorizes 
popular emancipation.  
The public is the element of the political system most sensitive to the 
complexity present in the people. It can detect the individual problems and 
expectations that compose what is called the “people.” Through political filters that 
select out this diversity, the public chooses popular manifestations in a political 
manner and translates them according to the political code. After this selection it 
influences policies, which in turn limit the administration. The administrative 
                                                          
3  This would be a transformation of the ideal normative hetero-observation of the political 
system in self-observation of this system; in other words, using political philosophy to 
make political decisions. This possibility leads to a blocking of the autonomy of the 
political system, which cannot support this type of inversion. With respect to ideal 
normative hetero-observation, but in this case specific to the legal system, see NEVES 
2004: 2-3. 
4  Luhmann does not assume this posture explicitly, but he admits that through the concept 
of “people,” the traditional theory justifies political representation from outside the 
political system (LUHMANN 2002: 333). 
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decisions then bind the public and produce effects on the people, who react in a 
nonpolitical manner. Obviously, the inverse effect or counter-circularity is 
produced simultaneously with this process. When the political power acquires 
autonomy, it liberates the people from the burden of the hierarchy. It encourages 
the recognition of differences and complexity, which are no longer reducible to a 
single absolute value. According to Luhmann, if, for traditional power, the 
hierarchical order can be expressed by the formula according to which People = 
Politics + Public + Administration, the circularity and counter-circularity of 
modern power reproduces the People/Politics/Public/Administration scheme 
(LUHMANN 2002: 257 -258). Differenthy from Luhmann, who according to this 
scheme includes people as another internal sphere of the political sistem, I prefer to 
redescribe the formula as follows: People ≠ Politics/Administration/Public. With 
this it can be demonstrated that the difference between people and the other 
elements is more salient because it (people) does not belong to the political system, 
as Luhmann otherwise suggests. This is the only conception of political power 
compatible with democracy, because – as affirms De Giorgi – it allows “the 
maintenance of a high degree of complexity while continually producing new 
decision possibilities” (DE GIORGI 1998: 41). 
 
 
6. The European Constitution as a reconstruction of legal and 
political autonomy in the supranational sphere 
Resuming the discussion with respect to the European Constitution, it is possible to 
affirm that the problem is less concentrated on the figure of the European people 
and more on the construction of procedures and institutions that create autonomy 
for the political system at the level of regional integration. The European people 
already exist. It is composed of a multiplicity, differences of all types: cultural, 
economic, social, linguistic, historical etc. In order to filter this complexity and 
stabilize it in the form of political decisions, it is necessary to establish a public, 
politics and administration in the supra-regional political system. Appealing to an 
identity for the European people as a solution for political problems would 
maintain hierarchical operations that are already being unconsciously practiced by 
the preeminence of the economy in the European integration process. The 
autonomy of political power – and this is also true for law – depends on the 
formation of an organization capable of processing political communication; in 
other words, always connecting internal and external references through internal 
operations. Only a political system with tri-dimensional differentiation among 
public, politics and administration can fulfill this function.  
The creation of a European Constitution is fundamental for attaining political 
and legal autonomy in the face of the de-differentiation produced by the primacy of 
the economy in the supranational blocs. The Constitution is the form through 
which the political system reacts to its own autonomy: it requires a decision-
making forum for each element of the tri-dimensionality. In this way it immunizes 
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itself from the power of external interventions like the economy, for example. The 
Constitution should be seen as an act that produces institutions and procedures 
which reinforce the circularity – and counter-circularity – of political power, and 
not as an appeal to the construction of an identity or European people. Viewed as a 
mechanism for creating institutions and procedures, the Constitution is also 
fundamental for the legal system because it introduces internal rules not just for 
applying the individual norms of law but also to produce the general and abstract 
norms of law.5 In this way the legal system creates forms for controlling the 
intervention of money in its code and blocks the possibility of non-differentiation 
with its environment. In producing autonomy, the Constitution creates relations 
among these social systems. As separate units, politics, law and the economy can 
be linked without any pretension of colonization on the part of any of these 
systems. This is the function of the Constitution as a structural coupling: it 
connects the systems because it separates them. This is the form through which 
political and legal mechanisms could block economic interventions into the 
political and legal systems. In other words: it maintains the functional 
differentiation between law, politics and the economy in the regional integration 
process.  
The Constitution is indeed important, but its relevance is not focused on 
constructing an identity or a “European people.” As has been said, the people 
already exist. The Constitution is a fundamental instrument for creating a circuit of 
law and power at the level of regional integration, guaranteeing the legal and 
political interests of popular diversity: it blocks the imperialistic pretensions of the 
economic system As one can notice, the idea of structural coupling, inherent to the 
concept of a Constitution, is more important. Structural coupling are evolutional 
acquisition, are decisions product. Decisions are choices between alternatives. In 
the decision process, possibilities are rejected. For this reason, legitimating 
institutions and procedures are necessary. It is, from this perspective, that one can 
sustain the choice of a structural coupling formation instead of a frustrating search 
for identity or consensus. It seems that the current discussion about the European 
Constitution does not walk the path here defended. That is what shows in the 
disillusions of the French and Dutch “no”s and the consensus reconstruction 
policies used afterwards. 
Regional integration involves generalizing the principle of inclusion in the 
economic system. This is a big evolutionary achievement for modern society. But 
since the economic system is incapable of executing a task of this size on its own, 
it resorts to the political and legal systems to further its pretensions. The major 
problem here is that this resource departs from the functional autonomy of each of 
these social systems. In essence, this is the current legitimacy crisis of the 
European Union, its democratic deficit. Contemporary political, legal and 
sociological theories attribute the reconstruction of the identities of law and politics 
                                                          
5  With respect to the Constitution as an element that paradoxically produces cognitive 
opening and operative closure for the political and legal systems, see LUHMANN 
1990b: 176-220; NEVES 1994: 61-75 and CORSI 2001: 253-266. 
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to the value “people.” Such an abstraction, however, says little about procedures 
and institutions capable of setting limits for economic excess. The European 
Constitution should be immersed in these concerns: creating legal and political 
power mechanisms that can oppose the hegemonic pretension of the economy at 
the level of regional integration. 
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Civil Society Participation in Mercosur: Some 
Critical Points 
Michelle Ratton Sanchez 
Abstract 
 
The Mercosur Council Working Program 2004-2006 (MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC no 
26/03) employs the term “civil society” with the purpose of increasing its 
participation in the institutional structure of Mercosur.  As such an expression has 
never been applied in any formal document of that regional integration process, in 
this article firstly I intend to investigate the concepts related to "civil society" in 
Mercosur, identifying the groups of actors that have participated during recent 
years.  The analysis also comprehends an evaluation of the Mercosur institutional 
channels for "civil society" participation, which might be revised according to 
Ouro Preto 2nd Round Decisions. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Due to the increasing complexity of economic relations in regional integration 
processes, with more interaction between the productive chains and a greater scope 
and technicality in the regulation of social and economic life, new forms of 
representation and participation are required on the different levels of political 
decision.  
Currently Mercosur is undergoing a process of questioning its economic and 
political viability. Among the factors that have been identified are its weak 
institutionalization and the poor social cohesion of the bloc. In this article I intend 
to analyze the relation between these two factors.  
Decision No. 09/95 of the Common Market Council (CMC) – the Mercosur 
1995-2000 Action Program –foresaw in paragraph 3.2 that: The strengthening of 
the integration process requires a more intensive participation on the part of 
society. To this end, the Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC) and the Economic 
and Social Advisory Forum (ESAF) shall ensure the due participation of the 
sectors involved. After the Mercosur Relaunching Project in 2000 and its 
Institutional Strengthening Project in 2001, the 2004-2006 Mercosur Work 
Program was finally launched in 2003.1  This work program defines lines of action 
                                                          
1 For access to the official documents, see CMC Decisions: CMC/DEC/22/2000, 
CMC/DEC/23/2000, CMC/DEC/24/2000, CMC/DEC/25/2000, CMC/DEC/26/2000, 
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for affirming and expanding the integration project, articulating for the first time 
the idea of participation on the part of "civil society" (paragraph 2.1 of the 2004-
2006 Mercosur Work Program). 
Two points are worth noting in the mentioned documents: one is the fact that in 
the 1995-2000 Action Program reference is made to mechanisms for both 
representation (JPC) and direct participation (ESAF); the other point is the 
employment, beginning with the 2004-2006 Mercosur Work Program, of the term 
“civil society.” 
Attention is called to the use of the expression “civil society” in an official 
Mercosur document considering that a detailed search for its content: (i) defines 
the group of interests involved (and represented); and (ii) establishes lines to 
identify its interlocutors.2 I understand that this exercise is essential when applying 
the concept of “civil society” in international or regional fora.  In spite of there 
being a terminological coincidence with respect to the theory of the modern State, 
the political structure on which the new usage is based is distinct.  Moreover, the 
term has been applied with specific content in each international forum. 
Considering the proposal for revising the institutional structure of Mercosur – 
known as “Ouro Preto II” and which defines the participation of “civil society” as 
one of its central elements –, it has yet to be confirmed if the institutional reform 
indeed favors the participation of “civil society.” 
Though I recognize that the existence of a participatory culture is essential, it is 
also true that the creation of institutions encourages and ensures "civil society" 
participation.3 In order to confirm this last hypothesis, in this article I intend to 
explore how mechanisms were created for the participation of actors other than 
representatives of the bureaucratic body of Mercosur member-States, and how such 
mechanisms have worked during last years. The purpose is to ally the identification 
of potential actors embraced by the concept of “civil society” with the existing 
mechanisms, as well as to demonstrate some critical points of that relation in 
Mercosur. 
To this end, besides this brief introduction and the final notes, this article is 
organized around three other topics that seek to identify in Mercosur: (i) its 
institutional structure and the provisions for representation and participation 
mechanisms; (ii) some concepts related to the idea of “civil society” employed in 
the integration process documents and the concerned interests; and (iii) all forms of 
participation that have been admitted until today. In each of the following items, 
not only will the legal provision be analyzed but also the evolution of the tense 
                                                                                                                                      
CMC/DEC/27/2000, CMC/DEC/28/2000, CMC/DEC/30/2000, CMC/DEC/31/2000 and 
CMC/DEC/32/2000 (Mercosur Relaunching Project); CMC/DEC/01/2002 and 
CMC/DEC/16/2002 (Institutional Strengthening Project); and CMC/DEC/26/2003 
(2004-2006 Mercosur Work Program). All available at <http://www.mercosur.org.uy>. 
2  For example, a similar exercise was developed in SANCHEZ (2003) with respect to the 
use of the expression “civil society” in the negotiations process for the FTAA. 
3  ALVIM (2000:59) and FESUR (2004:6 ff.) are works that defend a strong relation 
between civil society participation and institutional culture in Mercosur. 
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relation between “civil society” (in other words, different actors of a non-state 
nature) and the Mercosur institutions.  
 
 
2. Participation and representation mechanisms in Mercosur 
The processes of economic, political and/or social integration within a legal 
framework of a regional character – as per integration or community laws operate 
today – are relatively recent. In general, the historical process of the European 
Community and the creation of its institutes have been taken as a reference to 
analyze and justify similar phenomena. In spite of the particularities of each 
integration process, a common aspect among them is the fact of not replicating the 
constitution of the Nation-State, thus establishing new political institutes and 
responsive organizations.4 This is the first assumption I take for the analysis in this 
article. 
Besides that, current examples evidence that regional integration processes are 
not exclusively restricted to an interstate logic anymore (as with other 
intergovernmental fora). Therefore, the second assumption is that classic 
international law postulates might not provide the most adequate categories to 
explain those new institutes5  
Both premises illustrate the difficulty in currently dealing with the question of 
the representativeness and participation of “civil society” in the international 
system – in this specific case, Mercosur. In Mercosur member-States, 
representativeness in intergovernmental fora has been based on the electoral 
system and the delegation of power in conducting the foreign policy negotiation 
and implementation.6 On the other hand, the idea of participation comprehends the 
direct presence of actors other than those represented by the traditional politics of 
state bureaucracy.7 Thus, as employed in this article, participation is not an 
                                                          
4  In this respect, ALVIM (2000:44) emphasizes a difference between functional authority 
(for the regional integration process) and regional authority (for the State). 
5  I use here the concept of classic international law founded on the Westphalian model, 
with an identification of international relations restricted to the interstate system; in 
other words, to actors endowed with sovereignty and, consequently, the acceptation of 
the State as the only actor for which international law grants personality. In this respect, 
QUOC DINH (1999:83 ff.) 
6  For a direct relation between the Westphalian interstate system and the idea of 
representation in international relations, see BATORA (2003). 
7  With respect to this counterpoint, SHELL (1995:915) elucidates the relation between 
representation and participation in another intergovernmental forum – the World Trade 
Organization – when referring to the theories that such mechanisms are based on: “The 
WTO brings out the same tensions discussed in the civic republicanism literature 
between the traditional ‘representative’ model of governance, which in the WTO context 
relies on states to represent collective interests of their citizens, and the civic republican 
‘participatory’ model, which seeks to expand deliberative processes to a broad array of 
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alternative to representation, but rather a complementary constituent for the 
incorporation of specific interests of the society. 
In this respect, one particular characteristic of the direct participation in a 
regional integration process is the fact that, being based on the specific concerns of 
the actors involved, it acknowledges the presence of local groups, national 
leaderships and regional alliances on the regional mechanisms.8 This means that 
different spatial dimensions and perceptions of the world may be recognized and 
considered legitimate by the forum. 
The structure of Mercosur today organized around two hundred and fifty 
bodies, some of a permanent character and others ad hoc.9 The basic and most 
important bodies to be analyzed in this article are listed in the organizational chart 
below, with an indication of whether their functions are primarily political, 
executive or technical: 
 
 
Political Consultation
and Conciliation Forum
Joint Parliamentary Commission
Economic and Social
 Advisory Forum
Mercosur Secretariat
Working Subgroups
Technical Committees
Trade Commission Specialized Meetings
Ad hoc Groups
Common Market Group
Common Market Council Ministerial Meetings
Executive 
Technical 
Political 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author, based on the Ouro Preto Protocol (1994) and the organiza-
tional chart available at < http://www.mercosur.org.uy > in September 2004.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
parties and interest groups so that ‘all interests potentially affected by [an action will 
have] meaningful opportunities to engage in discussion about the action.” I explored the 
question of participation and representation in the WTO and the negotiations process for 
the FTAA in SANCHEZ (2004:98 ff; 2003:213 ff.).  
8  Such dimensions are here also brought to the State perspective, as municipal authorities 
in the integration process. In this respect, see the collection VIGEVANI et al (2004). 
These municipal authorities, thus, will not be included in the non-state actors group for 
the purpose of this article. 
9  For access to the complete list of bodies existing up to 2003, see VENTURA (2003:678 
ff.), Annex 3, Table 7. Updated information can also be obtained from the official 
Mercosur website (<http://www.mercosur.org.uy>) and the COMISEC - Comisión 
Sectorial para el Mercosur website  (<http://www.mercosur-comisec.gub.uy>). 
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The structure of Mercosur was essentially defined in 1994 by the Additional 
Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur, 
otherwise known as the Ouro Preto Protocol (OPP).10 In such structure 
representativeness prevails, especially with respect to the bodies having a 
deliberative power11 (the Common Market Council, the Common Market Group 
and the Mercosur Trade Commission). 
The Common Market Council (CMC), responsible for the political guidance of 
Mercosur, is composed of authorities at the Ministerial level. The Common Market 
Group (CMG), Mercosur’s executive body, integrates four representatives from 
each member-State, among whom one is from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, 
one from the Finance Ministry and one from the Central Bank. Finally, the 
Mercosur Trade Commission (MTC), responsible for providing the CMG with 
technical subsidies; is composed of four representatives from each member-State 
and coordinated by the Foreign Relations Ministries together.  
Note, therefore, that the deliberative axis of Mercosur is basically composed of 
representatives of the state bureaucracy who not directly elected by the citizens of 
the member-States. The only exception to this rule is the guaranteed participation 
of the Presidents of Mercosur member-States in the CMC meetings each six 
months (article 6 of the OPP). 
The presence of directly-elected representatives also appears in the Joint Parlia-
mentary Commission (JPC). However, as stipulated in the OPP (article 22 and 
followings), the JPC represents the Legislatures of the member-States and not their 
citizens. According to articles 25 and 26 of the OPP, the JPC is responsible for: (i) 
accompanying the integration of Mercosur’s rules into the domestic legal systems 
and (ii) making recommendations to the CMC, through the CMG. Therefore, in the 
institutional structure of Mercosur, the JPC assumes a mere advisory role.12 
A consulting role is also ascribed to the Economic and Social Advisory Forum 
(ESAF). This forum represents the “economic and social sectors” of each of the 
                                                          
10  Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur 
(Ouro Preto Protocol), signed on December 17, 1994. The structure of Mercosur is 
defined in the first article of the OPP. The basic organization has been complemented 
with working and ad hoc groups over the past ten years, as admitted by the protocol 
itself. The Mercosur Secretariat was also modified from an Administrative Secretariat to 
a Technical one according to CMC Decision CMC/DEC/30/2002 dated December 6, 
2002. 
11  The concept of deliberation applied here has a specific meaning restricted to the right to 
vote in the adoption of binding rules. The concept will be developed in more detail in 
item 4 of this article. To identify the binding rules for Mercosur, see article 41 of the 
OPP. 
12  In the 2004-2006 Mercosur Work Program, paragraph 3.1, reference is made to the 
intent of creating a Mercosur Parliament. However, even if a regional Parliament 
integrates the structure of Mercosur, for the concepts expounded in this article this 
would not be considered as a direct participation mechanism. Therefore, it will also not 
be the object of analysis in this article. As a counterpoint on the theme of Parliament as 
participation, see FESUR (2004:19 ff.) and PEÑA (2003a). 
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member-States (article 28 of the OPP), with the right to make recommendations to 
the CMG. According to the OPP, the ESAF is the only mechanism for the 
exclusive direct and participation of non-state actors. Participation in the ESAF is, 
however, limited to thirty-six representatives, with nine seats reserved for each 
Member state (it is not compulsory to appoint entities for all nine seats).  
There are other possibilities of direct participation in Mercosur bodies not 
exclusive of non-state actors. Among them are the preparatory meetings for the 
Work Subgroups (WSGs) and respective Commissions linked to the CMG.13 
Currently there are fourteen WSGs distributed according to specific issues, and 
forty-five Commissions.14 Participation in these bodies is limited to three 
representatives of the “private sector” per meeting. A similar provision is stipulated 
for the Technical Committees, which can request at any time advice from experts 
and consult representatives from the “private sector.”15  
Besides the provisions appointed above, empirical data shows that there are 
also bodies in Mercosur which admit informal and ad hoc input. Clear examples 
are the cases of the Specialized Meetings and the Ad Hoc Groups16. In considering 
that the provisions for the WSGs, the Specialized Meetings and the Ad Hoc Groups 
are all stipulated in Chapter VI, an extensive interpretation of the CMG Working 
Procedures allows the understanding that the provisions of Chapter VII with 
respect to the participation of the private sector are valid for all these bodies of the 
bloc (and not only to the WSGs explicitly referred). However, such an 
interpretation should also consider the participation in the Specialized Meetings 
and Ad Hoc Groups restricted to a preparatory phase for these encounters, with the 
limitation of three representatives per meeting. 
                                                          
13  Under the terms of the Working Procedures of the CMG, approved by a CMC Decision 
in 1991 (MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC04/91), chapter VII (articles 26 to 31), the WSGs and 
the Commissions organize their activities in: a preparatory stage and a decisional one. 
14  The provision for establishing WSGs is in article 13 of the Treaty of Asuncion. The 
WSGs in the current structure of Mercosur are organized under the issues: 
Communications (WSG1); Institutional Aspects (WSG2); Technical Regulations 
(WSG3); Financial Aspects (WSG4); Transportation (WSG5); Environment (WSG6); 
Industry (WSG7); Agriculture (WSG8); Energy and Mining (WSG9); Labor, 
Employment and Social Security Questions (WSG10); Health (WSG11); Investments 
(WSG12); Electronic Commerce (WSG13); and Economic Monitoring (WSG14). For 
more information on the WSGs and their respective Commissions, see the Mercosur 
website and VENTURA (2003:681 ff.). 
15  Cf. MTC Working Procedures (CCM/DIR/05/1996, article 18). The Technical 
Committees in the current structure of Mercosur are: Tariffs, Nomenclature and 
Classification of Merchandise (CT-1); Customs Issues (CT-2); Trade Norms and 
Regulations (CT-3); Public Policies Distorting Competitiveness (CT-4); Competition 
(CT-5); and Consumer Rights (CT-7). In this respect, see VENTURA (2003:687 ff.). 
16  The minutes of meetings of such bodies records the participation of non-state actors, 
what is not explicitly established by Mercosur set of regulation. For access to these 
documents it is necessary to consult the files of the Mercosur Secretariat in loco. 
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As per the description above, it is worth noting that in the composition of all 
Mercosur bodies there is always a concern for maintaining parity among the 
number of participants from each of the member-States. Such a criterion is applied 
to the formal mechanisms of both representation and participation. Up to now, 
there is no institute in the bloc that assumes or recognizes a regional logic in the 
decision-making process.17 
In a few words, it is possible to note that the structure of Mercosur favors 
indirect participation with traditional representation from non-elected state 
bureaucracies. Mechanisms for direct participation are in a small number, being 
concentrated at the executive level and few at the technical level. Moreover, when 
it does occur, it has a restricted (limited number of participants) and, sometimes, 
informal character and often with neither transparent criteria nor clear procedures. 
 
 
3. The concept of “civil society” in Mercosur and concerned 
interests  
3.1 Terms related to “civil society” and usage in official documents  
In order to analyze the operation of the participation mechanisms, it is important to 
first consider which non-state actors are recognized in the Mercosur decision-
making process. 
As already mentioned, the term “civil society” is not applied in the agreements, 
protocols and rulings of Mercosur.18 A plurality of other expressions has been used 
since Mercosur constitution by the Treaty of Asuncion (TA), in 1991. Even though 
it is worth questioning whether the application of the concepts has adhered to a 
terminological rigor and an evaluation of the resulting practice in the bloc daily 
activities, it is important to develop this exercise. The objective is to co-relate the 
content of the expressions applied on the Mercosur regulation with the practice of 
                                                          
17  A regional logic could be identified either (i) in the case of representative(s) named on 
behalf of the entire bloc to exercise a regional function or (ii) in the case of proportional 
representation for each member-State in order to attend to their economic/ social 
differences and particularities. Only in October 2003, it was established the Commission 
of Permanent Mercosur Representatives (CPMR) (as per Decision 
MERCOSUL/IVCMCEXT/DEC11/03). The CPMR is a Mercosur body that includes 
representatives from each of the member-States and a President. The position of 
President, currently occupied by Eduardo Duhalde (Decision 
MERCOSUL/IVCMCEXT/DEC14/03), is somehow related to the regional logic (i) ap-
pointed above. However, in spite of representing the unity of the bloc, the CPMR 
President has an eminently political function without any deliberative power or even the 
competence to participate in the decision-making process. 
18  Beginning in 1997, in some ESAF Recommendations the nomenclature “civil society” 
does appear. Even though the CMG shall recognize such Recommendations, the term 
starts to be used by the deliberative axis just after the 2004-2006 Work Plan.  
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its bodies, as well as identify still-pending demands for participation that can 
corroborate a definition of “civil society” in the bloc.  
One of the most frequent expressions applied by official Mercosur documents 
is “private sector”. This expression is found in the TA (article 14) and in some 
working procedures of Mercosur bodies, such as those of the CMG (article 26 ff.), 
the MTC (article 18) and the ESAF (article 3). The CMG Working Procedure is the 
only document that describes the meaning of the term: that which has a direct 
interest in any of the stages of the production, distribution and consumption 
processes (article 29). 
Such a description is enough ambiguous to allow different interpretations. A re-
strictive meaning may consider as “private sector” groups directly related to the 
economic chain – that is, “production” for industry, “distribution” for retail and 
“consumption” for consumers. And, a broader interpretation may consider a broad 
array of any and all interest related to the production, distribution and consumption 
processes and it opens the possibility of including all and any group or individual 
in a capitalist society.19 
The application of the term "private sector" in 1991 was more coherent with the 
objectives of Mercosur at the time, which was to first create a customs union. The 
TA had provisions for an integration restricted to the economic affairs in the 
region. Moreover, until 1994, a regional institutional structure did not even exist. 
Nevertheless, in 1994, when the organizational structure of the bloc and the 
steps toward forming a common market were defined, the term “private sector” 
was still used. Its application has been reiterated in regulations passed by the CMG 
(1991), the MTC (1996) and the ESAF (1996). The application of the term “private 
sector” in these documents seems not to have been thought about or to have been a 
merely repetition of an expression already employed in earlier integration 
documents.  
The application of the term “private sector” in 1994 contrasts with the new 
expression “economic and social sectors” introduced into the bloc regulation at that 
stage, as per article 28 of the OPP and article 1 ff. of the ESAF Working 
Procedure.20 The ESAF working procedure illustrates the content of this 
expression: entrepreneurs, workers and other economic and social sectors (article 
12.2). In principle, this new conception allows the recognition of a wider range of 
interests related to the integration process than the restricted interpretation of the 
“private sector.”  
Another term present in formal Mercosur documents that can refer to the 
concept of “civil society” is “private party”: persons and/or companies with an 
interest in defending themselves under the Mercosur dispute settlement system 
(article 25 of the Brasilia Protocol and article 40 of the Olivos Protocol). The use 
of the term "private party" also does not reveal much in the way of terminological 
                                                          
19  Aggregated to this broad interpretation, and not coincidentally, is the understanding that 
the term “private sector” is composed of everything that does not have a state 
component.  
20  Cf. CMG Resolution approved on June 20, 1996, MERCOSUR/GMC/RES68/96.  
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precision, since requesting a consultation can involve a person and/or company, 
either individually or collectively. However, I will examine this mechanism here as 
the participation of "private party" occurs before the National Section of the CMG 
and the presentation of the demand is made on behalf of the State, what is not part 
of the nucleus axis of concern in this article.21  
 
3.2 Empirical application of the terms: limits and critical points 
A complementary exercise is the analysis of how the Mercosur bodies have applied 
those legal definitions during last years. That is, to identify (i) which actors 
effectively participate in such mechanisms and (ii) which other actors do not 
currently participate due to current institutional limitations (pending demands).  
The ESAF started its activities in 1996, with in a first moment predominantly 
representatives of the “economic and social sectors” in the meetings: 
representatives of national business associations (industrial and agricultural) and 
labor unions.22  
Upon the development of the ESAF activities and new negotiations in the bloc, 
other non-state actors started having an interest in participating. This demand thus 
provided consistency to guaranteeing the right of participation from “other 
economic and social sectors,” as foreseen in the ESAF Working Procedures (article 
12.2).  
An important point in the composition of the ESAF is that the National Section 
of each member-State must select according to its internal particularities, the 
economic and social sectors that will comprise it (as per article 3of the ESAF 
Working Procedures). The only common rules to all National Sections are the 
following: (i) the actors enrolled must be the most representative of the sector at 
the domestic level, (ii) parity in designating representatives for labor and business 
organizations and (iii) the limited number of delegates (nine) for each Section 
(articles 3.1 and 6.2 of the ESAF Working Procedures).  
Discretionarily, each National Section defines its own working procedures, 
including form of organization and composition. Their articles of incorporation and 
the working procedures shall be registered with the ESAF, in order to make them 
                                                          
21  This exclusion is justified in order to concentrate on analyzing the decision-making 
process. The participation of civil society in the Mercosur dispute settlement system 
might be analyzed in a separate study. Though such mechanism has a traditional inter-
State character, it does not prevent the participation from “civil society” in it. An 
example of this is the practice of amicus curiae in other intergovernmental fora dispute 
settlement system, as is the case of the WTO. In this respect, see DUNOFF (1998), 
SHELL (1995) and SANCHEZ (2004). 
22  For a list of non-state actors that participated in the first ESAF meeting in May 1996, see 
Appendix (Table 1). More details on this meeting can be found in SEIXAS et al 
(2000:21 ff.). 
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available to all Mercosur members.23 However, in their rulings, the National 
Sections have neither defined uniform criteria for selecting the national actors nor 
indicated similar procedures for their decision-making process.24  
Such incoherence among the National Section regulations suggests potential 
dissonance in the overall participation in the ESAF. Of which an initial possible 
difficulty is that in selecting the representatives: the profiles of the actors enrolled 
might be different, above all with respect to their areas of activity (especially when 
selecting the undefined “other economic and social sectors”).  
The few uniform criteria among the National Sections are also problematic in 
themselves, be it due to their precariousness in dealing with a complex 
organization of the society in the Mercosur region. The criterion of national 
representation limits the participation of actors with a relevant influence at the 
local level or those derived from regional alliances (on the Mercosur region). 
Moreover, in the Mercosur member-States, national representativeness is a very 
sensitive concept since all four members have their population concentrated in a 
few urban centers.25  
                                                          
23  Cf. article 25 of the ESAF Working Procedures. The National Section for Argentina was 
created in December 1995, Brazil’s and Paraguay’s at the beginning of 1996, and the 
Section for Uruguay in November 1995. The Regulations for each of the National 
Sections have undergone changes in recent years. For more information on the creation 
of the National Sections and the difficulties in their establishment and organization, see 
PADRON (n/r); for access to the Working Procedures of each Section, it is necessary to 
consult the files of the Mercosur Secretariat in loco. 
24  The institutional structure of the National Section for Argentina in the ESAF is 
composed of a Plenary Session, Coordinating Bench and Advisory Bodies (article 5 of 
its Working Procedures); Brazil’s Section has a Plenary Session, International 
Representation Committee, Coordinating Bench and Advisory Bodies (article 4 of its 
Working Procedures); Paraguay’s Section is composed of a Plenary Session and 
Coordinating Bench (article 12 of its Working Procedures); while Uruguay has a 
Plenary Session, Executive Council, Deliberative Board and Advisory and 
Administrative Support Bodies (article 5 of its Working Procedures). In principle, the 
structure does not seem to cause problems. The dilemma is the composition of each of 
the National Sections’ bodies and their procedures for deliberation, which, among other 
consequences, affect the representativeness of the different sectors in each Section’s 
decision-making process. Other details on the ESAF National Sections are listed in the 
Appendix (Table 2). 
25  In the case of Argentina, 7.6% of its population lives in Buenos Aires; in Brazil, of the 
169,799,170 citizens, 24,333,465 (14.3%) are concentrated in two metropolitan areas 
(São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro), both located in the Southeast region of the country; in 
Paraguay, 9.8% of the population lives in Asuncion; and in Uruguay, 42.5% of its 
population resides in Montevideo. All these data are available at the websites of the 
official statistical agencies: INDEC (Argentina), IBGE (Brazil), DGEEC (Paraguay) and 
INE (Uruguay). Those regions and cities become the main economic centre(s) of each 
Mercosur member-State. As a result many of the entities representing the “economic and 
social sectors” are located in specific areas. Thus, it is possible to question how much 
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The criterion of national representativeness defined by each National Section 
can also favor elitist representation, and it might not be sufficiently flexible to 
allow the recognition of new actors interested in participating in the regional 
decision-making process.26 Greater flexibility could favor an expansion of the 
number of eligible actors, thereby increasing the diversity of points-of-views in 
Mercosur institutional bodies.  
The second criterion of uniformity (parity) has nevertheless not been respected 
by most National Sections (Uruguay is the exception). This is reflected in the 
working procedures of the Sections and the ESAF’s minutes. It should be 
emphasized that the Working Procedures of the four National Sections make 
reference to the parity criterion. However, such criterion was not foreseen in the 
composition of the founding-institutions board of the Brazilian, Paraguayan and 
Uruguayan National Sections, having their Working Procedures registered a 
disproportion favorable to entities representing entrepreneurs in relation to those of 
workers.27 Besides this, it remains the problem of no-minimum quota for the 
representation of the "other economic and social sectors", in each of the National 
Sections.28  
The quantitative restriction for each National Section also raises the criticism 
that the mechanism does represent the bloc or even the diversities existing among 
each of the member-States (domestic and foreign differences in relation to each 
other), especially with respect to economic and social participation in the 
composition of the bloc. There are examples of other intergovernmental fora that 
establish criteria for meeting such diversity, as is the case of the European 
Economic and Social Council, which establishes a formula based on the population 
of each State in composition with a single coefficient,29 or the example of agencies 
                                                                                                                                      
such entities might represent the complexity, as well as the diversity and extension of a 
broad array of structures that may exist in those States (beyond those centers). 
26  The National Sections made that criteria event more restrictive, when appointed in their 
Working Procedures some permanent representatives before the ESAF. In order to 
substitute any of these entities, their regulations have to be amended. Cf. Appendix 
(Table 2). 
27  In the case of the Argentinean National Section, for example, the founding entities 
include three business entities, one for workers and one for consumers; in the case of the 
Brazilian one, four are entrepreneurial, three are for workers and one is for consumers; 
and for the Paraguayan, five entities are for entrepreneurs, three for workers and one for 
cooperatives. The only National Section that has been more coherent is that of Uruguay, 
which establishes in article 14.1 of its Working Procedures four seats for institutions 
representing entrepreneurs, four for institutions representing workers and two for other 
sectors. More details in the Appendix (Tables 1 and 2).  
28  As there is no criterion to "other economic and social sectors”, the National Sections 
have admitted the participation of other business entities (such as associations for 
insurance companies, cooperatives and the agricultural sector) under this category. This 
data accentuate the disproportion on the representativeness of the different sectors 
mentioned above, again favoring entrepreneurs. 
29  For more information, see CESE (2003) and additional data at <http://www.esc.eu.int>. 
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like the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which 
seeks to promote regional balance (geographical diversity) in participation.30  
In addition, other non-state actors than those active at ESAF also participate in 
other intergovernmental fora related to the theme of economic cooperation, such as 
the ministerial conferences and meetings of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
UNCTAD, and the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 
In these cases, there are not so strict pre-established criteria for the selection of the 
non-state actors, as for a national section or the requirement of representativeness 
with a national scope or the obligation of a minimum delegation for each State. 
Participation in these other fora results from specific interests on the issues under 
negotiation and/or the co-relation between the activities of the entities and those of 
the intergovernmental forum.  
A surprising observation is that the participation in these other fora – in 
comparison to the ESAF – largely involves entities that are distinct from (or 
beyond) those in the Mercosur forum.31 There are many reasons for participating in 
other international fora and not in Mercosur; one of them might be the formal 
limitation on participation in the ESAF.  
Although there are problems on the starting points of the National Sections, 
since the launch of their activities in 1996, their composition and representation in 
the ESAF has changed.32 Currently the profile of entities comprising the National 
Sections is quite similar, consisting basically of: industrial and agricultural 
confederations (as representatives of business), labor unions (workers’ 
representatives) and as representatives of other sectors, cooperative and consumer 
associations, with occasional exceptions.33  
Based on an analysis of data on the ESAF mechanism, we can note, however, 
that some actors which were not on the initial list for the National Sections later 
demanded the right to participate, among them entities representing cooperatives, 
                                                          
30  Cf. ICTSD (1999:9). Additional information at UNCTAD website: 
<http://www.unctad.org/>. 
31  The lists of non-state actors from the Mercosur region that attended the ministerial 
meetings and conferences for the aforementioned fora are available at FTAA, WTO and 
UNCTAD XI websites: <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/spcomm/commcs_e.asp>, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm>, 
<http://www.unctadxi.org/sections/u11/docs/105_CsosAccredited_en.pdf>. Data on the 
number of actors in these fora and the proportion in relation to the total population of 
each member-State are highlighted in the Appendix (Table 3). 
32  A list of the founding entities for each National Section is in the Appendix (Tables 1 and 
2). 
33  This observation reduces criticism of potential incoherence in the ESAF, but nonetheless 
corroborates complaints relative to an elitist tendency on the part of the National 
Sections. For a list of entities that currently comprise the ESAF, see the Appendix 
(Table 1). 
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insurance companies and insurance brokers, and some universities.34 For the latter, 
it is possible that specific interests with respect to negotiation themes and/or 
research projects encouraged the demands. In the case of the cooperative 
associations, the interest demonstrated does not seem to be related to a specific 
theme but rather insufficient representativeness on the part of previously-registered 
producers’ associations.35 There are also pending demands such as from 
stakeholders for environmental and gender issues.36  
The interests that fuel demands for participation can be diverse; what is 
important is to note that in many cases participation in ESAF meetings has been 
sporadic. Such distancing from the ESAF’s activities by some actors allows the 
formulation of certain hypotheses: (i) focused interest in a specific negotiation; (ii) 
lack of human or financial resources to attend the ESAF meetings; (iii) satisfaction 
with other forms of participation or even representation in the bloc’s decision-
making process. These hypotheses do not invalidate one another. A combination of 
these and other factors might have contributed to the decision not to participate and 
should be taken into consideration when revising the participation mechanisms for 
“civil society” in Mercosur.  
Notwithstanding the organizational fragilities of the National Sections, their 
formalization has been a great advance in foreign policy procedures of the 
Mercosur member-States. The formalization evidence the elitism usually present in 
the formulation of foreign policy and it able anyone to identify the actors, who, 
lacking formal mechanisms, would normally operate through the lobbies and 
personal acquaintances.37  
                                                          
34  For more details, including the identification of other demands, see the Appendix (Table 
1). VIGEVANI (1998:332) pointed out the risk of questioning this limitation for 
participation mechanisms in the institutional structure of Mercosur. 
35  Such a case reinforces the previously-demonstrated hypothesis on the ESAF’s operation 
and its composition: the insufficient or restricted procedures for the selection of entities 
qualified to participate by the National Sections. 
36  With respect to the pending demands, see ABONG, ALOP, MLAL (1998:32) and 
MELLO (2001). According to Fátima Mello, an international relations advisor for FASE 
and a member of REBRIP – a Brazilian movement with growing interest and 
participation in international negotiations –, the initiatives presented so far by these 
movements is still at a very initial stage. At the time this author expect that in the near 
future some Brazilian NGOs shall obtain approval for a seat on the ESAF. Cf. MELLO 
(2001:11). 
37  Working the idea of direct participation in an intergovernmental forum require also an 
analysis of the traditional lobbies, as a form of influence for the elite in the foreign 
policy of each State. It is important to note that, as for participation and representation, 
participation and lobbying are not exclusive mechanisms. In this respect, REALE 
(2003:13/14) distinguishes the particularities of each mechanism: “In the attempt to 
qualify the model implemented at the European level of participation of social partners, 
several authors have not hesitated to qualify it as openly ‘corporatist’ or 
‘protocorporatist’. The pragmatic acceptance of functional interest-representation in 
policy-making is in fact a main feature of corporatist systems. While lobbying is 
intended as a mechanism of interest articulation in a system based on open competition, 
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Besides the ESAF, there are also other Mercosur bodies that, although equipped 
with formal provisions, lack criteria and more explicit procedures for participation. 
As indicated above, such is the case of the WSGs, the Technical Committees, the 
Specialized Meetings and the Ad Hoc Groups. It is possible to identify the 
presence of non-state actors in the meetings of these bodies from their minutes. Up 
to now, there were participants with different profiles, such as isolated companies, 
associations of companies, industrial and agricultural confederations and union 
representatives. These entities participate according to their interest or the 
speciality and the topic of work being developed by the body.  It should also be 
mentioned, nevertheless, that perhaps due to the fact that this participation lacks 
explicit rules it is not possible to know with certainty all of the non-state actors that 
might have attended such meetings, nor the procedures by in which such 
participation was admitted.  
It is interesting to note that international civil servants of other 
intergovernmental organizations and functionaries of non-Mercosur States have 
attended in some meetings of Mercosur bodies either.38 Taking into account such 
participation, it comes the question if such actors could not also be classified as of 
a non-state character (due to the fact that they do not represent the bloc’s member-
States but rather another set of actors in a participative system) This question has a 
provocative purpose, in order to merely illustrate the complexity of global relations 
and the difficulty in appointing the legitimate actors to participate in international 
fora nowadays. Though mentioned, such actors are not part of the analysis in this 
paper; one of the reasons for this is my central concern with actors from the 
Mercosur region. 
 
3.3 Synthesis and observations  
After the exercise of identifying the terms used in official Mercosur documents and 
their application in the bodies that allow participation, it is possible to draw some 
generic lines regarding the relation of these practices to a concept of “civil society” 
for the bloc, as well as some of the current difficulties to have a normative 
definition for “civil society”. 
Of the different terms applied in Mercosur norms (“ private sector,” “economic 
and social sectors,” “other economic and social sectors,” “sectorial groups” and 
                                                                                                                                      
in the corporatist view the integrated participation in public decision-making is realized 
through a small number of interest associations.” (footnotes omitted). The recent 
transformations in the intergovernmental fora have, besides participation, also promoted 
direct lobbying in the intergovernmental mechanisms. In this respect, the article by 
BÖRZEL, RISSE (2000) develops this analysis reporting the influence of these new 
interaction levels on the domestic policy of each State. 
38  Among the intergovernmental organizations represented are: the World Health 
Organization (WHO), UNCTAD and the International Labor Organization (ILO). For a 
list of such organizations that have attended ESAF meetings as observers, see the 
Appendix (Table 1). 
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"private party") and the empiric experience of the past decade and a half, the 
objective of defining criteria or elements to identify a “civil society” for the bloc at 
this time does not seem to be an easy task.39 Some of the reasons presented above 
can be synthesized into: (i) the variety of concepts applied; (ii) no strict 
terminology correlation with the set of actors involved; (iii) pending participation 
demands; (iv) the lack of objective and uniform criteria in the National Sections to 
select entities capable of participating in the mechanisms of the bloc; (v) the 
absence of concepts and methods that recognize the participation of actors of a 
local and regional character; and (vi) the lack of a regional and/or national 
mechanism to promote the participation of new actors (in order to avoid elitism 
and to identify potential actors with an interest in participating in the regional 
decision-making process40). 
Due to all those reasons, and bearing in mind the current criteria and their 
shortcomings, it can be concluded that in order to integrate a broader conception of 
the participation of “civil society” a revision of the criteria for selecting actors to 
participate in the decision-making process is essential.  
It is possible to observe that the conceptual precision for defining the actors of 
a non-state character might also be related to the type of mechanism that admits 
direct participation. For this reason, the forms of participation allowed in the bloc 
constitute an element of very important analysis. Since there could be more than 
one form of participation in more than one mechanism of the integration process, it 
could also be necessary to apply more than one concept in a single integration 
process in order to identify the interests and actors according to the respective 
mechanism and its level of activity political, executive or technical.  
 
 
4. Forms of participation in the Mercosur decision-making 
process  
Based on methodology already applied in some of my previous works,41 I identify 
four possible forms of participation in intergovernmental fora, which are: 
                                                          
39  This is a crucial point on the participation of “civil society” and its different interest 
groups in intergovernmental fora, being a recurring issue in non-state actors demands. 
For some analyses, see ABONG (2004), UNO (2003). 
40  It should be noted that the problem of elitism or even the restrictive profile of “civil 
society” defined by the participation criteria in mechanisms for intergovernmental fora 
is not limited to Mercosur. For an example of this issue in the European Union, see 
REALE (2003:16): “Magnette holds that the involvement currently fostered is based on 
an extremely limited conception of participation, dominated by the monopoly of 
organized groups (and the social partners are among them) and not by the idea of 
‘enlarged’ participation to ordinary citizens. Moreover, the involvement of citizens and 
groups currently envisaged is limited to defined procedures, without enhancing the 
‘general level of civic consciousness and participation’” (footnotes omitted). 
41  In this respect, see SANCHEZ (2004, 2003). 
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information, consultation, cooperation and deliberation. I will briefly describe their 
conception in order to afterwards identify the forms of participation currently 
admitted in Mercosur. 
Information is a unilateral process, by which there is a manifestation of one 
institution in relation to another (in this case, from Mercosur to civil society or vice 
versa). Consultation, cooperation and deliberation, on the other hand, are based on 
the active performance of all the agents involved. Consultation is a two-sided 
relationship conducted for specific topics or questions and cooperation involves a 
more permanent and intense degree in the interaction. Deliberation, stricto sensu, 
has a direct relation with the right to vote, which in Mercosur is restricted to 
representatives of the state bureaucracy (the deliberative axis). For this reason 
deliberation is not the object of analysis in this article. Of the four ideal-types, the 
first three forms of participation can be part of the decision-making process, with 
information considered a requirement for any form of participation42 and 
deliberation synthesizing the relation between all the others. 
Just as with the previous item, the order of analysis is first the provisions in 
official Mercosur documents for each of the forms of participation and after the 
evolution of each in recent years. 
 
4.1 Information as a condition for participation 
Due access to information implies that, when provided, it contents be: complete, 
objective, reliable, useful and easy to find and understand. It is also important to 
aggregate to these elements the idea of predictability with respect to when and 
where to find the information.  
In an integration process, information can be assured by the publication of 
documents and works developed by the organization, as well as by access to 
meetings and events promoted through its institutional structure. In the case of 
Mercosur, neither the TA nor the OPP include a principle of integrating public 
access to information on intergovernmental actions and decisions.43 What does 
exist in the bloc are specific dispositions related to the idea of information in 
Mercosur agreements and official documents, besides certain mechanisms that 
have been developed from practice.  
In principle, under the terms of article 15 of the TA and articles 31 to 33 of the 
OPP, the obligation to render information seems to be concentrated in the 
Mercosur Secretariat. According to article 32 of the OPP, the duty to render 
                                                          
42  In this respect, see PEÑA (2004, 2003). 
43  The term “external transparency” should be applied to this form of transparency, as 
opposed to the idea of “internal transparency.” The latter refers to transparency among 
Members of the bloc and their mechanisms. An example of internal transparency in 
Mercosur is the possibility of representatives of Mercosur bodies and employees 
attending meetings of other bodies in the institutional structure of the bloc. In this 
respect, see articles 12 and 29 of the OPP and articles 2 and 7 of the ESAF Working 
Procedures. 
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information is limited to: (i) maintaining an official Mercosur database; (ii) 
publishing and divulging decisions adopted in the Mercosur institutional structure; 
and, (iii) editing the Mercosur Official Bulletin. Beyond these, the Secretariat 
produces a periodic report on its own activities; but since it is an operational 
support body for the CMG, the report may or may not to be published as decided 
by the CMG.44  
On the Mercosur electronic page maintained by the Secretariat, legal 
documents of the bloc are available (the TA and its protocols, CMC Decisions, 
CMG Resolutions and MTC Guidelines), besides some agreements signed between 
Mercosur and other international organizations. In addition, the minutes of 
meetings held by the deliberative axis (the CMC, CMG and MTC) are also made 
available.  
What usually occurs, however, it is an incomplete publication of these 
documents. For example, a large number of them do not contain their annexes, 
according to the original information.45 Furthermore, the minutes of the other 
bodies are not available at Mercosur website (not even the bodies that count on 
direct participation like the ESAF, the WSGs, the Committees, the Specialized 
Meetings and the Ad Hoc Groups). The publication of these minutes could entail a 
possible form of control by “civil society” in relation to the other non-state actors 
that actively participate in the available mechanisms.  
The result of partially publishing information (of each of the minutes and all the 
minutes of the Mercosur bodies) has been to increase the degree of difficulty in 
understanding the content and, possibly, the consequences that each of the 
decisions may have on the integration process and even economic and social 
relations at a national level.  
The Mercosur Secretariat also publishes a schedule of meetings and the 
Mercosur Bulletin on its website. However, once again, such information is made 
available disconnected one from another, generating a low degree of trust and 
cognition. The schedule of meetings often contains an indication of provisional 
dates "to be confirmed" –even for meetings that should have already occurred – 
and in the case of the bodies in the deliberative axis, the expected agenda for each 
of the indicated meetings is also not published. Notification of the agenda and 
publication of the deliberations are only divulged to bodies which are dependent on 
that axis, on a post hoc basis.46 
The Mercosur Bulletin, which is expected to be a periodical with information 
on all the activities in the bloc’s mechanisms, contains in fact quite a restricted 
                                                          
44  Cf. articles 14.XIII and 31 ff. of the OPP.  
45  The CMG minutes and their annexes (including a list of who attended the meeting) must 
be published, as stipulated in article 9 of the CMG Working Procedures. Nevertheless, 
this obligation is not honored. 
46  For example, in November 2004, the information available (basically work programs 
and negotiating agendas) were of activities that took place almost a year earlier (. In this 
respect, see Mercosur website (< http://www.mercosur.org.uy >). For criticism on this 
specific point, see PENÃ (2003b:8 ff.). 
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content,47 besides its printed version having a very high cost.48 Moreover, until 
now the Bulletin has not been published with a defined periodicity, which hinders 
the logic of information in the printed Mercosur material, as well as a monitoring 
of the bloc’s work based on an official information for the general public. 
The high costs of the printed version of the Bulletin result in more accessibility 
to information by electronic means (Internet). However, this may be also 
considered a restrictive factor in access to such a type of participation for civil 
society in Mercosur, especially considering the socioeconomic conditions in the 
region and the level of digital exclusion in its societies.49 Mercosur until today has 
never launched a campaign for information about its bodies and activities to the 
broad public (or "civil society"). 
In addition to information rendered by Mercosur Secretariat, there are legal 
provisions conferring the responsibility for spreading information to each 
Member’s National Section, which includes the elaboration of studies and the 
organization of seminars and events.50 Finally, another form of obtaining 
information can be the direct participation in ESAF meetings as an observer (i.e., 
without the right to speak) (art. 6.5 of the ESAF Working Procedures). 
From this brief description, a number of obvious deficiencies in the rendering 
information by the institutional structure of Mercosur can be identified: the 
information is not complete, objective, coherent within itself (or even useful) nor 
easy to obtain. And there is no way of controlling when the information might be 
made available for access. Another flaw is the absence of explanatory works and 
reports in accessible language on the integration process and its official documents. 
                                                          
47  The limitation on content in the Mercosur Bulletin is due to a legal restriction. 
According to article 39 of the OPP, the Bulletin should contain MTC Decisions, CMG 
Resolutions, MTC Guidelines and Arbitration Awards. Other information can be added, 
if and only if, the MTC or CMG believe it necessary to attribute official publicity. 
Observing this rule, the ESAF can also ask the CMG to publish its Recommendations 
(article 19 of the ESAF Working Procedures). In this respect, see the request by the 
ESAF to publish its Recommendations in the Bulletin at a joint CMG/ESAF meeting, cf. 
CMG XXXV/Ata 03/99, which did not receive an effective answer from the CMG. 
48  The cost stipulated for acquiring a copy of the Bulletin varies between US$20 and 
US$80 for versions from 1991 to 2000, in the event the interested party resides in the 
member-States. Cf. Mercosur website (< http://www.mercosur.org.uy >). 
49  In Brazil, for example, according to the “digital exclusion map” published by 
INTEGRAÇÃO (the electronic magazine of the Third Sector): only 12.46% of the 
Brazilian population has access to computers and only 8.31% is connected to the 
Internet. For access to the magazine’s content, see  
<http://integracao.fgvsp.br/ano6/06/pesquisas.htm > (last visit in November 2004). 
50  See, in this respect, the ESAF’s National Sections Working Procedures: Argentina 
(article 2.V), Brazil (article 2.II), Paraguay (article 5, (e)) and Uruguay (article 2.VI). 
This information must be directly obtained in the National Section for each of the 
member-States. In the case of Brazil, there is no official document with respect to the 
National Section and its activities that can be easily accessed by the public (see, for 
example, the Foreign Relations Ministry’s page on the Internet). 
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The providing of information today in Mercosur is essentially limited to an 
incomplete database in electronic format. 
In conclusion, due to the fact that transparency is not a principle of the 
integration process nor is the duty to provide it explicit in the legal regulation of 
the bloc, in the current institutional structure there is no mechanism of control or 
through which information can be collected by actors who may eventually 
integrate “civil society.” 
To complete the cycle of information as a form of participation, it is necessary 
to also consider two other possibilities: (i) that the different actors in “civil society” 
have a mechanism for communicating their positions and considerations about the 
bloc and its activities to the institutional framework (mechanisms known as 
“resonance boxes” in the institutional structure)51 and, furthermore, (ii) that the 
bloc’s bodies can actively request information to develop their works, from any of 
the entities in “civil society.”  
With respect to the first possibility, there is no structure in the bloc that allows 
this type of communication (and when it does occur, it is usually informal).52 For 
the second possibility, there are some dispositions whereby some bodies can 
request information from specialists or actors in “civil society,” such as: the 
Technical Committees (articles 17 (b) and 18 of the MTC Working Procedures), 
the ESAF (articles 20 and 21 of the ESAF Working Procedures) and the WSGs 
(article 27 of the CMG Working Procedures). In a more systematic manner and 
with mutual participation, the solicitation of information can acquire the character 
of consultations. Notwithstanding, from the minutes of the meetings it is not 
possible to identify whether this information had been requested before in the 
decision-making processes of these bodies.  
 
4.2 Consultation as a proposal for dialogue 
Consultations can be held on specific themes in order to obtain opinions and 
positions from representatives of some sectors, as well as technical advices. Three 
different conceptions can be identified as consultation mechanisms for “civil 
                                                          
51  In this respect, PEÑA (2003b) supports the creation of an ombudsman position in the 
structure of the bloc: “La puesta en práctica de esta idea podría comenzar, en forma 
experimental, con la apertura de un espacio de 'quejas y reclamos' en la página Web 
oficial del Mercosur, el embrión de una especie de 'ombudsman' electrónico. Un 
funcionario de la Secretaría Técnica debería, en tal caso, tener a su cargo la derivación 
de los reclamos a las instancias nacionales correspondientes y el reclamante debería 
poder seguir por la página Web el estado del proceso de eventual respuesta.” 
52  As an example of how this has developed in other intergovernmental fora, there is the 
possibility of receiving position papers in the negotiations for the FTAA [cf. SANCHEZ 
(2003) and the official FTAA website] and also the WTO and the NGO Room, which 
provides with discussion fora, posting of position papers and activity reports from actors 
of a non-state character [analyzed in more detail in SANCHEZ (2004), with information 
available on the WTO website]. 
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society” groups in Mercosur: (i) the actual operations of the ESAF (which includes 
the works of each Member’s National Section and voluntary recommendations 
made by the ESAF to the CMG); (ii) the consultation provisions of the other bodies 
with respect to the ESAF (as the representation of “civil society” in the bloc’s 
structure); and (iii) the possibility of direct consultations made by Mercosur bodies 
to any entities of “civil society.”  
As shown previously, in the ESAF mechanism there are specific dispositions in 
the Mercosur agreements with regard to how its activities should be organized. In 
principle, part of the activities is developed in the National Sections and should be 
presented in a report to the ESAF before each joint meeting. Based on the practice 
in recent last years, it can be observed that not all Sections communicate their 
activities and, when they do, they rarely follow minimum standards for describing 
their activities53 in order to permit a monitoring of the dynamics of each one’s 
work and its influence in the ESAF’s deliberations. It can also be noted from the 
minutes that in all of the National Sections there is an internal work division 
according to thematic and sub-sectorial interests.  
Besides this dynamic in each National Section, the ESAF Working Procedures 
also admits the possibility of forming sectorial groups for studies and discussions 
on themes of specific interest (article 12.2).54  
According to the operating dynamics stipulated in Chapter V of the ESAF 
Working Procedures, the forum holds a Plenary Session at least once every six 
months. Before each meeting, the coordinating National Section shall notify the 
other sections of the planned agenda for the Plenary Session at least fifteen days 
beforehand. And, the ESAF’s decisions shall be adopted by consensus; in the event 
this is not possible, all divergent positions are subsequently forwarded to the CMG 
(articles 15 and 16 of the ESAF Working Procedures). Another point worth 
highlighting is that the costs of participating in the ESAF meetings are the 
                                                          
53  There is a certain inconstancy in the providing of information on the part of each 
National Section. The first communication was presented in writing by Argentina at a 
meeting in December 1997; during the following years one or another Section presented 
a report and only in 2002 and 2004 did all of the Sections fulfill the commitment to 
present reports on their activities. 
54  In this respect, an ad hoc Commission Report on the operations of the ESAF in October 
1998 proposed the creation of four thematic areas: Consolidation and Improvement of 
the Customs Union, Deepening the Process of Integration, Foreign Relations of 
Mercosur, and Social Aspects of Mercosur. One of the paradigmatic cases was a 
verification on the part of labor unions that the logic adopted by the National Section 
could favor a consensus with entrepreneurs; after this, the Southern Cone Labor Union 
Coalition (CCSCS) proposed a coordination of the ESAF’s works by sector 
(entrepreneurs, unions and social organizations). Regarding such a proposal, see 
PORTELLA (2000) and VIGEVANI, MARIANO (1999:230). Furthermore, this 
manifestation works the idea of giving a regional character to different interest groups in 
order to strengthen their alliances in the integration process and their position with 
relative autonomy with respect to their States. For a detailed description of the trade 
union movements in Mercosur, see VIGEVANI, MARIANO (1999:223). 
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responsibility of each of the non-state actors (article 23 of the ESAF Working 
Procedures).55  
Through a decision by the Plenary Session, the ESAF can also allow observers 
selected by the National Sections to manifest orally at its meetings (articles 6.5 and 
8.V of the ESAF Working Procedures). This form of participation can also be 
typified as consultation by the ESAF with other non-state actors.  
Besides its internal dynamics, with the participation of actors selected by each 
National Section, the ESAF can also promote consultations with national or 
international and public or private entities to develop its functions (articles 2.VI 
and 20 of the ESAF Working Procedures). 
Based on the ESAF’s works, its members may formulate recommendations to 
the CMG. In principle, a strict interpretation of the ESAF’s function, as established 
on article 29 of the OPP, would lead to the conclusion that the forum could only 
articulate written opinions when consulted by the CMG. However, article 2.I of the 
ESAF Working Procedures defines that the forum can manifest on any theme 
within its competence,56 be it through its own initiative or consultations with the 
CMG or any other Mercosur body.57 The terms of the Working Procedures extends 
the possibility of consultations by ESAF within the structure of the bloc and also 
guarantee openness on the part of the ESAF when invited to participate in the 
meetings of other body's (such as the CMC and CMG; articles 12 and 29 of the 
OPP and article 7 of the ESAF Working Procedures, the latter also foreseeing JPC 
meetings).  
Since the expanded interpretation of its competence was defined by the ESAF 
itself in its Working Procedures and through its practices, the current regulation of 
the bloc does not guarantee the receptivity of voluntary Recommendations made to 
the CMG, nor even the CMG’s need to justify any acceptance (either total or 
partial) or rejection of an ESAF proposal. Thus a black hole has been formed in 
Mercosur’s structure whereby the ESAF cannot rely on any well-founded 
evaluation or consideration of its Recommendations.  
Except for the functioning of each of the National Sections (under the criticism 
presented in item 3 above), the internal operation of the ESAF is reasonably 
descriptive and allows consultations to be duly accomplished. Nevertheless, 
Mercosur’s regulations do not ensure that external transparency is provided to the 
ESAF’s recommendations and, consequently, there is no way to monitor its 
recommendations and opinions. This has generated a questioning with respect to 
                                                          
55  This is also a critical point with respect to representativeness in ESAF participation for 
sectors with less financial and human resources, as pointed out in item 3.2 above. 
56  According to article 2 of the Working Procedures, the ESAF’s Recommendations can 
cover as much internal Mercosur questions as its relation with other States, international 
organizations and other integration processes. 
57  It is estimated that in the nine years of the ESAF’s existence, more than 90% of its 
Recommendations to the CMG came from its own initiative. 
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the credibility and usefulness of the ESAF, as well as the difficulty in correlating 
its dialogue with other bodies in the Mercosur structure.58  
The third form of consultation is the possibility of direct consultations by some 
bodies with any of the entities of “civil society.” These provisions are established 
for the ESAF (as appointed above), the WSGs, the CMG Commissions and the 
MTC Technical Committees.  
Chapter VII of the CMG Working Procedures establishes some of the 
consultation criteria and procedures for the WSGs and CMG Commissions. First, 
the consultations can only be held in preparatory meetings; in this phase, joint 
activities can also be conducted by such bodies with the “private sector” (which is 
more closely related to the idea of cooperation). The entities that may be consulted 
by the WSGs and Commissions shall be included on a list of entities that are 
“representative of the private sector,” elaborated by each National Section of the 
CMG. However, these provisions do not describe how the criterion for selecting 
the entities to be invited is to be established, who covers the costs of any eventual 
need to transport the representatives of these entities and how and to what extent 
the issued opinions were incorporated or not into the final decision of the 
Mercosur's bodies. The establishment of such criteria could improve transparency 
and credibility of the consultation mechanism.  
In the case of Technical Committees meetings, article 18 of the MTC’s 
Working Procedures foresees the possibility of such bodies requesting the advice 
of specialists and consulting representatives from the “private sector.” No criterion 
or procedure is stipulated with respect to how and under what circumstances these 
consultations can and should take place. As can be noted from the minutes of these 
Committees, some entities have indeed participated, but it is not known how they 
were selected nor what their contribution was to the meeting.  
There are also, in practice, other bodies which have permitted the participation 
of non-state actors in their meetings. Such is the case of the Specialized Meetings 
and the Ad Hoc Groups. This participation can be allowed through an extensive 
interpretation (indicated in item 2) that follows the same criteria as the WSGs and 
their Commissions. In this case, the same criticism applied to these procedures is 
valid.  
In principle, the accomplishment of consultations should be based on clear 
objectives and rules and be divulged within a reasonable space of time so that the 
participating entity can understand how to collaborate and to what extent it can 
interfere with its input. Ideally, the consultations also include mechanisms of 
accountability with respect to the use and application of what is presented to the 
bodies by non-state actors. As for the consultation provisions for Mercosur bodies, 
                                                          
58  In spite of the ESAF being considered the most objective and most clearly organized 
participation mechanism in the institutional structure of Mercosur, a recurring criticism 
is that it is an empty mechanism within the dynamics of the bloc’s decision-making 
process. With respect to this issue, see, for example, VENTURA’s (2003:597) analysis 
of the lack of consultation with the ESAF and JPC during the reform of the dispute 
settlement system in 2002 (the Olivos Protocol). 
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it can be concluded that the objectives and rules are still fragmentary (the ESAF 
being the body with most comprehensive provisions) and, finally, the consultation 
procedures in Mercosur fail to take the concern about accountability on the 
employment of the consultation results and their importance to the decision-
making process.  
 
4.3 Cooperation: a deepening interaction  
The presence of cooperation mechanisms with “civil society”, or better yet, the 
existence of legal dispositions that allow this form of participation is identified in 
few Mercosur bodies. Cooperation is a form of participation that almost establishes 
a partnership between the institutional structure of the bloc and non-state entities, 
entailing joint projects and activities on the field. 
One of the provisions in Mercosur regulation is that the ESAF can 
communicate directly with national or international entities, including the based on 
formal cooperation arrangements (articles 20 and 21 of the ESAF Working 
Procedures). The other forms admitted on the bloc are those indicated previously 
for consultations with specialists and the “private sector” by the Technical 
Committees, and with the “private sector” by the WSGs (with the possibility of 
conducting joint events).  
Until today, however, there is no registry of partnerships established between 
Mercosur bodies and non-state actors. In any event, there are still-pending 
demands that, in expanding the functions of the ESAF, it be reformed from a mere 
consultative body to a cooperative body with the deliberative axis of Mercosur.59  
In spite of cooperation foreseeing this mutual and continuous interaction of 
contributions, the responsibility for a final decision (or deliberation) might depend 
on a restricted group that is considered to be representative and legitimate for this 
end. In the case of Mercosur, such function is concentrated in the deliberative axis. 
 
4.4 Synthesis and observations 
For a synthetic evaluation of the forms of participation in Mercosur, its 
chronological evolution during the following three periods will be considered: (i) 
                                                          
59  MELLO (2001:9, note 6) describes that: “In a letter to the presidents of Mercosur in 
1999, the São Paulo Forum already indicated the need to expand the available functions 
and forms of participation for civil society in Mercosur with the manifestation: We 
understand that the merely advisory role exercised by the Parliamentary Commission 
and the Economic and Social Forum limits the participation of our people in this 
process. Mercosur is, for the parties gathered here, a policy of our States and our 
societies which requires channels for manifesting democratically’.”(free translation by 
the author). In this respect a request was presented to the CMG in December 1997 to 
expand the ESAF in order to strengthen it, and in 2003 that need was reiterated (cf. 
CMGLII/Ata04/03, Annex XV). 
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the creation of Mercosur (1986-1991), (ii) the development of the integration 
process (1992-1999) and (iii) the reiterated attempts to strengthen Mercosur (2000-
present).  
In the first period there was much difficulty in access to information, above all 
due to the lack of institutionalization.60 At that moment, access to information on 
the progress of the negotiations was very asymmetrical.61 As for consultations, 
once again the lack of institutionalization in the bloc did not favor this form of 
participation. Nevertheless, pressure from regional coalitions of entrepreneurs and 
labor unions arose at the time, in a non-systematic way.62  
The quantity and quality of the information provided gradually increased with 
the development of the bloc institutions – above all starting in 1994.63 Beginning 
with the second period, the basic institutionalization of the CMC and CMG and the 
dispute settlement system fostered the channels for the interests of different "civil 
society" groups. In this respect, the creation of the ESAF stands out as an 
important institutional recognition of direct participation.  
The Recommendations of the ESAF provided an important vehicle for 
expressing demands for more frequent consultations and cooperation mechanisms 
with “civil society” within the bloc. The ESAF’s most active period was from 1997 
to 1999. The ESAF’s manifestations during this period also promoted regional 
coalitions of non-state actors dealing with subjects under negotiation between the 
bloc and other intergovernmental fora. During this period, new demands for 
participation from other sectors of “civil society” became evident.64  
The third period has resulted in a questioning process regarding the viability of 
the commitments assumed within the ambit of the bloc and the integration between 
member-States. Such lack of confidence had negative effects in the participation of 
actors from “civil society”, especially the reduction in the number of ESAF 
meetings and actors in attending them. On the other hand, the 2004-2006 Work 
                                                          
60  For description of this historic moment and the interaction of state-bureaucracy 
representatives with non-state actors, see PEÑA (2003b:8). 
61  Specific comments are presented in PEÑA (2003b), PORTELLA (2000) and 
VIGEVANI (1998). 
62  Creation of the Southern Cone Labor Union Coalition (CCSCS) in 1986 and the 
Mercosur Industrial Council in 1991. 
63  The relation of institutionalization and information improvement is also evident in the 
recent institutional reform projects. As an example, since the attribution of a technical 
character to the works of the Mercosur Secretariat, it publishes reports detailing its 
activities and offering a critical evaluation of the bloc’s structure (for access to the first 
report, see the webpage of the Federal Regional Court for the 4th Region on the Internet). 
64 It is worth emphasizing here the importance of democratic systems in the region for 
consolidating direct participation in regional mechanisms. For the history of the ESAF, 
see PEÑA (2003b:7 ff.) and PADRON (n/r). For this analysis and an analysis of the 
ESAF’s participation in other international fora and its influence on the participation 
capacity of civil society in Mercosur, see PEÑA (2003b:9 ff.). Among the bloc’s 
negotiations, those with the FTAA (1994) and the European Union (1995) are the most 
salient. 
 
  Civil Society Participation in Mercosur: Some Critical Points 101 
Plan, based on the revision plan for strengthening the bloc, seems to sympathize 
with some of the steady demands from the ESAF to improve the direct 
participation in the bloc. 
 
 
5. Final notes  
Given the general observations and some specific notes it is possible to identify 
that the participation mechanisms for “civil society” in Mercosur are still marginal 
with respect to the decision-making process and count on few (or no) dispositions 
that ensure full knowledge of their operation. 
From what can be observed from the integration process development process, 
its institutionalization significantly corroborated the participation of different 
groups of “civil society”. And, it happened as much in terms of arousing their 
interests as in instigating the technical preparation and negotiating ability of the 
non-state actors.  
There are, however, some characteristics of the current institutionalization of 
the direct participation process that could considerably hinder a further expansion 
of the presence of “civil society” in the bloc, as planned by the Mercosur 2004-
2006 Work Plan.  
The present crisis in identifying the objectives of Mercosur is already a factor 
that hampers the establishment of criteria for selecting and recognizing which 
interlocutors are necessary in the bloc. This is an obstacle that needs to be 
overcome in order to identify which categories or groups of actors are to be 
recognized by each body or forum in each of the three levels of the institutional 
structure (political, executive and technical), besides the objectives for promoting 
these forms of direct participation.  
The term “civil society” is sufficiently wide-ranging to incorporate a vast 
number of actors and could be the motto for encouraging a systemic revision of 
how different interest groups could and should participate in the structures of the 
bloc (including at this time of revision to strengthen the institutions of the bloc). 
“Civil society” can offer opinions, contribute with ideas, technical knowledge and 
the attainment of objectives, but it has the primordial function of supervening the 
decision-making process.  
At the same time, re-imagining the structure of the bloc requires both 
improving the existing mechanisms and developing new effective ones. These 
should be simultaneous steps, in order to always consider the totality. To improve 
the current mechanisms it is necessary to create sufficiently-flexible mechanisms 
responsive to a dynamic society, in a constant state of rebuilding itself. There is no 
doubt that the institutional structure can favor participation to the extent that the 
participation itself favors the recognition of what is “civil society”.  
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MERCOSUL/GMC/Ata 03/04, 7th-8th October 2004. 
GMCLII/Ata04/03, Anexo XV – MERCOSUR/XXVFCES/REC1/03 – “Programa 
para la Consolidación de la Unión Aduanera y para el Lanzamiento del 
Mercado Común ‘Objetivo 2006’”, 8th-10th December 2003. 
GMXXXV/Ata03/99, Anexo V – MERCOSUR/FCES/REC03/99 – “Pautas 
planteadas por el FCES al GMC”, 27th-29th September 1999. 
 
Internet Websites (last visits in November 2004) 
 
FTAA – Free Trade Area of the Americas, Governmental Representative 
Committee on the Participation of Civil Society: <http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/spcomm/commcs_e.asp>. 
COMISEC-Comisión Sectorial para el Mercosur do Governo Uruguaio: 
<http://www.mercosur-comisec.gub.uy>. 
DGEEC-Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos: 
<http://www.dgeec.gov.py>. 
EESC- European Economic and Social Committee: <http://www.esc.eu.int>. 
IBGE- Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística: <http://www.ibge.gov.br>. 
INDEC- Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos: <http://www.indec.gov.ar>. 
INE- Instituto Nacional de Estadística: <http://www.ine.gub.uy>. 
INTEGRAÇÃO-Revista eletrônica do Terceiro Setor: <http://integracao.fgvsp.br>. 
MRE-Ministério de Relações Exteriores do Brasil, Seção Mercosul: 
<http://www.mre.gov.br> e <http://www.mercosul.gov.br>. 
MERCOSUL- Mercado Comum do Sul: <http://www.mercosur.org.uy>. 
WTO, NGO Room: <http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm>. 
UNCTAD- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – UNCTAD 
XI: <http://www.unctadxi.org/sections/u11/docs/105_CsosAccredited_en.pdf>. 
Tribunal Regional Federal da 4a. região, Jurisprudência Internacional/Órgãos 
Internacionais: <http://www.trf4.gov.br/trf4/institucional/institucional.php?id= 
juris_inter_orgaos_internacionais>.  
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Table 1 – List of entities in ESAF meetings*  
Date and Place 
of Meeting Argentina    Brazil Paraguay Uruguay Observers
** 
30-31 May 1996 
Buenos Aires 
ADELCO/ CAC/ CGT/ 
SRA/ UIA
CNA/ CNC/ CNI / CNT/ 
CUT/ FS  
ARP/ CyBC/ CIP/ CNT/ 
CPT/ CUT/ FEPRINCO 
CIU/ COSUPEM/ PIT-
CNT 
International: IMO/ ILO 
National: CEFIR(uy) 
21-22 April 1997 
Asuncion 
ADELCO/ CAC/ CGT/ 
SRA/ UIA 
CGT/ CNA/ CNC/ CNI/ 
CNT/ CUT/ FS/ IDEC 
ARP/ CyBCP/ CIP/ 
CNT/ CPT/ CUT/ 
FEPRINCO/ 
FEDEXA/ FEBAFISA/ 
SNA/ UIP*** 
COSUPEM/ PIT-CNT International: ILO 
National: FENASEG (br) 
4-5 Sept. 1997 
Montevideo 
ADELCO/ CAC/ CGT/ 
SRA/ UIA 
CGT/ CNA/ CNC/ CNI/ 
CNT/ CUT/ FS/ IDEC 
CIP/ CPT/ CNT/ CUT  AUDU/ COSUPEM/ 
CUDECOOP/ PIT-CNT  
International: CES/ Consumers 
International/ ILO 
National: AACS(ar)/ ANONG(uy)/ 
CIRA(ar)/ CGE(ar)/ FENASEG(br) 
12-13 Dec. 1997 
Montevideo 
ADELCO/ CAC/ CGT/ 
SRA/ UAC/ UIA 
CGT/ CNA/ CNC/ CNI/ 
CNT/ CUT/ IDEC 
CyBCP/ CIP/ CNT/ 
CUT/ FEPRINCO 
COSUPEM/ 
CUDECOOP/ PIT-CNT 
International: ILO 
National: AACorS(ar)/ CGP(ar)/ 
CGProfessores(ar)/ CIRA(ar)/ 
FACPCE(ar)/ UDES(ar) 
4-5 May 1998 
Buenos Aires 
ADELCO/ CAC/ CGT/ 
SRA/ UIA/ CAConst 
CGT/ CNC/ CNI/ CNT/ 
CUT/ FS/ IDEC 
No entities listed AUDU/ CUDECOOP/ 
COSUPEM/ PIT-CNT 
International: ILO 
National: AACS(ar)/ CGP(ar)/ 
ABAPRA(ar)/ CGPRA(ar)/ CIRA(ar)/ 
CNA(br)/ FENASEG(br)/ UAC(ar)/ 
UDES(ar)/ UB(ar) 
22-23 July 1998 
Buenos Aires 
ABAPRA/ AACS/ 
ADELCO/ CAC/ 
CAConst/ CIRA/ CGT/ 
FACPCE/ SRA/ UAC/ 
UIA*** 
CGT/ CNA/ CNC/ CNI/ 
CUT/ FS 
CyBCP/ CIP/ CNT/ 
CPT/  FEPRINCO 
AUDU/ CUDECOOP/  
COSUPEM/ PIT-CNT 
International:ILO 
National: CPF(ar)/ r)/ CGPRA(ar)/ 
CONINAGRO(ar)/ UDES(ar)/ UB(ar)/ 
Sec.PyME(ar)/ SGMYMG(ar)/ 
CGE(ar)/ FENASEG(br)/ IDEC(br)/ 
CONPACOOP(py) 
5-6 Nov. 1998  
Porto Alegre 
CAC/ CGT/ SRA/ UIA CGT/ CNA/ CNC/ CNI/ 
CUT/ FENASEG/ FS/  
ARP/ CBC/ CUT COSUPEM/ PIT-CNT International: ORIT  
National: CAT(br) 
Advisors: CNI(br)/ FENASEG(br)/ 
CNC(bt)/ CUT(br) 
 Date and Place Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay Observers** of Meeting 
7-9 Dec. 1998  
Rio de Janeiro 
ADELCO/ CAC/ CGT/ 
SRA 
CAT/ CGT/ CNC/ CNI/ 
CUT/ FENASEG/ FS/ 
 
CNT / CPT/ CUT/ 
FEPRINCO/ UIP 
AUDU/ COSUPEM/ 
PIT-CNT 
 
International: CES  
National:CTA(ar); UDES(ar), CAT(br) 
Advisors: CNI(br), CUT(br), CAT(br), 
FS(br), CGT(br) 
Guests: PUC-RIO(br)/ Unb(br)/ Centro 
de Solidaridad AFL-CIO 
26-27 April 1999 
Asuncion 
ADELCO/ 
CAC/ CGT 
CAT/ CGT/ CNC/ CNI/ 
CUT/ FENASEG 
ARP/ CNT/ 
CONPACCOP/ CPT 
/CUT FEPRINCO 
COSUPEM/ 
CUDECCOP/ PIT-CNT 
No entities listed. 
22 June 1999 
Rio de Janeiro 
ADELCO/ CAC/ CA 
Const/ CGT /SRA/ UIA 
CAT/ CGT/ CNI/ CUT/ 
FENASEG 
CNT/ CONPACOOP  COSUPEM/ 
CUDECCOP/ PIT-CNT 
 
National: CUDECOOP(uy)/ CAF(uy)/ 
OCB(br) 
Advisors: CTA(ar)/ CGT(br)/ CNT(br)/ 
CUT(br)/ FS(br)/ FENASEG(br)/ 
CNI(br)/ CNC(br)/ CAT(br)/ CNA(br) 
6-7 Oct. 1999  
Montevideo 
ADELCO/ CAC/ CA 
Const/ CGT /SRA 
CAT/ CGT/ CNC/ CNI/ 
CUT/ FENASEG/ FS/ 
SBPC 
ARP/ CNCSP / CNT/  
CONPACOOP/ CUT 
AUDU/ COSUPEM/ 
CUDECCOP/ PIT-CNT  
International: Conselho Econômico and 
Social da Espanha/ Asesor del Ministro 
de Trabajo y Previsión Social  de Chile/ 
Confederación de la Producción y el 
Comercio de Chile 
National: CEFIR(uy) / ANONG(uy)/ 
CUDECOOP (uy)/ CTA(ar)/ CUT(br) 
Advisors: CNC(br), CNI(br) 
8-9 Dec. 1999  
Montevideo 
ADELCO/ CAC/ C.A. 
Const 
CAT/ CGT/ CNA/ 
CNC/ CNI/ CUT/ 
FENASEG/ FS/  
ARP/ CIP/ 
CONPACOOP/ CNT/ 
CUT/ UIP 
AUDU/ COSUPEM/ 
CUDECCOP/ PIT-CNT 
International: CES/ ALADI 
National: OCB(br)/ COOPERAR(ar)/ 
CNC(br) 
Advisors: CIRA(ar)/ CTA(ar)/ 
CONINAGRO(ar)/ CNI(br), CNC(br) 
13-14 June 2001  
Asuncion 
CTA/ CGT/ UIA/ CGT/ CNA / CNC/ CNI 
/ CUT/ FS  
ARP/ CIP/ CNT/ 
CONPACCOP/ CUT/ 
FEPRINCO/ UIP 
COSUPEM/ 
CUDECCOP/ PIT-CNT 
No entities listed 
 Date and Place 
of Meeting Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay Observers
** 
8-10 Oct. 2001  
Montevideo 
CGT/ CTA CAT/ CGT/ CNC/ CNI/ 
CNT/ CUT 
CUT  COSUPEM/
CUDECCOP/ PIT-CNT 
 
 
National: CEFIR(uy)/ Facultad de 
Ciencias Sociales(uy)/ RedMERCOSUR 
(uy) 
Advisors: CGT (ar) / CNC (br)/ CNI (br)/ 
ANONG(uy)/ CUDECOOP (uy)/ 
CIU(uy) 
19-20 Dec. 2001  
Montevideo 
CTA/ CGT/ UIA/ CAT/ CGT/ CNA/ 
CNC/ CNI/ CUT/ FS 
CONPACOOP/ UIP COSUPEM/ 
CUDECCOP/ PIT-CNT 
 
National: CGT(ar) / COMISEC(uy)/ 
RedMERCOSUR(uy) 
Advisors: CNC(br), CNI(br), CUT(br)/ 
CUDECOOP (uy)/ FRU (uy)/ ANONG 
(uy)/ CNCSP(uy) 
21-22 March 
2002 
Buenos Aires 
ADELCO/ CAC/ CGT/ 
CTA/ UIA/ SRA 
CAT/ CGT/ CNA/ 
CNC/ CNI/ CUT/  
FSNASEG/ FS 
CNT/ CONPACOOP/ 
CPT/ CUT  
COSUPEM/ 
CUDECCOP/ PIT-CNT 
 
National: AACS(ar)/ CGT (ar)/ 
CGPRA (ar)/ CNA(ar) 
Advisors: CNC(br), CNI(br), CUT(br), 
FS(br), FENASEG (br) 
18-19 June 2002  
Buenos Aires 
ADELCO/ CGT/ CIRA/ 
COOPERAR/ CTA/ 
UIA/ SRA 
CAT/ CGT/ CNA/ 
CNC/ CNI/ CNT/ CUT/ 
FENASEG/ FS/ OCB*** 
CONPACOOP/ CUT COSUPEM/ 
CUDECCOP/ PIT-CNT 
International: CES 
30-31 March 
2004  
Buenos Aires 
ADELCO/ CAC/ CGT/ 
CTA/ UIA/ SRA 
  
CAT/ CGT/ CNC/ CNI/ 
CUT/ FS/ OCB 
CNCSP / CNT/ 
CONCACOOP/ CUT 
COSUPEM/ 
CUDECCOP/ PIT-CNT 
International: AICESIS 
National: Cancillería Argentina (ar) 
ABAPPRA(ar)/ CNA(ar), UDES(ar)/ 
CGPRA(ar)/ CGT(ar) 
Advisors: CUDECOOP(uy) 
 
 
 Table 2 – Main characteristics of the ESAF National Sections (NS) 
 Argentina    Brazil Paraguay Uruguay
Creation of the NS 01 December 1995 March 1996 May 1996 21 November 1995  
Last amendment to 
the Working 
Procedures 
03 January 2004 No change 21 June 2004 28 July 1997 
Types of NS 
Associates 
Founding Part Entities 
(UIA, SRA, CAC; CGT, 
ADELCO)/ Part Entities/ 
Observer Members. 
Instituting Entities (CUT, CGT CNC, 
CNA, CNI, CNT, FS, IDEC)/ Part 
Entities/ Observers/ Advisors. 
Plenary members (FEPRIN-
CO, ARP, UIP, CNCS, CIP, 
CNT, CPT, CUT; 
CONPACOOP)/ Observers. 
Founding Organizations (COSUPEM, 
PIT-CNT)/ Other organizations/ 
Permanent Observers / Observers/ 
Advisors. 
Criteria and 
procedures for 
admissibility to the 
NS 
For Part Entity: national 
representativity and 
character; private-sector 
company with at least 2 
years legal existence./ For 
Observer Member: 
approval by the Directing 
Table. 
For Part Entities: national character and 
more than 2 years legal existence; 
private-sector company; representativity 
and scope evaluated by the number of 
associates/affiliates and/or by the nature 
and quality of the entity./ For Observers 
and Advisors: invitation by Part Entities. 
For Plenary members: after 
6 months as observers and 
upon payment of a fee./ For 
Observers: according to 
antecedents, activities in the 
sector, representativity and 
commitment. 
For Other organizations: decision and 
criteria of the Plenary Session./ For 
Permanent Observers: decision of the 
Plenary Session./ For Observers: 
designated by the Executive Council or 
invited by the Deliberative Junta./ 
Advisors: designated by the Executive 
Council or Plenary Session. 
Institutional 
structure (status, 
composition, 
functions) 
Plenary Session (superior 
organ, composed of the 
Founding Part Entities, 
decides on ESAF themes 
and approves the entry of 
new Entities)/ Directing 
Table (executive and 
representation organ 
integrated by Founding 
Part Entities, executes 
decision of the Plenary 
Session and adopts ESAF 
Recommendations)/ 
Advisory Organizations 
(studies and analyses, as 
defined by the Plenary 
Session). 
Plenary Session (superior organ, 
composed of Instituting and Part Entities, 
decides on ESAF themes, approves the 
entry of new Entities and elects the 
Coordinating Table); International 
Representation Committee (representative 
organ, integrated by the Coordinating 
Table and other Part Entities designated 
by the Plenary Session)/ Coordinating 
Table (executive organ, composed of 3 
Part Entities elected by the Plenary 
Session, executes deliberations of the 
Plenary Session)/ Advisory Organ 
(studies, analyses and elaboration of 
proposals, as defined by the Plenary 
Session). 
Plenary Session (no clear 
terms)/ National 
Coordination (superior 
organ, composed a Titular 
Coordinator, Alternate 
Coordinator and Secretary, 
representatives from each of 
the sectors). 
Plenary Session (superior organ, 
composed of 20 representatives from 
different sectors, decides on themes of 
the ESAF and approves the entry of 
Other Organizations and Observers), 
Executive Council (executive organ, 
composed of 10 representatives from 
different sectors, executes decision of 
the Plenary Session and adopts 
Recommendation of the ESAF), 
Deliberative Junta (consulting organ, 
composed of members of the Plenary 
Session and one delegate from each of 
the organizations that are part of the 
NS); Advisory and Administrative 
Support Organs (studies, analyses and 
elaboration of proposals, as defined by 
the Plenary Session). 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on the Working Procedures of the National Sections. 
 Table 3 – Total number of non-state actors registered for the Ministerial Meetings of the WTO, UNCTAD XI and the activities of the 
Committee of Governmental Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society in the FTAA / Proportion in relation to the total 
population of each member-State 
 
 Argentina    Brazil Paraguay Uruguay
     Total Proportion Total Proportion Total Proportion Total Proportion
FTAA 11         3.03 43 2.53 - - 2 5.9
WTO  6 1.65 20 1.17 3  5.44  4 11.77 
UNCTAD XI  1 0.27 32 1.88 - -  1 2.94 
MERCOSUR 22        6.06 14 0.82 13 23.57 12 35.30
 
Source: Elaboration by the author based on information available at the WTO, UNCTAD and the FTAA websites, and data collected on Mercosur 
(Table 1). 
 
Obs: This table does not intend to demonstrate an absolute relation with respect to proportion. It is recognized that the participation of the entities is 
not constant and could be related to circumstantial elements. The basic conclusion it offers regards the plurality of interested entities in each 
member-State due to participation in these intergovernmental forums. 
 
 
                                                 
* Acronyms: ARGENTINA: Asociación Argentina de Compañías de Seguros (AACS); Assoc. Argentina de Corretores de Seguro (AACorS); 
Asociación de Bancos Públicos y Privados de la República Argentina (ABAPPRA); Acción del Consumidor (ADELCO); Cámara Argentina del 
Comercio (CAC); Cámara Argentina de la Construcción (CAConst); Cámara de Importadores de la República Argentina (CIRA); Confederación 
General Económica (CGE); Confederación General de Profesionales de la República Argentina (CGPRA/CGP); Confederação Geral de Professores 
da Argentina (CGProfessores); Cámara Naviera Argentina (CNA); Confederación Intercooperativa Argentina de Agropecuarias (CONINAGRO); 
Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT); Central Trabajadores Argentina (CTA); Confederación Cooperativa de la República Argentina 
Ltda.(COOPERAR); Federación Argentina de Consejos Profesionales de Ciencias Económicas (FACPCE); Sociedad Rural Argentina (SRA); 
(SGMYMG); Unión Argentina de la Construcción (UAC); Universidad de Belgrano (UB); Unión Argentina de Entidades de Servicios (UDES) e 
Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA). BRAZIL: Central Autônoma dos Trabalhadores (CAT); Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT); Confederação 
Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT); Confederação Nacional da Agricultura (CNA); Confederação Nacional do Comércio (CNC); Confederação 
Nacional da Indústria (CNI); Confederação Nacional do Transporte (CNT); Força Sindical (FS); Federação Nacional de Empresas de Seguros 
Privados e de Capitalização (FENASEG); Instituto Brasileiro de Defesa do Consumidor (IDEC); Organização das Cooperativas Brasileiras (OCB); 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-RIO); Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso da Ciência (SBPC) e Universidade de Brasília 
(Unb). PARAGUAY: Asociación Rural del Paraguay (ARP); Cámara y Bolsa de Comercio (CyBC); Centro de Importadores (CIP); Cámara 
Nacional de Comercio y Servicios de Paraguay (CNCSP); Central Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT); Confederación Paraguaya de Cooperativas 
(CONPACOOP); Confederación Paraguaya de Trabajadores (CPT); Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT); Federación de Exportadores 
Agroindustriales (FEDEXA); Federación de la Producción, la Industria y el Comercio (FEPRINCO); Federación de Bancos, Financieras y 
Sociedades de Ahorro y Préstamo para la Vivienda (FEBAFISA); Unión Industrial Paraguaya (UIP) e Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (SNA). 
URUGUAY: Asociación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales de Uruguay (ANONG); Agrupación Universitaria del Uruguay (AUDU); Centro 
de Informação para a Integração Regional (CEFIR); Comisión Sectorial para el Mercosur do Governo Uruguaio (COMISEC); Consejo Superior 
Empresarial (COSUPEM) - Integrado por nove entidades de cúpula[ Cámara de Industrias del Uruguay (CIU); Cámara Nacional de Comercio 
(CNC); Cámara Mercantil de Productos del País (CMPP); Asociación Rural del Uruguay (ARU); Federación Rural del Uruguay (FRU); Cámara de 
la Construcción; Asociación de Bancos del Uruguay (ABU); Cámara Uruguaya de Turismo 
Asociación Nacional de Broadcasters del Uruguay (ANBU)]; Confederación Uruguaya de Entidades Cooperativas (CUDECOOP) [Integrada por: 
Asociación de Cooperativas de Ahorro y Crédito (ACAC); Cooperativas Agrarias Federadas (CAF); Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito de Uruguay 
(CAYCU); Centro Cooperativistas Uruguayo (CCU); Comisión Nacional de Fomento Rural (CNFR); Cooperativa Nacional de Ahorro y Crédito 
(COFAC); Federación de Cooperativas de Producción del Uruguay (FCPU); Federación de Cooperativas de Ahorro y Crédito (FECOAC); 
Federación de Cooperativas de Vivienda por Ahorro Previo (FECOVI); Federación Médica del Interior (FEMI); Federación Uruguaya de 
Cooperativas de Ahorro y Crédito (FUCAC); Federación Uruguaya de Cooperativas de Consumo (FUCC); Federación Uruguaya de Cooperativas de 
Vivienda por Ayuda Mutua (FUCVAM); Compañía Cooperativa de Seguros (SURCO); Primera Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito de Paysandú 
(CACDU); Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito del Uruguay (CAYCU)]; Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores - 
Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (PIT-CNT) e Red de Investigaciones Económicas del MERCOSUR (RedMERCOSUR). 
INTERNATIONAL: Association Internationale des Conseils Economiques et Sociaux et Institutions Similaires (AICESIS); Associação 
Latinoamericana de Integração (ALADI); Centro de Solidaridad AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations); 
Conselho Econômico e Social da União Européia (CES); Conselho Econômico e Social da Espanha (CES-Espanha); International Migration 
Organization (IMO); International Labor Organization (ILO); Organização Regional Interamericana de Trabalhadores (ORIT). 
** Entities which were sometimes as observers and at other times as delegates of the National Sections of their respective countries of origin appear 
in bold in order to indicate some of the demands for participation in the ESAF by new entities “representative of the economic and social sectors.” 
*** Possibly some of these entities were present as observers without the right to vote. However, such a status does not appear in the ESAF’s 
minutes. 
 
The European Union’s Social Capital 
Wenzel Matiaske 
1. Introduction  
Certainly "social capital" is currently one of the most overtaxed terms in the social 
sciences. Or to put it somewhat ironically: if there were a competition for the next 
big trend in the social sciences, the debate on social capital over the past decade 
would be a hot candidate. All the same, the current prominence of the concept is 
rather astonishing, and thus demands some explanation.  
Social capital, in contrast to other epochal social scientific terms like the 
"lonely crowd", "post-industrial society", or the "silent revolution" was by no 
means a catchy phrase coined to sum up a practical problem, movement, or 
development. Even a quarter century ago – in the meantime, the search for 
predecessors has located earlier sources1 – the term was only familiar to those 
Francophile social scientists not horrified by the hypercomplexity of Pierre 
Bourdieu's writings. He first used his concept in his ethnological study on the 
Kabylia (1972), later systematically elaborating it in his class-oriented analysis of 
French society (1979). Economic, cultural, and social capital are the theoretical and 
empirical dimensions of Bourdieu's social analysis (1992). Regardless of how 
significant one considers Bourdieu's sociology as a whole, at the start of his work's 
reception nobody could have predicted that two decades later the World Bank 
would classify social capital as a central factor of sustainable economic 
development (Grootaert et al. 2003). The rapid rise of the concept was thanks on 
the one hand to the fact that the term has found application in various theoretical 
and empirical studies, entirely divorced of Bourdieu's sociology. Putnam in 
particular promoted this concept with his study of political and social development 
in Italy (1992) and especially his work on the (purported)2 decline of public life in 
the US. At the same time, however, the concept was also used in work with a 
different thematic focus, in particular Coleman's microsociological theory (1990). 
On the theoretical level Coleman's work attempts to bridge the gap between 
sociology and economics, while on the methodological level exploring the 
usefulness of the category of social capital for analysing social networks.  
                                                          
1  In the meantime, Hanifan's study of community, which Putnam recently referred to in a 
virtual discussion, has been established as the earliest source (1920, pp. 78 f.).  
2  This is not the place for a detailed critique of Putnam's complex study. Allow me to 
note, however, that the study might overemphasise the decline of older forms of 
exchange in comparison to the rise of new forms of community. In contrast to the 
pessimistic view of 'bowling alone', the more optimistic perspective or 'skating' or 
'chatting' is given too little attention. 
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At the same time, in addition to the elasticity of the term in both theoretical and 
empirical analyses the normative connotation should be considered the second 
factor in the term's rapid rise. Social capital promises not only to solve an old 
problem of the social sciences – the theoretical linkage of "community" and 
"society", or in its contemporary formulation the problem of "embeddedness" 
(Granovetter 1985), but furthermore offers a recipe for how civil society might be 
promoted. Social capital points to the social relations between individuals and the 
trust placed in social networks. It is this faith in the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that makes the concept so attractive for policymakers. In Putnam's 
words, “When trust and social networks flourish, individuals, firms, 
neighborhoods, and even nations prosper” (2000, p. 167). 
This contribution will not primarily circle around such theoretical problems. 
Instead, using the example of the European Union's (EU) social capital it will be 
show how various aspects of social capital can be made fruitful on a theoretical and 
a practical level. The conceptual difficulties of the term will thus largely be set 
aside. Nonetheless, in the following section I will discuss my understanding of the 
concept used here.  The remainder of the article will proceed on two levels: in the 
third section, I will explore the aspect of generalised reciprocity and trust within 
the member states and in regard to the EU as a political institution. In the fourth 
section, the network analytical dimension of formal and informal relations between 
member states will be examined. Based on EU supported instruments and data, I 
will finally used secondary analyses to illustrate these comments empirically, 
closing with a comprehensive overview. 
 
 
2. Theoretical and Political Aspects of Social Capital 
2.1 Theoretical Perspectives on Social Capital 
 
As I see it, the dazzling term 'social capital' implies two dimensions: first, the term 
is related to the aspect of generalised trust, that is, faith in a collective. In 
sociological terminology, this is intended as a specific medium, or to put it more 
precisely, it address a mediating mechanism of social action.3 In so doing, the trust-
based exchange is typically related to a generalised other – be it an organisation, a 
state, or a supranational institution. In any case, the term as a rule refers to a 
collective, and usually addresses the functionality of social cooperation, as the 
above quotation from Putnam illustrates.  
                                                          
3  Regarding  the classical conception of symbolic media of social exchange, at that is 
based on Parsons (1977), scepticism is clearly demanded when it comes to its 
generalisation. More narrowly generalisable is certainly the medium of economic 
exchange: money. Personalised trust, in contrast, is a medium that is only generalisable 
to a limited extent, and thus a medium that further mediates interactions (Matiaske 
1999).  
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This conceptualisation, which I term collective social capital, is to be 
distinguished from a conceptualisation that does not primarily focus on the 
collective but rather the individual side of action (Matiaske 1999). On this level, 
the relations of ego to alter are central to the analysis. That is, significant here are 
the links – and thus the trust – between one actor and another on a lateral level. 
Empirically speaking, the category of social capital in this perspective – which I 
term "individual social capital" – is tied to the analysis of social networks.  
Obviously these levels cannot be clearly distinguished from one another. At 
least in terms of exchange theory, trust in a collective and thus the validity or 
enforceability of norms is dependent on their collective acceptance and 
institutional constitution. The selectivity of the two layers suffers significantly 
when, as is the case here, the focus is placed on trust in a collective actor (the EU) 
on the one hand, a collective actor that on the other hand at least partially 
guarantees the validity of norms and supports the direct exchange between member 
states, regions, local government, and citizens. 
Nonetheless, in regard to the following discussion it will be useful to maintain 
the analytic division between collective and individual social capital, for this 
division is typically linked to various optionalisations. While collective social 
capital is often the object of survey research, individual social capital can be 
investigated, observed, or explored by way of secondary analysis in an approach 
based in network analysis.  The discussion of the material presented in the 
following follows this operational definition and first presents material from 
surveys on the trust of citizens among one another and regarding the EU. The 
following section will then present network analytic considerations and findings.  
 
2.1 The EU Policy Framework 
Social capital is no longer just a category for sociological and economic analysis, 
but also a concept that also guides political decision-making and policy shaping. In 
the case of the EU, this is clearly shown by a series of current Commission 
positions and programs that emphasise the role of human and social capital for 
economic and social development.4 These papers recognise that local actors can 
significantly contribute to regional cohesion, innovation and entrepreneurship, or 
in the words of Rita Soares (2003, p. 4): 'Fostering social capital through integrated 
intervention is a key component of local development strategies, pursued by 
different Commission financial instruments'. The commission emphasises three 
goals for its programs:  
- the role of citizen involvement   
- the importance of linking social dialogue with civil society   
                                                          
4  See especially Commission (2001; 2003; 2004) as well as European Commission: 
Employment and Social Affairs DG (2002). 
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- the construction and reestablishment of trust in institutions 
 
In the future, the EU will seek to establish a social capital monitoring system. 
The new Social Situation Report will seek to highlight differences in social capital 
among the member states, develop social capital indicators (participation, trust in 
institutions), and provide new data on these indicators. The EU has however 
already promoted a number of instruments – both in terms of policy making as well 
as social scientific reporting – that serve these goals. The following secondary 
analyses will explore some of these instruments. 
 
 
3. Generalised Reciprocity 
The concept of generalised reciprocity is used in various ways in empirical studies. 
In relation to the community [Gemeinschaft], the operationalisations focus as a rule 
on interpersonal trust and commitment (solidarity) (Brunkhorst 2005). In 
comparative intercultural studies, occasionally the aspect of shared values is 
emphasised, an aspect that is neglected here. On a social level, the concept implies 
trust in organisations and institutions. In relation to the EU, the trust in European 
institutions and the commitment to Europe are central.  
 
3.1 Social Trust 
One of the most important sources of social-scientific reporting in and around the 
EU and its member states is the so-called Eurobarometer: the European Social 
Survey and the European Value Survey. These survey studies have in part since the 
early 1970s been carried out regularly out as cross-sectional studies in the member 
states of Europe and are available to interested researchers. The subject of these 
surveys is the attitude of citizens in the member states to Europe. Furthermore, 
special surveys are carried out on current problematic areas and issues. In the past 
decade, this set of instruments has been further differentiated, and beside the 
standard Eurobarometer special regular studies of central issues, for example on 
working conditions in Europe, have been carried out.  
An emphasis of the more recent studies in the member states were indicators of 
social capital in the sense of a generalised trust (van Schaik 2002). Typical 
indicators of social capital in these surveys are social contacts ('meeting 
friends/family weekly', 'satisfaction with social contact', 'feeling lonesome'), the 
subjective level of trust (“you can trust other people', 'other people would be fair to 
me', 'people are willing to help each other') and the willingness of others to help as 
experienced by the person asked ('other will help me if I'm depressed', '. . . I have 
problems with money') or experience in social commitment ('helping old people', 
'helping the handicapped'). 
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MDS Stress = 0.024, HCA (Ward) based on euclidian distances 
Sources: Eurobarometer 2001, European Social Survey 2002, European Value Survey 
1999/00 
 
Fig. 1: Social Capital in the EU 15 
 
 
Typically speaking, national distinctions of the level of social capital are 
analysed on the basis of these surveys. Figure 1 shows such an analysis on the 
basis of the relevant secondary data: the group of smaller countries measured in 
terms of population (Cluster 1, right) and Holland is quite stably differentiated 
from the other member countries. In these countries, high quotas can be found in 
the surveys for the questions on tradition (family) and modern social contacts 
(friends) as well as the perceived willingness to help others or be helped. In the 
larger countries, this level is lower (Cluster 2, left). A special role is played by 
Greece, Italy, and Ireland, which exhibit high values in some indicators (readiness 
to help the old and handicapped in Italy and Ireland) high, and in others low values 
(meeting the family in Greece).  
More interesting than such theory-poor country comparisons are correlative 
studies of the determinants of social commitment. Figure 2 shows the extent of 
trust (in percent) or fairness (in average per country) and the perceived level of 
social commitment. The correlations show that the perceived social commitment 
correlates positively with the subjective level of trust (r = 0.69) and fairness 
experienced (r = 0.46). Of course, these analyses require more precise 
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examination. But if we leave aside difficulties in terms of the quality of data and 
the level of aggregation, a number of things attest to the efforts of the EU 
commission to take the controllability of social capital seriously and thus to 
undertake efforts to increase the level of trust or fairness in everyday interactions 
with the goal of increasing civic commitment.  
 
 
Sources: Eurobarometer 2001, European Social Survey 2002, European Value Survey 
1999/00 
Fig. 2: Civil Engagement, Trust, and Fairness in the EU 15 
 
 
3.2 Commitment 
For the cooperative actor EU, it is perhaps more significant to sound out the level 
of commitment to Europe and increase it. It is thus not very surprising that the 
commitment to Europe and the European idea stands under constant observation 
among the member states and candidate countries. The current standstill in the 
referendum on a common constitution makes clear not only the significance of this 
observation, but also the urgent need to identify legitimate foundations for the EU 
for the citizens of Europe. The above quoted standard surveys of long-term 
observation in the EU, like the Eurobarometer, accordingly inquire on a regular 
basis about support for national EU membership, the state of awareness about the 
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Union, or satisfaction with democracy on a European level. Interesting for our 
purposes is the level of trust in Europe.  
 
Source: Eurobarometer 1999 
 
Fig. 3: Trust in the EU, Benefits from the EU, and feeling European 
 
 
Figure 3 shows an example of three findings on the basis of the Eurobarometer 
surveys: the expressed faith in the EU in correlation with perceived advantages 
from the EU and the feeling of belonging to the EU. In bivariate observation, 
positive correlations are shown (r = 0.71, r = 0.61). The correlation between these 
determinants, that both provided significant findings on the level of trust, (OLS 
Regression, R2 =.71) is merely r = 0.22 when considered multivariately. On the 
basis of this highly aggregate data, there is no confirmation for the widespread 
prejudice that the integration mechanism of the EU is largely to be attributed to 
perceived material advantages. Instead, there are additional determinants that serve 
to promote commitment to Europe, and thus the faith in European social 
institutions. 
 
 
4. Social Connectedness 
In the terminology here proposed, the consideration of individual social capital 
directs attention to the direct relationships between the member states of the EU. 
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This membership can be distinguished among various layers – countries, provinces 
or states, local government etc., and finally citizens. Links between functionally 
structured organisations and their members are transverse to the hierarchy of 
governmental institutions. Theoretically more significant that these empirical terms 
is a differentiation in the EU between formal and informal relationship networks. 
The EU is active in both formal and informal networking. It provides instruments 
of formal network formation and enables contacts between member countries on 
various levels.  
 
4.1 Formal Memberships 
The EU contributes to formal relations between its member countries on various 
levels: the financial and institutional promotion of networking in the border regions 
of the European member countries, networks among research institutions, 
universities, schools, and cultural institutions, or state institutions like government 
administrations, the police, etc. In other functionally differentiated areas, the EU 
presents the legal framework for integration—in the area of economy, for example, 
with the Euro-Companies Act or the Euro-works council—or stimulates 
collaboration among national associations and organisations like industrial 
associations or unions. Town twinning has proven to be an especially effective 
instrument for integration. The idea goes back to the immediate post-war years. In 
1946, Orleans (France) and Dundee (UK) founded a city partnership. The 
partnership could pick up on a 700-year-old alliance between the two cities ("Auld 
Alliance") and had as its goal the strengthening of the European idea. Just a short 
time later, already at the start of the 1950s, town twinnings began between 
Germany and France; these were to become a central instrument in promoting 
understanding between the two former "archenemies."  
A twinning agreement between two municipalities establishes a formal 
framework that encourages: 
- mutual understanding between citizens 
- the exchange of experience for managing local affairs and sharing 
solutions between diverse groups 
- launching initiatives in such fields as employment or social affairs, and 
- celebrating diverse cultural heritages. 
 
Perhaps this final aspect is the most important. For twinning agreements are in 
a sense framing treaties that stimulate civic exchange beneath the level of formal 
partnership between municipalities and their representatives. Mutual visits of 
cultural or sport associations for festivals or celebrations in the partner towns, has 
from the German perspective at least, played a quite essential role in contributing 
to reconciliation with our European neighbours.  
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Source: Council of European Municipalities and Regions, 2003 
 
Fig. 4: Towntwinning in the EU 
 
 
The success of this institution can be shown more clearly in terms of numbers. 
Since 1990, more than 11,000 municipalities have participated in twinning actions 
funded by the European Commission. The largest member countries make the top 
five of the overall statistics (France 2.804, Germany 2.327, Italy 1054, UK 557, 
Spain 557). Poland and Hungary are on the top of the (candidate/new member) 
countries (Poland 477, Hungary 292, Czech Rep. 172, Slovakia 66). 
Figure 4 depicts the network of the European countries, showing the twinnings 
between municipalities founded since 1990. 
- The five large countries (ES, FR, GR, IT, UK) have their main partner 
from one of the other large countries. 
- Towns from peripheral regions tend to prefer partners from central 
countries. 
- Their are relatively limited links between towns from the northern and 
southern Europe. 
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- Towns in the countries of the Baltic region mostly team up with each 
other. 
 
The city partnerships cross Europe with a dense network, and it can be 
expected that this network will become ever tighter in coming years, especially in 
the direction of the new member countries.   
 
4.2 Informal Social Networks 
Europe's cultural diversity is both a problem and a challenge. Living together in 
Europe means crossing borders on various levels: trade, production, and thus 
working abroad just as well as tourism, cultural exchange, and learning foreign 
languages.  Europe's informal growing together can be shown in everyday culture 
– consider the enrichment of national cuisines by way of influences from European 
neighbouring countries, as seen in restaurant menus or the rapid publication of 
cookbooks – as well as in high culture. Special efforts of the Commission are made 
in the area of education. On the one hand at issue is promoting the mobility and the 
creation of a European educational region. On the other hand, these exchanges 
especially help the younger generation to experience Europe, allowing them to 
study and make personal contacts across borders.  
A few figures to clarify the volume of this exchange: 
- About 15,000 (annually) young adults make use of EU programs as 
trainees abroad 
- About 10,000 Europeans make use of EU programs for language training. 
- Ca. 6,000 teachers (annually) make use of EU programs. 
 
Among these measures, the exchange of students has developed to become the 
most significant in quantitative terms (Teichler 2000). Figure 5 shows the 
development of numbers of student participants in the so-called ERASMUS 
program, a program that supports institutions of higher education in formal 
exchange relations. In the meantime, around 125,000 students take part in the 
ERASMUS exchange (figures for 2002/03). At the start of the program in winter 
semester 1987/88 the number was just 3,244. This area is also being expanded 
further: beside the direct promotion of mobility, especially the creation of a 
European realm of higher education, in particular the creation of a European realm 
of higher education is to strength the mobility of students in Europe (“Bologna 
Process”, Conference of Ministers 2003).  
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Source: European Commission: Education and Training, 2004. 
 
Fig. 5: Number of ERASMUS Students 1987/88-2002/03 
 
 
5. Summary 
The sketch of the social capital of the EU shows the multifacetedness of this 
inviting term. Its imprecision is both an advantage and a disadvantage: imprecise 
terms invite discussion, and encourage dialogue across disciplinary boundaries. 
But the discussion has long since reached the level of policy makers, who have 
discovered a significant need for information. A negative aspect of the term is thus 
its immaturity: due to the short-term demands of the world of politics, social 
researchers quickly transform "old" indicators – for example, shared value 
orientation – into operational definitions of social capital. There is thus a 
significant need for more precise conceptualisation as well as the exploration and 
establishment of new operationalisations. This should be recalled when the quoted 
instruments of long-term social scientific observation are to be applied to this new 
field.  
Social capital is above all also a category of practical discourse. Living together 
in Europe: this means crossing borders and networking organisations and people. 
To that extent, the EU shapes Europe's social capital. Emphasised are the activities 
of the EU towards developing a European educational realm and the exchange 
among younger generations. This is a promise for the future that the members of 
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younger cohorts will increasingly understand themselves primarily as Europeans, 
not limited to the education elites. With town twinnings, a broadly effective 
instrument of networking is presented that has developed to become a model for 
success. For belong the formal partnership, these arrangements offer the possibility 
of informal meetings of citizens from various communities. 
The second dimension of social capital refers to the trust of the citizens among 
one another and in regard to the EU as a corporative actor.  For EU citizens, 
Brussels is still far away. The task at hand is not just so spread knowledge about 
the EU and its institutions. Over the long term, the legitimacy of the EU cannot 
solely rest on economic advantage, since the EU increasingly also allocates 
burdens. Trust can form in interaction – this is shown by the success of the 
networking by way of exchange within the EU. On the level of political decision-
making, this means first of all participation. To that extent, the expansion of 
European democracy will also increase social capital.  
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Between Non-Regulation and Harmonisation: 
Tax Policy in the European Union  
Gerd Grözinger 
There's a German saying that there are two things unavoidable in life: death and 
taxes. But this might be wisdom from times past. More recently, you get the 
impression that if you belong to the richer classes or the bigger enterprises, you 
have a good chance of constantly having your tax obligations lowered or even 
getting away without any payments at all. The widely accepted explanation behind 
this is, of course, the process of globalisation and the free flow of capital that 
comes with it. I will later discuss how substantiated this claim is. 
But it is certainly real in the sense that it shapes tax policies. Governments react 
to the challenge of globalisation by making the financial environment more 
attractive for ‘investors’– which is a synonym for the wealthy and large 
corporations. For just one example, let's have a short look at the recent situation in 
my own country. For eight years (1998–2005) Germany had a so-called Red-Green 
administration, made up of the Social Democrats and the more ecologically-
oriented Greens. This is the equivalent of a Lula government, and can with some 
justification be seen as the most progressive one possible in Germany at the 
moment. It ended by loosing popular support – presumably due to so-called labour 
market reforms – bringing on early elections and the change to a new coalition, 
now made up of the conservative Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. 
This somewhat left-of-centre red-green government changed three main laws in 
the tax realm. First, it lowered in steps the statutory tax rates on personal income at 
all levels, inclusive and even most visible the higher ones. Until 1998 the top rate 
was 53%, it now stands at only 45%.  Secondly, it lowered the federal standard tax 
rate on profits (there are additional local and minor extra taxes). For corporations 
in 1998, the rate was 53%, when earnings were paid out as dividends and 45% in 
the case of a retention of earnings. It is now uniformly only 25%. And thirdly, it 
introduced a generous pardon for tax evaders: income from economic activities in 
Germany that was not declared but instead illegally smuggled abroad could be then 
legally re-channelled to Germany and legalised by paying a discounted tax rate and 
penalty. 
There are many other examples of similar developments in the tax policies of 
the member states of the European Union. I would like to propose however that the 
process of globalisation does not automatically lead to shrinking public budgets 
due to the increased capital mobility. The picture is rather more complicated. 
Beginning with a short look at some relevant data about the income situation from 
taxes in the OECD world, I will in this paper explore EU initiatives to date in the 
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realm of tax coordination. I will then conclude by offering two proposals for better 
coordination in the future, proposals that I consider equally appropriate for the EU 
and Mercosur. The first is about output (instead of input) coordination in the case 
of taxes on profits for corporations. The second argues for the introduction of a 
citizenship (instead of a residence) principle in income taxation. This short list of 
necessary reforms is by no ways complete, but in my view covers the most relevant 
dimensions. 
 
 
The empirical situation 
Beginning with long term empirical trends, one first has to notice that lowering 
direct tax rates in many countries might be quite prominent in policy-making 
today, but it is not that new. Actually, this wave is already at the end of its second 
decade. The OECD writes in one of their most recent yearly reports on tax 
revenues: 'After the mid-1980s, most OECD countries substantially reduced the 
statutory rates of their personal and corporate income tax' (OECD 2004:20). 
Does this lead to lower tax income for the state? Not necessarily, for at the 
same time there was also a broadening of the tax base. The OECD continues, 'But 
the negative revenue impact of widespread tax reforms remained limited because 
the drain on tax revenues following rate reductions was often offset by reducing or 
abolishing tax reliefs.' 
Comparing statutory tax rates over time or internationally does quite often give 
a wrong impression, since different definitions of the tax base may exert a much 
bigger influence on the revenue. In fact, there is no general trend of shrinking state 
income for the group of the most developed countries: instead, quite the opposite is 
the case. This can be shown using the OECD's Revenue Statistics, the most reliable 
source for such questions. This statistic has the methodological advantage that the 
data of many countries are collected under the same principles and therefore 
comparable. 
In Figure 1, trends for the OECD member states and for the European Union 
are shown. But the picture for singular countries is usually rather similar. The 
OECD – the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – consists 
of 30 countries, over half of them members of the European Union (Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The other countries are Canada, Mexico, 
United States, Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland, and Turkey. To allow long-term comparisons, the OECD calculates 
figures only for the so-called EU 15, which consists of the above mentioned 
countries without the new member states of the EU: Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia. 
The graph below shows the trends for the comprehensive definition of public 
revenues, which includes social security contributions as well. This makes sense, 
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because the same welfare state services, like old age pensions for example, are in 
some countries financed by general taxes, in others by a distinct system of 
contributions. To calibrate the indicator, the expression of revenues as percentage 
of the GDP is used. The GDP, the Gross Domestic Product, is the amount of all 
goods and services produced in a certain period.  
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The picture that here emerges is probably a surprise to most readers: the 
revenue trends for both the EU 15 and the total of the OECD are definitely 
increasing over time. Let us have a closer look at the EU 15. In 1965, less than 
28% of all income went to the state, in 1975 this figure was 32%, another ten years 
later, in 1985, it was over 38%, in 1995 then more than 40%, and in the last years it 
still seems to be slightly increasing, at least it is not going down. 
A basically similar picture emerges also for the OECD as a whole, which is 
always a bit lower than the rates for the European Union alone, due to financially 
more conservative countries like the United States. Although we have the 
aforementioned cuts in relevant statutory tax rates since the mid-1980s, what we 
observe might be a slowing down of the increase in the revenue share of the GDP, 
but definitely not an absolute downturn. 
Both the political institutions of the EU and the OECD seem to have accepted 
this long-term trend as a kind of given. They see two main structural reasons for it, 
which will not go away in the future. First of all, since their populations are getting 
older, these countries will have increased expenses in the realm of old age pensions 
and health care. Both segments are in the OECD widely covered by systems of 
public procurement. The other reason is the increasing role of education, another 
segment of state intervention in Europe. It makes quite a costly difference if 10% 
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or if 50% of a generation goes to college. In addition, in nearly all OECD countries 
we have higher rates of unemployment now than twenty or thirty years ago, also 
placing a severe strain on public budgets (European Commission 2003). 
It might be objected that total revenue income is not a very good indicator for 
the pressure felt by countries to lower their tax share. And I basically agree with 
this objection. Taxes can principally be imposed on capital, but also on labour, on 
consumption, and on natural resources. Might it not be the case that although the 
whole tax share has increased over the time, taxes on capital are going down 
slightly? 
The answer is not that simple. Let’s have a look at taxes on corporate income, 
again as percentage of the GDP (in OECD terms, it is the position 1200 of the 
Revenue Statistics). The restriction to ‘corporations’ is unavoidable for 
methodological reasons because for unincorporated companies and self-employed 
persons no proper distinction can be made between profits and labour income. And 
the concentration on corporations is also useful for another reason. Corporations 
are usually the largest economic enterprises, and are the classical case of 
internationally mobile capital. Therefore, if globalisation is a threat to the taxing of 
capital, we should find empirical proof of this especially in this category of taxes. 
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But – another surprise – for the tax revenues from internationally mobile capital 
also rise over time. The EU 15-situation again taken as quid pro quo: it starts with 
1.9% in 1965 and ends with 3.6% in 2000. For the OECD as a whole, the picture is 
very similar.  
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Is this the final refutation of the globalisation threat? The answer is no: an 
increase in this indicator can be explained by more than one cause. There are three 
possibilities. First, it may indeed be a sign of a real higher tax burden on capital. 
But it might also be just a reflection of a change in the composition of the GDP. 
When the share of income for capital is growing at the expense of the share of 
income for labour, then tax revenues from profits will increase because profits are 
growing in relative terms. And thirdly, the indicator is restricted to corporations. 
When the relative share of corporations on the value added increases – compared 
with the share of non-incorporated companies and the self-employed – then, if all 
else remains constant, this will also result in more tax revenue from corporate 
profits. And to make a long story short: in the OECD and the EU there are signs of 
increasing trends in both the share of profits and the share of corporations.  
Nevertheless, after neutralising those influences, an interesting picture emerges 
(neutralising here is defined as calculating the real tax payment on one unit of 
value added minus the wages). In some OECD-countries we then see an increasing 
trend, in some others a decreasing trend, in still others a more or less stagnant 
development.  
In the following the position of the majority of the EU 15 members are given 
(for Ireland and Luxembourg the data is lacking) after correcting the data for 
changes in the share of profits and of corporations. In addition, the respective 
maximum period for a trend calculation is named, since the states provided 
statistics from a different period than those provided by the OECD.  
- Increasing taxes: Austria (1995–2002), Belgium (1985–2002), Denmark 
(1981–2002), Finland (1995–2003), Greece (1995 – 2002), Italy (1980–
2002), Netherlands (1980–2002), Portugal (1995–2001), Spain (1995 –2002), 
Sweden (1993–2001) 
- Stagnant: France (1978–2002), United Kingdom (1987–2002) 
- A decreasing trend for taxes on profits: Germany (1991–2002) 
 
The picture is quite impressive: the great majority of the EU members did 
succeed in increasing their profit tax revenues or keep them at least constant 
despite the fear of capital flight. Only one real counterexample exists: Germany. 
However, due to the enlargement of the EU some new players have entered the 
field. And those members, where data are given, show a distinctive different 
pattern of behaviour. None exhibit a really increasing tax share. 
- The situation can be considered stagnant in Hungary (1995–2002). 
- The trend is decreasing in the Czech Republic (1993–2002), Poland (1995–
2002), Slovakia (1998–2001). 
 
The new member states – all former communist countries turned capitalist, with 
often radically market-oriented administrations – are quite openly and aggressively 
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competing for foreign direct investment. And this situation is being closely 
monitored by the other EU member states. 
 
 
Tax coordination in the EU 
The EU has undergone several waves of enlargement. It is no wonder then that 
nearly from the beginning there was a certain awareness that a higher degree of 
economic integration may lead to unwelcome tax competition. For reasons of space 
the following is again restricted to income taxes, especially taxes on profits. 
The EU has a long history of thinking about some coordination in this area. It 
commissioned many reports, usually chaired by very renowned financial 
economists (Grözinger 1999).  
- 1962 Neumark-Report. Recommendation: harmonisation 
- 1969 Van den Temple-Report. Recommendation: harmonisation 
- 1975 EU-Commission-Report. Recommendation: harmonisation 
- 1990 Ruding Report. Recommendation: 30–40% profit taxation 
 
In short, the expert panels usually recommended strict harmonisation policies 
or, in the end already exhausted by the political resistance, at least a narrow band 
of tax rates. But none of these proposals were implemented, and this is the situation 
still today. 
However, with the recent enlargement of the European Union to the East and 
the South, and more countries still waiting in line, something will have to be done 
in future. The policies of some newer member states, which offer real discount 
rates for capital, are marking the older member states quite nervous, bringing about 
a renewed harmonisation debate.  
But one can be very sceptical about a harmonisation of tax rates as the best way 
to stop tax competition: for other factors may be much more influential. Especially 
the definition of the tax base is the bigger challenge. Let’s take Germany again as 
an example. For many years my country did have the highest statutory tax rates for 
profits of corporations in the EU. But at the same time it had the lowest revenues 
from that source. This was not, because the profit share in Germany was so low, 
nor was the share of corporations insignificant. It was because our definition of the 
tax base has so many loopholes that paying taxes could be minimised. 
But a harmonisation of tax rates and tax bases is a rather cumbersome 
endeavour for a political union. There are so many national peculiarities that one 
can spend decades debating whether those are justified or not, which one to keep, 
which one to abandon. The question is therefore: is there another way of 
coordination where national traditions may prevail but harmful tax competition can 
be avoided? 
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First proposal: output coordination for profit taxes 
Due to the above-mentioned difficulties, I propose an alternative instrument. Why 
not change from an input coordination - harmonising tax rates and tax bases – to an 
output coordination? In that case each member country must show a certain 
‘appropriate minimum amount’ of revenues from that category, again calculated as 
a percentage of the GDP. ‘Appropriate’ here means that the respective share of 
profits and corporations would have to be taken into account. And what should 
happen in the case of non-compliance? Then such a country would have to pay a 
hefty penalty to the other members, for example the total of the difference missing. 
What are the advantages? First, it could be implemented quite quickly. We 
already have standardised revenue data from the OECD's Revenue Statistics and 
National Accounts, and we have also standardised data about the share of 
corporations and their profit position (OECD 2004).  
The second advantage is that implementation is done by every national 
government. It may work with changing general tax rates, or revoking special tax 
breaks for certain branches, or in the way it deals with income from abroad. Only 
the outcome counts.  And we could make the rule quite flexible. For example, we 
could take economic cycles into account, and use moving averages over the years 
as calculation base. Or, as part of a temporary aid-package, we could give poorer 
countries for some years more leeway to attract foreign capital, helping them to 
catch up with the other member states. In sum, I think, output coordination would 
make a far better tool against tax competition than input harmonisation. 
 
 
Second proposal: citizenship principle for personal income taxes 
What about personal income? It is often said that very rich people may avoid the 
taxation of income just by moving to other countries. And that even corporate 
headquarters – for example in the financial sector – are sometimes relocated due to 
the personal interests of their high-paid management.  
There is a relatively easy way to put a stop to such behaviour. We could change 
from a residence system to a citizenship principle in personal taxation. Under the 
first scheme one is taxable after the rules of the residence country, under the 
second one, additionally under the rules of the home country. In this case, to avoid 
double taxation income taxes in the country of residence must be deductible. 
At first glance, this seems quite a mad proposition. Does not the whole world 
adhere to the residence principle? Not quite. We have a very convincing and 
working model for the citizenship principle: the United States of America. Every 
US citizen remains taxable in his home country with his world income, 
independent of his actual place of residence. Two other countries that do the same 
are the Philippines and Liberia, which traditionally follow the US legal model. 
The advantages are obvious. Rich people are simply better taxable than is now 
the case. This generates more revenues.  And it also removes some of the political 
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pressure to lower top tax rates. Additionally, a citizenship principle can be easily 
extended to inheritance taxes, another problem where we see some tax migration.  
And even if some try to avoid their tax obligations by changing their passports 
and trying to move to Monaco, the Cayman Islands, or wherever, one is not left 
powerless. The taxability could be extended over the time of the citizenship. 
Again, have a look at the USA (Bauen 2004). Since 1996 US-expatriates with a 
certain income remain taxable another ten years after giving up their citizenship. 
Of course, many existing ‘double-taxation-treaties’ would have to be 
renogotiated. Even the United States needed a lot of time to do so, and still doesn’t 
have such treaties with all countries (Brazil for example, to my knowledge). And 
there are other dangers too. What happens if a country turns dictatorial? Are the 
other states then still obliged to deliver data on the income of their citizens, and 
thereby help stabilise such a regime? So, we must introduce contingency clauses 
that in such a case international tax cooperation is suspended, until democracy and 
the rule of law is re-established. 
However, technical obstacles could be overcome and solutions for ethically 
problematic situations could be found. And in my opinion implementation is a real 
possibility. If the EU and Mercosur countries would undertake a move in this 
direction, together with the United States this would form a virtually invincible 
coalition. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This leads immediately to my overall conclusion. Both an output coordination of 
taxes on profits and a citizenship principle in personal income taxation would send 
a strong signal to the world that globalisation is not destiny, but a man-made 
development that can be steered in the direction of a better, not a worse economic 
situation for the majority.  
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Economic Governance in the European Union: 
Possibilities and Problems of Supranational 
Policy Coordination* 
Arne Heise 
1. Introduction 
In a book on globalisation, I found the interesting comment that Sao Paulo is 
sometimes mentioned as ‘Germany’s largest industrial city’ (see Dicken 1992)! 
Taking the vast amount of German Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Sao 
Paulo region and the number of jobs involved into account, this may well be true. 
However, such a statement does not adequately portray the most important facet of 
the process of globalisation: Contrary to the suggestion of an increasingly rootless 
capital spreading without any systematic pattern across the globe, the process of 
economic globalisation really evolves along the line of regions of intense and ever 
growing economic integration1. From a European perspective, the process of 
European integration is definitely the most important aspect of globalisation, which 
has reached a first climax of ‘positive’ integration in the sense of the creation of 
union-wide institutions with monetary unification and the establishment of a 
European Central Bank (ECB) in 1999. 
It was particularly this last step, which has sharpened the view for the need of a 
comprehensive system of economic governance in the European Union (EU).2 By 
‘governance’ in contrast to ‘government’ a process of continuing cooperation of 
national actors and the coordination of national or even sub-national (e.g. regional) 
economic policies is meant  (see e.g. Rosenau/Czempiel 1992, Gilpin 2001: 
391ff.). 
                                                          
*   paper presented to the International Workshop ‘European Union as the model for the 
development of Mercosur?’ organised by the Fundacao Getulio Vargas held in Sao 
Paulo 27th to 29th of September 2004. 
1  “As some of the extreme advocates of globalization recognize, the world economy is far 
from being genuinely ‘global’. Rather trade, investment and financial flows are 
concentrated in the Triad of Europe, Japan and North America and this dominance 
seems set to continue” (Hirst/Thompson 1999: 2). 
2  Reading the European Commission’s White Paper on European governance (European 
Commission 2001) one gets the impression that addressing European governance is 
merely a question of improving the apprehension of policy making at the EU level by 
the European people (“The goal is to open up policy-making to make it more inclusive 
and accountable”). Out of five principles of ‘good governance’ only one 
(‘Effectiveness’) is related to economic policies ends.     
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Before explaining the system of economic governance in the EU (part 4) and 
taking a look ahead (part 5), let me start with some clarifying principles of the 
provision of public goods in general (part 2) and of European public goods in 
particular (part 3). 
 
 
2. The principle problems of public good provision in an 
integrating world 
Economic policy can sensibly be analysed in terms of the provision of public 
goods3: social security or infrastructure as well as economic or price stability, fiscal 
or environmental sustainability, public education, lighthouses or public utilities etc. 
However, due to the peculiar characteristics of public goods (as opposed to private 
goods) – i.e. non-rivalness in consumption and non-excludability – the task of 
maximising social welfare by providing public goods (i.e. the economic principle 
of efficiency) becomes unmanageable: On the one hand, it is impossible to 
construct anything like a consistent and uncontroversial social welfare function in 
heterogeneous societies (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem)4, one the other hand, 
financing public goods is prone to free-riding behaviour.5 Both problems are 
exactly at the bottom of public instead of private goods provision (which would not 
occur under these circumstances), yet they include that the provision of public 
goods – i.e. the amount and specific nature – will always be torn between vested 
individual, class or other interests. In democratic societies, this ‘battle’ or choice 
takes the form of elections, putting the electoral processes – the electoral system as 
such as well as agenda-building and agenda-setting-processes – at centre stage of 
economic policy. 
 
                                                          
3   see e.g. Reinecke (1998: 85ff.) or Conybeare (1984). 
4  Which includes a frustration of individual preferences or, as in fig. 1, the breaking of 
institutional congruence. As fig. 1 shows, this results in a pareto-inefficient supply of 
public goods.  
5  Which includes, as in fig. 1, a rupture between the individual consumer (of public 
goods) as constituent and as tax payer (i.e. the connexity) and the non-existence of fiscal 
equivalence.   
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Figure 1: Three dimensions of goods provision  
 
CONSTITUENT BENEFICIARY 
TAX PAYER 
Pareto 
optimality
Institutional congruence
Fiscal equivalence Connexity 
 
Note: Under the assumption of connexity, institutional congruence and fiscal equivalence, 
the provision of goods will be pareto-optimal. This is the ordinary assumption of private 
goods provision as beneficiary, payer and constituent are only three dimensions of one 
individual actor: the consumer. 
 
The process of globalisation in general and of European integration in 
particular aggravates the problems of public goods provision at national levels: 
firstly, external effects such as competitive aspects of social security systems or 
spill-over effects of fiscal or monetary stabilisation policies affect adversely the 
connection between the electorate (or constituency) and the beneficiary or they 
increase the social costs of economic policies. Secondly, economic actors get a 
second option: in closed economies, they can use the ‘voice-option’ in the electoral 
process, yet have to accept the electoral outcome finally. In a growingly open 
economy, some actors – those with the least cost of mobility – may also use the 
‘exit-option’ if public goods provision does not conform with their preferences 
and, in some cases, even the ‘dirty’ exit-option which combines the possibility of 
consuming public goods in a country without providing resources for the provision 
of such public goods. The result of both problems is either a deficient supply of 
public goods – e.g. the level of social security will be reduced below what a society 
would like to consume if globalisation or regional integration would not have taken 
place or stabilisation policies will not be used effectively because every country is 
waiting for the ‘locomotive function’ of the other countries – or a ‘gap of justice’ 
as the less mobile actors – particularly workers and the less skilled – will be 
increasingly burdened. 
138 Arne Heise 
In this context, the sometimes alleged positive effects of the ‘competition of 
economic, social and tax systems’ in a growingly global world (the ‘Tiebout 
proposition’6) ignores the potential rupture between tax payer and beneficiary – 
what is called ‘fiscal equivalence’ – and must therefore be taken very critically. 
 
 
3. European public goods as a normative concept 
To cure the problems of public goods provision at least to the extent caused by 
European integration, a cooperation of economic policy actors and a harmonization 
of policies in the areas of fiscal, social, budgetary and probably even wage policies 
is necessary. In the light of a variety of path-dependent, historically grown 
institutional systems in the now 25 EU members states, harmonisation cannot be 
translated as ‘standardisation’, but rather a benchmark-based establishment of 
functional equivalence of different systems preventing dumping effects from 
happening. Taking the almost complete absence of financial resources at the EU-
level and the lack of a conscious European public opinion for granted (see 
Abromeit 1998; Etzioni-Halevy 2002), the provision of European public goods 
cannot take place in the form a hierarchical cooperation – i.e. government in a 
‘European Republic’ – but must be established as a process of multi-level 
cooperation with most legal and financial resources and the political legitimacy 
still at national (or even sub-national) level – i.e. governance in the above-
mentioned sense. 
Monetary unification with the provision of a single currency and the 
hierarchical cooperation of national central banks in the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) headed by the ECB must, therefore, rather be seen as the 
exception to this rule than as a viable blue print for a system of European economic 
governance. Although hierarchical or hegemonial cooperation is often believed to 
be more stable than the cooperation among equals (see Keohane 1984), this seems 
to be no viable option in the European Union where most crucial decisions still 
have to be made unanimously (and decision making is rooting in national 
interests). 
 
 
4. Fragments of a European economic governance system in 
reality 
4.1 The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 
The coordination of economic policy areas among equals keeping financial 
resources at their disposal is called ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC) in EU 
                                                          
6  see Tiebout (1956), Epple/Zelenitz (1981) and, applied to European Integration, 
Berthold/Neumann (2001). 
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reality.7 This method is used for the coordination of economic policies in general 
and finds its expression in the ‘Broad Economic Policy Guidelines’ (BEPG) passed 
each year after a long, reflexive process of discussions among the European 
Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP), the European Council, and the 
Social partners (see tab. 1). After the Amsterdam revision of the Treaty of the 
European Union has accepted EU-responsibility for employment issues, the OMC 
has been expanded to employment policies in what is called annual ‘Employment 
Policy Guidelines’ (EPG) being also passed after an equally long process of 
communication and initiating individual ‘National Action Plans’ for each EU 
member state.8 Two more governance processes using the OMC should also be 
mentioned:  
 
- The ‘Cardiff process’ coordinates structural reforms and liberalisations on 
goods, service and financial markets by which so called ‘meritoric’ public 
goods9 are successively being transformed into private goods (e.g. in 
telecommunications, public utilities such as electricity and water supply, 
etc.). 
- And, finally the ‘Cologne process’ is supposed to organise a ‘macro 
dialogue’ between the ECB (responsible for monetary policy), EU finance 
ministers (ECOFIN responsible for fiscal and budgetary policies) and the 
social partners (responsible for wage policies). 
 
 
                                                          
7  Although the OMC has only recently been established by the so called ‘Lisbon strategy’, 
the multilateral surveillance procedures of earlier EU programmes (i.e. the employment 
chapter of the Amsterdam treaty) can be summarised as a variant or predecessor of the 
OMC (see e.g. Hodson 2004). 
8  European employment policy under OMC is coordinating national policies that neither 
interact nor are interdependent (see tab. 4). Therefore, coordination is not necessary in 
order the enhance effectiveness of national policies but rather means the harmonisation 
of preferences, standards or the exchange of tacit knowledge. In this respect, 
coordination can be regarded as something in its own right but cannot be derived by 
economic rationality as I tried to expose above.  
9  Meritoric public goods are such goods that, for whatever reason, have been supplied 
exclusively by public authorities although they do not bear the characteristics of pure 
public goods (see Musgrave 1959). 
Table 1: The process of Economic Governance in the European Union 
 
                Actor 
 
 
Field of action 
EU Commission Council of 
Ministers 
Economic 
Committee; 
Employment 
Committee 
Social partners ECB European  
Parliament 
National 
Governments 
Employment 
Policy 
Drafts: 
• Economic Policy 
Guidelines 
(EPG) 
Decides on: 
• Economic Policy 
Guidelines 
(EPG) 
comments on: 
• Economic Policy 
Guidelines 
(EPG) 
comments on: 
• Economic Policy 
Guidelines 
(EPG) 
 comments on: 
• Economic Policy 
Guidelines 
(EPG) 
 
 
 
• Luxemburg 
process 
• Annual 
Employment 
Report 
• Annual 
Employment 
Reports 
• Annual 
Employment 
Reports 
• Annual 
Employment 
Reports 
 • Annual 
Employment 
Reports 
drafts: 
• National Actions 
Plans (NAP) 
• Cardiff process • Cardiff reports • Cardiff reports 
 
• Cardiff reports    • Nationale 
Cardiff reports 
• Cologne 
process 
partcipates: 
• Macro-dialogue 
participates: 
• Macro-dialogue 
participates: 
• Macro-dialogue 
participates: 
• Macro-dialogue 
participates: 
• Macro-dialogue 
  
 
 
Broad Economic 
Policy 
 
• Coordination 
 
 
 
Drafts: 
• Broad Economic 
Policy 
Guidelines 
(BEPG) 
• Annual 
Economic 
Reports 
Decides on:  
• Broad Economic 
Policy 
Guidelines 
(BEPG) 
• Annual 
Economic 
Reports 
comments on : 
• Broad Economic 
Policy 
Guidelines 
(BEPG) 
• Annual 
Economic 
Reports 
comments on: 
• Broad Economic 
Policy 
Guidelines 
(BEPG) 
• Annual 
Economic 
Reports 
 comments on: 
• Broad Economic 
Policy 
Guidelines 
(BEPG) 
• Annual 
Economic 
Reports 
 
• Budgetary 
Policy (ESGP) 
 
surveys: 
• Excess Deficit 
Procedure 
decides on: 
• Excess Deficit 
Procedure 
     drafts:
• Stability and 
Convergence 
programmes 
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The macro-dialogue of the ‘Cologne process’ – through all the documents of 
the EC, EP and council of ministers taken as the prerequisite for an environment 
favourable for growth and employment – in its present institutional design seems to 
be no more than a ‘chat box’ without traceable consequences for policy behaviour 
(see Heise 2002)10. A comparison of fiscal and monetary policy stances – a growth 
oriented policy mix is the proclaimed aim of the Cologne process – between 2000 
and 2004 indicates (see tab. 2), that both policies are set in a more restrictive mode 
in the Euro-Zone than in the United States. This result, which copies the divergent 
policy orientations in the United States and Germany at the end of the last decade 
(see e.g. Lombard 2000; Semmler 2000) and is even more pronounced if the 
development after the terror shock of 9/11 is portrayed instead of comparing 
annual averages across slightly divergent business cycles, has not benefited price 
stability in the Euro-Zone but must be seen as being detrimental to growth and 
employment in Europe. However, the performance indicators of the non-EMU 
countries at least suggest that a restrictive policy stance is not the exclusive result 
of an inefficient economic governance within the Euro-Zone. 
 
 
Table 2: Macroeconomic performance of the Euro-zone, USA, and the non-EMU 
countries Sweden, Denmark and the UK in 2000-2004 
 
  
Euro-
Zone 
 
 
USA 
 
DK 
 
S 
 
UK 
GDP1 1,6 3,5 1,5 2,2 2,5 
GDP-Deflator1 2,0 2,2 2,2 1,8 2,6 
Structural budgetary balance2 -2,4 -3,3 1,4 1,1 -1,2 
Total budgetary balance2 -1,8 -3,0 2,0 1,8 -0,6 
Short term real interest rate3 1,3 0,5 0,9 2,0 1,9 
Note: 1 = average annual growth rate; 2 = average % of GDP; 3 = average % 
Source: European Economy 2004 
 
Taking monetary policy separately, the restrictive and growth-damaging stance 
of ECB policy will be evident if it is compared to US monetary policy. In fig. 2 
actual (nominal) short-term interest rates are compared to interest rates generated 
                                                          
10  For a similar, yet more moderate interpretation see Watt/Hallwirth (2003) and 
Allsopp/Watt (2003).  
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by a Taylor-rule11. Although monetary policy in the Euro-Zone seems to follow the 
Taylor-rule predictions quite closely, US monetary policy shows how to react 
appropriately to an external shock. And in fig. 3, where the difference in monetary 
policy orientation is depicted against the different growth performances, the 
detrimental effect of restrictive monetary policy within the Euro-Zone (with a time 
lack of one period) is easy to detect. To be very explicit: this result is not caused by 
European monetary integration but proves the ineffectiveness of the European 
governance process with respect to macro-economic coordination.    
  
 
Figure 2: Monetary Policy in the United States and the Euro-Zone 1998 – 2004 
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Note: TaylorUSA = Taylor-rule prediction of short-term nominal interest rate for the United 
Sates; TaylorEURO = Raylor-rule prediction of short-term nominal interest rate for the 
Euro-Zone; USA = short-term nominal interest rate in the United States; EURO = short-term 
nominal interest rate in the Euro-Zone 
Source: OECD – Economic Outlook No. 75, 2004; IMF – World Economic Outlook 2004; 
own calculations 
 
 
                                                          
11  John B. Taylor (1993) established a simple rule that was able to explain (ex ante) and 
predict (ex post) monetary policy. The simple Taylor-rule used here is iT = i* + ∆Pt + 
0,5 [(inflation gap) + (output gab)]; with i* as the (real) equilibrium level of short-term 
interest rate (= 2%) and ∆Pt as the tolerated inflation rate.   
  Economic Governance in the European Union 143 
Figure 3: Monetary Policy and growth performance; United States and the Euro-
Zone 1998 - 2004 
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< 0 monetary policy more restrictive in USA 
> 0 monetary policy more restrictive in Euro-Zone
Note: DiffMoPo = ([iTUSA – iAcUSA] – [iTEURO – iAcEURO]); DiffGDP = GDPUSA - GDPEURO; 
mit iT = Taylor-rule based interest rate; iAc = actual nominal interest rate 
Source: OECD – Economic Outlook No. 75, 2004; IMF – World Economic Outlook 2004; 
own calculations 
 
4.2 The European Stability and Growth Pact (ESGP) 
Only in one policy area (see tab. 3), namely budgetary policy, a different method 
of coordination – ‘hard coordination’ called – has been established: the ‘European 
Stability and Growth Pact’ (ESGP) restrictively coordinates national budgetary 
policies to ensure ‘zero deficit budgets’ as fiscal policy rule in the European 
Monetary Union. Principally, the ESGP does not rely on ‘moral suasion’ but is 
based on a clear mechanism of material sanctions in order to ‘tie the hands of the 
single nations’. Ironically, it was the German government which believed this kind 
of ‘hard coordination’ to be necessary in order to prevent national governments 
from pursuing an overly expansionary fiscal policy – and to sweeten the farewell 
of the Deutsch-Mark to the Germans. The irony is that it was Germany which was 
the first12 to breach the rules of the ESGP in 2002 and has done so ever since. In 
consequence, the ESPG has been ‘softened’ only recently13. The basic problem 
with ESGP is that it is based on a very limited understanding of the working of 
economies in general and budgetary policies in particular and, more important, that 
                                                          
12  In company with Portugal and France. Only now, ex post, it becomes evident that 
Greece – a late-comer to EMU in 2001 – has deceived the European Union by 
conveying incorrect deficit figures since 2000.    
13  Not only deep recessions but also longer periods of economic stagnation are now 
regarded as situation which may go without sanction, see European Commission, 2004.    
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this understanding clashes with the understanding underlying the macro-dialogue 
of the ‘Cologne process’14; i.e. the architecture of the European economic 
governance is still self-contradictory and needs further amendment. 
 
 
Table 3: Policy coordination in the European Union 
 
Rules or Guidelines 
 
Yes No 
Y
es
  
ESGP 
 
 
* 
Sa
nc
tio
ns
 
N
o 
(O
M
C
)  BEPG 
EPG 
NAP 
Cardiff reports 
 
 
 
Macro-dialogue 
* sanctions for governance procedures without rules or guidelines seem senseless 
 
 
5. The way ahead 
Although it is too early to draw final conclusions on the process of European 
economic governance, it seems uncontroversial to state that we have seen only the 
beginning. Large areas of policies have not yet even been integrated into a proper 
process of economic governance, but it becomes ever more obvious that they need 
to be integrated: social policies or tax policies for example and wage policies, 
which are all prone to large negative external effects (see e.g. Scharpf 1997, 
Genschel 2002, Busch 1998). And even if the sometimes painted picture of 
gruesome wage and social dumping15 is not the most likely scenario to happen16, a 
deficient supply of social public goods and a growing shift of the financial burden 
seems – as argued above – to be unavoidable. 
But it is not only the missing policy areas which must be mentioned, but also 
the governance process itself which needs a second thought: those critics that see a 
need for coordination but believe a process of ‘coordination among equals’ to be 
too unstable or fragile, argue in favour of government at EU-level – a veritable 
‘European Republic’ (see Collignon 2003a, 2003b). The ongoing discussion about 
                                                          
14 While the ESGP is based on the explicit assumption of non-coordination of monetary 
and fiscal policies, the macro-dialogue’s goal is exactly to coordinate these policy areas.  
15  For a critical discussion see Sinn (1999), Boeri (2000), Krueger (2000). 
16  Different scenarios may evolve, see Heise (2000: 30ff.) or Genschel (2002). 
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a European Constitution which would strengthen the EU level and EU institutions 
such as the EP and the EC sheds a sceptical light on the viability of this way ahead 
– at least for the time being. Those critics that also see a need for coordination but 
do not believe in a ‘European Republic’ in the nearer future, argue in favour of a 
different institutional framework in order to strengthen the incentives for 
cooperation in a political environment where the national perspective is still far 
more important than the common interests of the EU: the ESGP and the macro-
dialogue of the Cologne process need to be revised, the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines and Employment Policy Guidelines must be set into a mode of 
favouring employment growth and income stability and must be ‘hardened’ in 
terms of commitment and credibility.  
 
 
Table 4: Policy coordination issues in the European Union 
 
Policy Interdependency  
Yes No 
Y
es
  Macro-dialogue 
 
 
EPG 
NAP 
Cardiff reports 
C
om
m
on
 g
oa
ls 
N
o 
 
 
ESGP 
Fiscal (tax) policy 
Welfare policies 
Wage policy 
(monetary policy*) 
 
 
National policies 
according to national 
preferences 
* has been supranationalised in the EU 
  
Both positions, relying on strengthened institutions to more effectively 
coordinate national policies in a European Economic Governance process on the 
one hand  and stressing the need for supranational, hierarchical forms of 
coordination in terms of a European (Economic) Government on the other hand, 
are not mutually exclusive, but rather point out that different coordination issues 
may need different procedures (see tab. 4): wherever coordination is based on a 
zero-sum game – such as curing externalities of tax and social systems - , the 
process of concession bargaining in order to establish an efficient governance 
system may be unpredictable and unviable.17 Hence, some kind of supranational 
                                                          
17  In most cases, zero-sum games occur in direct interactions of economic actors and a 
market-led coordination (prices as coordination devices) is optimal, if control- and 
enforcement costs (based on contracts) are low (Dixit has only recently pointed out that 
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coordinator would be needed.18 But wherever coordination starts a positive sum 
game – as in establishing a truly working macro-dialogue -, a governance process 
among equals may be both sufficient and efficient.19   
One thing seems obvious: If the European governance process is not going to 
work effectively, political (neo-)liberalism intending to cut public goods provision 
and tax rates in general will prevail and ever more national systems of distribution 
and social welfare will come under pressure (see e.g. Scharpf 1996). However, this 
would be no good prospect for further European integration and the establishment 
of something which is more than a pure ‘free trade zone’. Therefore, the process of 
European economic governance is condemned to work and some kind of 
supranational European (economic) government must eventually evolve. However, 
that is still a long way to go.              
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Governance, Democracy, and Judicial Control 
in the EU - The European Court of Justice and 
the EU Committees 
Rainer Nickel 
The state of the European Union is that the Union is not a state in the traditional 
sense of political philosophy, constitutional law, or international law, and it will 
not be one in the foreseeable future.1 Its parliament is not a parliament in the 
traditional sense of nation-state democracies, and its first attempt to establish a 
Constitution for Europe dramatically failed in 2005.2 Notwithstanding its 
constitutional crisis, however, the EU has evolved into a singular and highly 
successful supranational entity. Its problem-solving capacity and its evolution into 
a legal community, a Rechtsgemeinschaft, is cited frequently as incentives to take it 
as a positive role model for the development of other regional integration projects. 
Mercosur is obviously a possible candidate for such a supranational integration in 
South America; in contrast, for example, to NAFTA, which is clearly designated 
only to remain an intergovernmental trade agreement.3 
The success story of the EU, especially with regard to the establishment of an 
internal market, rests to a significant degree on its peculiar institutional structure. 
There are, however, two faces of the EU: the visible, “official” institutions, like the 
Council, the Commission, and the European Court of Justice, on the one hand, and 
a less visible structure where European market governance occurs, where 
bureaucrats, national and Community officials, and scientific experts convene and 
                                                          
1  This unclear position can even be traced back to the founding document and its different 
language versions: while the official English title of the TEU is “Treaty on European 
Union”, the Spanish “Tratado de la Unión Europea” and the German “Vertrag über die 
Europäische Union” translate into “Treaty on the European Union”. For consolidated 
versions of the Treaty in the community languages, see http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm.  
2  The “Treaty on a Constitution for Europe” fell through in the 2005 French and Dutch 
referenda. For a discussion about possible scenarios in case of a ratification crisis, see 
Bruno De Witte, The Process of Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty and the Crisis 
Options: A Legal Perspective, EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2004/16, 
http://www.iue.it/LAW/Publications.shtml.   
3  Admittedly, Mercosur and NAFTA share an important common feature: they consist of 
one large country and a number of smaller partners, economically as well as politically, 
with the corresponding risk of hegemony and domination. In contrast to these entities, 
the EU/EC is an endeavour of medium-size (Germany, France, the UK, for example) 
and small countries (Austria, the Netherlands, for example). Respective institutional 
arrangements can contain the risk of domination by one country or a group of countries.  
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continuously make decisions, develop routines, and shape the contents of European 
law, on the other hand. This less visible structure, sometimes coined the 
“underworld” of the Commission, is best represented in the EU committee system, 
also called “Comitology”.4 Its decisive influence on the material contents of 
European law is inversely proportional to its transparency and accessibility5, thus 
provoking sharp criticism about its opacity and inaccessibility. In other words, 
European Governance, and especially Comitology, may be held as one of the major 
culprit for the EU’s lack of democratic accountability. Should Mercosur really 
follow? 
This contribution will approach this question in three steps: firstly, it will 
address some functional commonalities of and structural differences between the 
EU and Mercosur; in a second step, it will analyze the new governance 
mechanisms that silently but successfully dominate the EU lawmaking processes; 
and thirdly it will address the judicial reaction to this transformation from 
government to governance. 
 
 
1. The benefits of mutual observation: EU Governance and 
Mercosur development 
1.1 Mercosur: A clone of the EU? 
Mercosur is an intergovernmental organization with an integration agenda and 
community objectives. Its zeal to establish a common market resembles in many 
respects the integration process of the EU. During the last four years and especially 
with the elections of Luis Inacio Lula da Silva and Nestor Kirchner as presidents of 
Brazil and Argentina respectively, the integration process has gained new political 
momentum. At a special summit in October 2003, the Mercosur heads of state 
decided to deepen integration in the framework of Mercosur and discussed future 
steps and projects that ensure that the integration within Mercosur is both 
strengthened and accelerated.6 A year before, in 2002, the heads of state had 
                                                          
4  For detailed analyses of the EU committee system, see the contributions in the volume 
by Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos (eds.), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and 
Politics (Oxford & Portland/Ore., Hart Publishing, 1999).  
5  See Rainer Nickel, “Participatory Governance and European Administrative Law: New 
Legal Benchmarks for the New European Public Order”, in: Erik O. Eriksen, Christian 
Joerges & Florian Roedl (eds.), Law and Democracy in the Post-National Union (Oslo: 
ARENA Reports, 2006), for a more detailed account on the development towards an 
integrating European administration and the role of EU committees. 
6  For a detailed description and analysis of the development of Mercosur until 2004, see 
John AE Vervaele, “Mercosur and Regional Integration in South America”, 54 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005), 387-410, esp. pp. 387-391 with 
further references. 
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already agreed upon the Protocol of Olivos, which contains a number of new 
provisions on conflict resolution proceedings and legal actions against Mercosur 
measures. One of the first results of these efforts is the installation of a permanent 
appellate tribunal of Mercosur, which has already delivered its first judgements.7 In 
a parallel move, Mercosur also widened its reach, with visible results: after a 
longer period of negotiations, on 4 July 2006 the heads of state of Argentina, 
Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela signed a treaty on the accession of 
Venezuela to Mercosur as the fifth full member state.8  
Like the EU, Mercosur has as its primal objective the creation of a ‘Mercado 
Común’, and the necessary integration steps are shaped by regulatory activity of 
the Council (Consejo del Mercado Común) whose composition resembles a 
combination of the European Council and the Council of Ministers in the EU. 
These obvious similarities between the institutional structure and the integration 
agenda of Mercosur and the structure and integration steps of the EU/EC may 
induce observers to conclude that Mercosur is copying the EU/EC and its path to 
integration. This conclusion, however, would be premature. On a closer look it 
becomes apparent that Mercosur has still a much stronger intergovernmental 
character than the EC ever had: while the EC, with its Commission and its Court of 
Justice, had supranational elements built in its institutional structure from the 
beginning, Mercosur was created by classical means of international law, with the 
power of legislative proposals resting with the Member States and a dispute 
settlement system instead of a court.9 Therefore, comparisons, as always, can only 
be made very cautiously, if they are not impossible altogether.10 
 
1.2 Integration, thick and thin 
This caution towards a transfer of legal concepts and designs is justified not only 
with regard to comparisons of the institutional structure of Mercosur and the EU, 
but also with regard to the term ‘integration’ itself, and the underlying processes 
that characterise it. ‘Integration’ in the present European context conveys a 
peculiar meaning, especially in view of the fact that the EU treaty has established 
an “ever closer Union” (Art. 1 TEU) with a constitutional project. The integration 
                                                          
7  The ‘Tribunal Permanente de Revisión del Mercosur’ has only recently been 
established. It is a forum for appellate proceedings against rulings of the ad hoc 
arbitration tribunals. In a preliminary assessment of its first decision, Daniel P. Piscitello 
and Jan P. Schmidt hold that the tribunal takes the European Court of Justice as a role 
model: „Der EuGH als Vorbild: Erste Entscheidung des ständigen Mercosur-Gerichts“, 
in  17 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2006), pp. 301-303. 
8  See http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/principal/contenido.asp (July 2006). 
9  See the founding Treaty of Asuncion, establishing Mercosur, and the four amending 
protocols at http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/principal/contenido.asp.  
10 See Günter Frankenberg, “Critical Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative Law”, 26 
Harvard International Law Review (1985), 411. 
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agenda of the EU has moved away from mere market integration towards political, 
legal and social integration.11 
Even the term ‘market integration’ is too broad and has to be conceptually 
specified as it can stand for very different modes of integration. For example, in 
retrospect it is frequently argued that European integration can roughly be divided 
into two different phases, a phase of ‘negative integration’ and a phase of ‘positive 
integration’.12 The former phase can be identified with the establishment of the 
Common Market; it was characterized by legislative activity aiming at the removal 
of non-tariff barriers to trade, while the latter phase is dominated by vast and far-
reaching activities aiming at a re-regulation of the Internal Market through 
administrative regulatory networks and agencies.  
Positive integration is even defined as a legal duty of the EU: title VI chapter 3 
TEC (Articles 93-97) precisely describes the possible ways for a harmonization of 
the Member State legal orders. Article 95.3 TEC in particular induced the 
European Commission to find creative ways for this re-regulation activity. This 
article obliges the Commission to ensure “a high level of protection” in the fields 
of health, safety, environmental and consumer protection when drafting proposals 
for legislative acts needed “to complete the internal market”. Instead of only 
removing barriers to trade in goods and services the Commission has to create a 
positive vision of qualitatively ‘good’ market governance.  
 
1.3 The way forward: Positive Integration of Mercosur? 
Such a quantum leap from negative to positive integration, even if not as neatly 
distinguishable in practice as often described in theory in the style of a regulatory 
model, may be the subject of future Mercosur integration activities as envisioned 
by the 2003 special summit.13 As future developments of Mercosur highly depend 
                                                          
11  The Treaty of Maastricht has brought the Union citizenship (Art. 17 TEC), the Treaties 
of Amsterdam and Nice have widened competences in the areas of social protection 
(Title XI TEC) and police and judicial co-operation (Title IV TEC, Title VI TEU).   
12  In this sense, for example, Fritz W. Scharpf, “Negative and Positive Integration in the 
Political Economy of European Welfare States”, in Gary Marks et al., Governance in the 
European Union (London: Sage, 1996). For a critique of the over-simplification implied 
in this division, see Christian Joerges, “Bureaucratic Nightmare, Technocratic Regime 
and the Dream of Good Transnational Governance”, in Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos 
(eds.), supra note 5, pp. 3-17, esp. at pp. 4-5. 
13  Regulatory activity in Mercosur shows some remarkable patterns. Although Article 1 of 
the Treaty of Asunción clearly states that the installation of a common market demands 
a harmonization of the legal orders of the Mercosur member states, a survey of the 
regulatory fields of Mercosur reveals some interesting gaps. There are, for example, no 
common market regulations in the agricultural sector. In contrast to this rather sluggish 
development in some areas there is a heightened activity especially in the field of 
judicial cooperation, police cooperation and intelligence, although judicial and police 
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upon political preferences as well as upon the political economic cycles within the 
Member States,14 however, speculations about the way forward may prove rather 
fruitless. Instead of describing and analyzing in detail the current differences 
between and the commonalities of the superstructures of Mercosur and the EU/EC, 
therefore, it is more useful to focus on specific patterns of European integration, 
patterns that characterize the peculiar path of EU integration better than 
methodologically questionable comparisons. A mutual observation of Mercosur 
and EU developments may provide for interesting exterior perspectives, no more, 
but also no less. Particularly for Mercosur, which is also struggling with the 
political, legal and legitimatory consequences of further integration, the European 
experience with internal market governance and its constitutionalization can serve 
as a yardstick –or a daunting example.   
 
 
2. The Emergence of EU Governance: A case study 
What is EU Governance – bureaucratic nightmare, technocratic regime, or good 
transnational governance?15 Whatever the final verdict may be, one of the most 
remarkable developments in the integration mechanisms of the EU in the last two 
decades is the emergence of a new form of supranational legislative and 
administrative activity that amounts to New Forms of Governance16 – a 
development that started in 1985/86 (with the White Paper of the Commission in 
198517 and with the Single European Act 198618), long before the word 
                                                                                                                                      
cooperation are not even mentioned in the Treaty of Asunción as objectives or 
instruments, see Vervaele, supra note 7, p. 401-407 with further references. 
14  For an account on the major steps to Mercosur integration, see Vervaele, supra note 7. 
15  See the title of Christian Joerges’ contribution, supra note 13. 
16  These ‘New Governance’ structures are best represented by the EU committee system 
(‘Comitology’), by the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), and by the so-called 
Lamfalussy method of regulation. For more detailed accounts on new forms of EU 
governance, see Joanne Scott & David Trubek, “Mind the Gap: Law and New 
Approaches to Governance in Europe”, 8 European Law Journal (2002), pp. 1-18; Erika 
Szyszczak, “Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination, 12 
European Law Journal 4 (2006), pp. 486-502; see also the contributions in the volume 
by Herwig C.H. Hofmann & Alexander Türk (eds.), EU Administrative Governance 
(Elgar Publishing, London 2006; forthcoming). 
17 In 1985 the Commission, under the impetus of its new President, Jacques Delors, 
published a “White Paper on the Internal Market” which identified the 279 legislative 
measures needed to complete the internal market. It put forward a schedule and 
proposed a deadline of 31 December 1992. 
18  The Single European Act (SEA), signed in Luxembourg and The Hague in 1986, and 
entered into force on 1 July 1987, provided for the adaptations required for the 
achievement of the Internal Market. It can be found in the Official Journal (OJ) L 169 of 
29 June 1987. 
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‘governance’ became a popular catchword,19 and it gained momentum in the 
1990’s when majoritarian voting mechanisms were introduced in more and more 
policy fields of the EU.20 
In the following I will sketch this institutional and legal development of the 
EU/EC towards what can be called an Integrating European Administration. I 
attempt to show that the EU/EC has silently evolved into a supranational 
administrative system in the shadow of the law, where horizontal and vertical 
administrative actions are intertwined in a unique way. This system functions 
largely without a coherent and comprehensive legal basis, but not outside the law. 
Its paradoxical position as being situated between lawmaking and political 
engineering is best illustrated by the frictions and irritations New Governance 
structures create within the legal system, and especially in the judgements of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). One of the most important cases highlighting the 
problems and pitfalls of European Governance mechanisms was the Rothmans 
case:21  
 
2.1 A Kafkaesque story 
By letter of 23 January 1997, the Rothmans company, a famous cigarette 
manufacturer, had requested access to a number of documents which included the 
minutes of the Customs Code Committee from 4 April 1995 onwards.22 Rothmans 
probably had heard that the Commission planned to take actions against illegal 
imports of cigarettes through third countries such as Romania or Bulgaria into the 
European Union. Many indicators pointed to the active involvement of cigarette 
manufacturers in these illegal activities. The reasons why Rothmans had 
                                                          
19  The emergence of the term ‘governance’ outside of the narrow field of corporate 
governance can be traced back in particular to the United Nations Commission on 
Global Governance. In a policy paper from 1995 it defined that “Governance is the sum 
of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common 
affairs”, United Nations Commission on Global Governance, Our Global 
Neighbourhood, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), Chapter 1, also available at: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20011222021819/www.cgg.ch/chap1.html. 
20  Milestones towards majority voting were the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001). 
21  Court of First Instance, judgment of 19 July 1999, Case T-188/97, Rothmans 
International BV vs. Commission, available at http://www.curia.europa.eu/en/index.htm 
(under ‘case-law’). The Court of First Instance can be characterised as an independent 
sub-division of the European Court of Justice. 
22 The request was based on Decision 94/90 granting access to certain documents of the 
Commission under certain conditions. This Decision has been replaced by the already 
mentioned Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents. The new regulation provides for a much higher degree of 
transparency and easier access to documents of the Council, the Commission, and the 
Parliament. 
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approached the Commission (and not the Customs Code Committee directly) were 
simple: like all committees assisting and counselling the Commission, this one did 
not have its own administration, budget, archive or premises, nor an address of its 
own. 
The Commission’s Directorate-General for Customs and Indirect Taxation 
forwarded a number of Commission documents, but refused to hand over the 
minutes of the Committee on the ground that the Commission was not their 
author.23 It pointed out that, while the minutes are drawn up by the Commission in 
its secretarial capacity, they “are adopted by the Committee, which is therefore 
their author”. The Commission also refused to hand over the Committee's internal 
regulation on the ground that the Commission was not the author of that document, 
either. Finally, it stated that, under that regulation, the Committee's proceedings are 
confidential. 
As a last resort, Rothmans approached the EU Member States. By letters of 30 
May 1997, the company requested access to the minutes in question from the 
customs authorities of each Member State. Seven of them answered, two merely 
acknowledging receipt of the application and the other five declining access by 
reference, in the majority of cases, to the confidential nature of the work carried 
out by the Committee.  
In June 1997 Rothmans brought an action against the Commission before the 
Court of First Instance and requested the annulment of the Commission´s decisions 
denying access to the minutes and the internal regulation of the Committee – 
successfully, as it turned out.  
This case was a landmark case in three respects: firstly, it challenged the 
practice of the Commission to retreat behind some form of intergovernmental 
confidentiality; secondly, it brought up the question of what the real mechanisms 
behind the Commission’s regulatory actions are: how does the EU bureaucracy 
actually work, and what is the role of the committees?; and finally, the case 
demanded a clarification of the openness, transparency, and accessibility of the EU 
bureaucracy: are citizens entitled to control the administrative process, and to what 
extent? 
The Rothmans decision, in line with a general policy of the ECJ, did not take 
up all these questions and answer them in a fundamental manner. It highlighted, 
however, that the fact that the committees formally do not possess decision-making 
powers of their own tends to complicate judicial review of committees´ work. 
Additionally, as Renaud Dehousse aptly observes, the “indirect character of the 
review process, compounded by the more general difficulty experienced by private 
parties seeking annulment of community decisions, reduces incentives to rely on 
litigation to ensure the proper functioning of committees.”24 Indeed, the structure 
of judicial review as laid out in Articles 220-245 TEC strongly supports this 
                                                          
23  Decision 94/90 provided that applications must be sent “directly to the author”. 
24  Renaud Dehousse, “Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European Governance”, 
in: Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe´s 
Integrated Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 207-229, at 215. 
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observation: while the reference procedure of Article 234 TEC represents the 
“normal” procedure where a national court refers a case to the ECJ in case of 
doubts about the interpretation and implementation of the TEC, individual access 
to the Court of First Instance (CFI)25 is granted only under strict conditions.26 In 
our case, because Rothmans was denied access to the minutes individually, the 
conditions for individual access to the Court of First Instance were met.27  
As to the material question concerning Rothmans´ right to access to the 
minutes, the position of the Commission amounted to a paradoxical – and 
embarrassing – situation: committees are supposed to be an emanation of the 
Council, they inform and control the measures of the Commission. But the Council 
does not hold copies of committee documents. Thus, the argument of the 
Commission that it held the pen for the committee but was not the author of the 
documents amounted to an exclusion of committees from the scope of rules 
granting access to Community documents.  
In its judgement the Court of First Instance resolved the case in favour of the 
right to access and stressed the importance of the principle of transparency. It held 
that “for the purposes of the Community rules on access to documents, 
“’comitology’ committees come under the Commission itself,…which is 
responsible for rulings on applications for access to documents of those 
committees”.28 With its decision the ECJ paid tribute to the new governance 
amalgam of Commission and committees that is called “Comitology”, but it did 
not go further and explore the status and constitutional position of the committee 
system.  
 
                                                          
25  The CFI was created in 1988 in order to ease the caseload of the ECJ. Originally, the 
CFI was only responsible for the rising number of cases related to employment matters 
of EC personnel; after the Treaties of Nizza and Amsterdam the CFI was entrusted with 
more and more tasks and functions presently as the first instance in all cases where the 
ECJ can be addressed directly (cf. Article 230 TEC). 
26  While Articles 230.2 and 230.3 TEC grant privileged access of the EU institutions and 
the Member States to the Court, Article 230.4 TEC allows for an individual motion of 
annulment of decisions by other plaintiffs such as private persons only if this decision 
addresses the plaintiff in person, or if a general regulation affects the plaintiff directly 
and individually. The interpretation of theses provisions is highly contested; from the 
beginning, the ECJ has taken up a strict position and interprets Article 230.4 TEC 
extremely narrow. A recent attempt of the CFI to loosen the conditions under which 
individual access to the court is granted has failed; in a parallel case, the ECJ 
immediately rejected the considerations the CFI had favoured. See case T-177/01, Jégo-
Quéré et Cie SA vs. Commission, CFI judgement of 3 May 2003 (loosening the 
conditions), and case C-50/00, Unión de Pequen ̃os Agricultores vs. Council, ECJ 
judgement of 25 July 2003 (re-establishing the strict conditions), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu.  
27  Case T-188/97, Rothmans vs. Commission, CFI judgement of 19 July 1999, para. 30-32. 
28  Case T-188/97, supra note 28, para. 61 
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2.2 The EU Committees: European Social Regulation between Governance 
and Government 
In order to grasp the somehow twisted character of the decision making process 
within the EU – “twisted” if compared to the traditional picture of parliamentary 
decision-making in the traditional democratic nation state – it is necessary to stress 
once more that the EU has a unique institutional fabric that resists comparisons 
with the structures we are familiar with from our nation state design: neither can 
the European Parliament be characterised as the law-making organ of the EU 
(especially because the Council is the primal legislative organ), nor does the 
European Commission fit the description of a government in the traditional sense 
(particularly because it is solely responsible for legislative proposals), and also the 
Council resists a clear characterisation in terms that are familiar from political 
science or legal text books (it is a non-parliamentarian law-making organ 
consisting of government ministers). At a different level, this unique constellation 
finds its counterpart in the committee system, another unique construction that was 
characterised above as ‘the Council in the Commission’. In order to illuminate this 
substructure of EU committees another prominent case, the so-called BSE case, is 
extremely useful. It has put the institutional framework of the EU to a crucial test, 
and it has revealed the reality of a supranational entity that is neither a democratic 
state nor an international institution.  
 
a. The BSE case 
 
In 1996, the BSE crisis shook the European Union institutions, and especially the 
European Commission. It finally resulted in the establishment of a Special Inquiry 
Committee of the European Parliament that scrutinized the European 
Commission´s decision making process in the BSE case.29  
What had happened? Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) had spread in 
the 1980´s and 1990´s into a major epidemic. This epidemic affected cattle and 
sheep, finally leading to their death because the disease literally caused the 
animals’ brain to dissolve. In Europe it had its origin undoubtedly in Great Britain, 
where cases of BSE had emerged first and had spread all over the country. BSE, 
however, was treated as one of the regular epidemic problems in the meat industry, 
similar to those diseases affecting pigs or poultry. During a long period, the general 
view in the UK was that there was nothing special or threatening about this 
disease, only that this time the crown jewel of the British food industry, “the roast 
                                                          
29  For a detailed account on the BSE crisis, see Graham R. Chambers, “The BSE crisis and 
the European Parliament”, in: Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos (eds.), supra note 5, pp. 
95-104, especially pp. 96-102, also to the following. - As Principal Research 
Administrator for the European Parliament, Chambers was involved in the writing of a 
report of the “European Parliament’s Special Inquiry Committee into BSE” on the BSE 
crisis.  
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beef of Old England”, was falling victim to it. But the real trouble began when a 
statement in the House of Commons in March 1996 about a possible link between 
BSE and a “new variant” form of Creutzfeld-Jacob disease (CJD) turned a 
veterinary problem into a public health problem. Young people, the statement said, 
seemed to be falling victim to a deadly disease which has historically only affected 
people five decades older.  
The BSE crisis turned into a scandal when more and more press reports 
emphasized the possible link between the new form of CJD and BSE, and 
consumer protection groups questioned the inaction of the EU with regard to the 
internal market: Although there were indicators of a serious health risk the 
Commission hesitated to impose a ban on British beef. The 1997 report of the EP 
Special Inquiry Committee finally revealed that the Standing Veterinary 
Committee counselling the Commission had been divided more or less along the 
national lines on the question which measures had to be taken, a result that was not 
surprising given the structure of this Committee. But what was more troubling was 
the fact that the Scientific Committee, where no votes are taken but a deliberating 
process is held, usually until a common solution is found, had been divided, too: In 
the case of the Scientific Veterinary Committee, a (critical) minority view was 
registered by a German government toxicologist with observer status in that 
Committee.  
When a closer look at the Scientific Committee revealed that the BSE case had 
been transferred to a BSE sub-committee, which consisted entirely of veterinarians, 
and almost exclusively of one nationality (of course: British), it became apparent 
why the official position of the Scientific Committee and the European 
Commission had reflected the mind-set, attitude, and policy of the UK Ministry of 
Agriculture rather than the warnings of critical voices that had been raised within 
the scientific community, or the worries expressed by a deeply concerned public: 
The Scientific Committee had obviously been captured by national economic 
interests.  
 
b. Governing the Single Market: The Committee system 
 
The BSE crisis shed public light for the first time on the mechanisms of rule-
making in the EU below the level of legislative acts in a narrow sense (directives 
or regulations). It revealed the fact (little known to legal scholars, almost unknown 
to the public at that time) that the Commission, in its decision making, operates 
through the particular system of “Comitology”. Comitology is “Eurospeak” for the 
variety of committees and procedures used in the implementation of EU legislative 
acts, and often it is also used to describe the “arcane science” of understanding the 
way in which the whole system works.30  
The Comitology process was created when the Council began delegating 
executive powers to the Commission in 1962 to implement a series of Council 
                                                          
30  Graham R. Chambers, supra note 30, at 99. 
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regulations organising the market in agricultural products in the then still 
comparably small EC of six Member States. After the considerable extensions of 
the EC in the 1970s and 1980s31 the Single European Act of 1986 added a third 
indent to the former Article 145 EEC (now Article 202 third indent TEC), which 
reads:  
 
“the Council shall (…) confer on the Commission, in the acts which the 
Council adopts, powers for the implementation of the rules which the 
Council lays down. The Council may impose certain requirements in 
respect of the exercise of these powers. The Council may also reserve the 
right, in specific cases, to exercise directly implementing powers itself”. 
 
The new feature of Comitology committees was not that they represent a new 
form of delegation of powers, but that they mix the powers of the Commission, the 
Council and the Member States in a unique way. In 1962, when the system was 
first established, the Council resisted the attempts of the Commission to present 
itself as the sole executive branch of the EC. The Council kept the right to have the 
last word on decisions delegated to the Commission, and the Member States kept 
their influence by ensuring that they were represented in each Comitology 
committee. 
In July 1987 the Council used its power as the basis for adopting what is known 
as the Comitology Decision, laying down the procedures for the exercise of the 
implementting powers conferred on the Commission. This Decision was replaced 
by the 1999 Comitology Decision32 that further specified the procedures and 
conditions concerning the implementation process.  
In essence, “Comitology” was invented especially because the Council was 
simply not able or willing to take decisions on a day-to-day basis on a plethora of 
technical matters. Devolving such decisions entirely to the Commission, on the 
other hand, would have given the Commission far too much power in the eyes of 
the Member States, and it would have conflicted with the institutional balance as 
laid down in the treaties. The solution was to construct a system of committees of 
experts and national representatives around this given structure. The Comitology 
system gives the Council the possibility of controlling the procedure at arm´s 
length and, in certain cases, of taking the issues back to the Council itself. 
Comitology was thus intended to be, in a constitutional sense, something like “the 
Council in the Commission”.33 
 
                                                          
31  Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, followed by Greece in 1981, 
Spain and Portugal in 1986. 
32  Council Decision 1999/468 of 28 June 1999, OJ 1999 L 184/23.  
33  See Graham R. Chambers, supra note 30, at 100. 
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c. A silent revolution 
 
The Committee system has, since 1962, evolved into a fascinating amalgam of 
supra-national decision making that has dramatically altered the decision-making 
and rule-making process in a number of important fields of European social 
regulation. Although the European Union´s institutional architecture is officially 
well defined in the EU and the EC treaties, the two fundamental documents that 
make up for the constitution of the EU, Comitology emerged as an almost 
invisible, but very powerful and essentially unique system that was not expressly 
foreseen in the treaties.  
The committees gather expertise and discuss solutions; for that purpose, 
thousands of representatives of the EU Member States, usually, but not necessary 
members of national administrations, congregate on a regular basis in the more 
than 400 committees that have been counted.34 Chaired by a Commission 
representative, the committees formulate and adopt measures of various kinds35, 
whereas “adoption” is meant here in a material sense: the committees do not 
possess decision-making powers of their own. Only the Commission and the 
Council are formally entitled to adopt a measure, but in practice the Commission 
holds the pen for the committees. 
A number of developments in the last decades have fuelled the growing 
importance of the regulative committees: the awareness of risks in modern 
societies, the aim of consumer protection and the widening of the competences of 
the European Union after the establishment of the Single Market, to name a few, 
have raised the demands for sophisticated EU decision-making processes. 
Especially the paradigmatic change from the Common Market concept to the 
Single Market demanded a qualitatively and quantitatively different know-how and 
expertise in the field of social regulation36, a demand the Commission was 
structurally unable to meet: the Commission is in many respects far from being the 
all-powerful and almighty institution as it is often portrayed in the press. Its staff of 
                                                          
34  The precise number of committees is not known; according to reports, not even the 
Commission has an overview over the whole system, or at least does it not keep track of 
the Committee system as a whole. The number of Comitology committees is rising 
constantly. While in 1962, when the Comitology committee system was established, 
there were only 10 committees, Annette E. Töller, Komitologie (Opladen: Leske + 
Budrich, 2002) claims that in 1998 there were 418 Comitology committees, see Töller, 
at p. 315. 
35  For further details, see the contributions in the volume by Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos 
(eds.), supra note 5; Christian Joerges & Jürgen Neyer, “From Intergovernmental 
Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalization of 
Comitology”, 3 European Law Journal (1997), pp. 273-299. 
36  The term „social regulation“ is used here in a broad sense. It denotes the complex task of 
creating legal norms for our modern industrial risk societies, norms that are structurally 
linked to distributive effects, without necessarily addressing those effects in a direct 
manner. “Social regulation”, in other words, is not reduced to welfare state provisions in 
a narrow sense, such as unemployment subsidies or health insurance regulations.  
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about 25.000 public officials is smaller than the staff of many European cities of 
medium size, and its budget is comparably limited. In sum, the Commission had 
neither the manpower nor the expertise and knowledge to fulfil the tasks conferred 
upon it in the course of the establishment of the Single Market. Thus, Comitology 
is also a complex answer to complex regulatory task within a multi-level 
governance system.  
 
d. From Hierarchy to Heterarchy  
 
According to the law in the books, the Council - as the only organ involved in  
Comitology that is at least indirectly under democratic control (because the 
Member State ministers in the Council can be held accountably by their respective 
parliaments) - is supervising and controlling the Comitology procedures. In reality, 
however, there is effectively no traditional top-down control. For example, in the 
period between 1993 and 1995 thousands of opinions were submitted by 
committees, but only six cases were referred back to the Council.37 This shows that 
Comitology committees have nothing in common with a hierarchical, Weberian-
style model of administration. Instead, they represent hundreds of networks 
consisting of experts and public officials who act quite independent from their 
home ministry as well as from public or democratic control. In their amassment the 
committees form a paradoxical decentralized center of power.  
While Comitology is viewed by many with suspicion, mainly due to the 
character of the system as “technocratic structures behind closed doors”38, 
Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer, in a famous 1997 contribution in the European 
Law Journal, have suggested a radical new vision of comitology as a forum for 
deliberative supranationalism in which all participants engage in the search for the 
common good.39 Viewed from this angle, comitology is a borderline case40 that 
seems to resists a clear characterization as governance or government – but 
nonetheless raises serious legitimacy questions: The rule-making process is quite 
intransparent, its actors are hard to define and even harder to make accountable for 
their actions, and the rules of participation effectively exclude the wider public and 
civil society in general. Although national administrations are not forced to send 
only one representative and only public official into the committees, a 
comprehensive representation of national or EU civil society actors is neither 
mandatory by law, nor practice. The BSE scandal revealed this structure, and its 
                                                          
37  Renaud Dehousse, “Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European Governance”, 
in: Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in Europe´s 
Integrated Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 207-229, at 213. 
38  Renaud Dehousse, supra note 38, at 214. 
39  Christian Joerges & Jürgen Neyer, supra note 36, at 273. 
40  Christian Joerges, “Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance: Exploring a Magic 
Triangle”, in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunter Teubner (eds.), 
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Oxford; Portland/Ore.: Hart 
Publishing, 2004), pp. 339-375, at 358. 
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flaws and shortcomings. The case produced a deep legitimacy crisis of the EU 
regulatory system as a whole. 
As the Rothmans case had shown, Comitology is a key component of EU 
Governance.41 The important role of Comitology in the law-making process of the 
EU – as briefly outlined above – underlines that the Commission and “its” 
committees have left the originally intended function of the committees as 
intergovernmental control mechanism far behind. They have turned into a unique, 
“freewheeling transnational structure”42, with its own merits as deliberative 
forums, but also without a clear legal structure and form. Especially the poor 
transparency of the committee procedures “makes it difficult to discern the part 
played by the committees in the formulation and eventual adoption of measures”.43 
Is EU Governance an untameable bureaucratic nightmare after all? 
 
 
3. The ECJ and the Emergence of an Integrating EU 
Administration 
3.1 From Executive Federalism to an Integrating Administrative Network 
Traditionally the EU administrative system is viewed and described as a two-level 
system: a small portion of administrative functions are directly executed on a 
central level (with the European Commission as executive), while most European 
legislative acts are executed indirectly by the Member States. An implementation 
through direct administration is the exception to the rule of indirect implementation 
by the Member States. This system is often referred to as ‘executive federalism’.44 
New Governance mechanisms such as Comitology do not fit into this 
description. Administrative actions in the European realm are increasingly 
‘decentred’ in the sense that they are neither rooted in a single legal source or 
structure, nor are they formed or implemented by a single administrative entity, be 
it the European Commission, or the administrations of the Member States, 
respectively. They represent the transformed reality of an “integration 
décentralisée” (Eduardo Chiti) and “décentralisation integrée” (Loic Azoulay).45 A 
                                                          
41  It still is, one may add, whereas more and more fields of regulation are dominated by 
regulative agencies; see most recently the establishment of the European Food Safety 
Authority in Parma/Italy, http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en.html. At a closer look, however, 
it becomes apparent that most regulative agencies are structured similar to the 
Comitology committees. This issue cannot be broadened here. 
42  Renaud Dehousse, supra  note 38, p. 214. 
43  Grainne De Búrca, in: Paul Craig and Grainne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law 
(1999), 55, at 77. 
44  See especially Koen Lenaerts, “Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the 
European Community”, 28 Common Market Law Review (1991), pp. 11-35, at 11 et seq. 
45  Loic Azoulay, “Extension et élévation du champ du droit administratif européen”, in: 
Jacques Ziller (ed.), What’s New in European Administrative Law?, EUI Law working 
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new administrative space has emerged in which the traditional Community 
methods and structures of hierarchy and delegation, in the framework of an 
executive federalism, are supplemented by new forms of procedural, 
communicative, and conflictual techniques.46 A special characteristic of this new 
space of regulatory and administrative activity is the fact that its institutional 
structures have emerged outside the traditional Community method, with its 
legislative triangle of Council, Commission, and European Parliament 
This new European public legal order is still in search of its legal form. The 
fusion of classical government functions (regulation and administration) with new 
institutional modes and forms, combined with the absence of a classical 
parliamentary legislator, blurs the distinction between legislation and 
administration to an up to now unknown degree. A crucial question, then, is 
whether this development should be described in and measured on constitutional 
terms and norms (with regard to doctrines of separation of powers, of popular 
sovereignty, or of constitutional rights, for example), or whether it should be 
described in terms of administrative law and administrative accountability, with its 
own distinctive set of normative expectations (following the doctrines of rule of 
law/Rechtsstaat, for example).47 
 
3.2 Democracy and Participation in the EU 
A second – and more pressing – aspect is, of course, the democratic question. On 
paper the EU is well suited for a democratic process; Article 6 TEU states that the 
EU is founded on the principle of democracy. The institution of the European 
Parliament is proof enough that there is a certain degree of legitimacy from below 
in the law-making process.48 The EU, however, found itself for reasons which were 
well apparent in the late 1990’s, in the focus of criticism because of its lack of 
                                                                                                                                      
paper 2005/10, http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/handle/1814/3330, at 44 with further 
reference to Edouardo Chiti, “Decentralisation and Integration into the Community 
Administrations: A New Perspective on European Agencies”, 10 European Law Journal 
(2004), at 402. 
46  Loic Azoulay, supra note 46, at 44. 
47  For a more thorough discussion on this topic, see Rainer Nickel, “Participatory 
Governance and European Administrative Law: New Legal Benchmarks for the New 
European Public Order”, in Erik O. Eriksen, Christian Joerges & Florian Roedl (eds.), 
Law and Democracy in the Post-National Union (Oslo: ARENA Reports, 2006). 
48  Low voter turnouts and other circumstances additionally weaken the – already limited - 
legitimising force of EU elections: The outcome of the 2004 elections for the European 
Parliament – as with the elections before – clearly demonstrated that the EU citizens still 
orientate themselves not only according to their nation-state preferences, but also on 
domestic issues, instead of on European issues. Election analysts unanimously stated 
that, throughout the EU, there was a trend to punish the ruling parties and the 
governments they formed, for domestic policies. This outcome stresses the importance 
of alternative ways of participation in the European law-making processes. 
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democratic legitimacy49: not only were the lack of full (or half-full) parliamentary 
sovereignty and the lack of an overarching European public sphere seen as 
symptoms of a regulatory structure that had reached its limits, but so were the 
regulatory structures themselves with their opaqueness and lack of transparency. In 
particular, the prospect of ten or more new Member States and the fact that the 
regulatory activity of the EU had not only increased quantitatively but also 
qualitatively, with major fields of rule-making shifting into the core Community 
sphere following the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, had caused a widely stated 
sense of uneasiness with the regulatory mechanisms as a whole. Article 257 EC, 
which foresees a certain form of functional participation of the Economic and 
Social Committee in some areas, only provides for a corporatist top-down 
approach to civil society, with rather limited potentials for the production of a 
significant legitimacy surplus.50 
 
a. The White Paper on Governance 
 
The European Commission reacted to this crisis with its (in)famous White Paper 
on European Governance.51 Instead of taking up the popular slogan of a 
strengthening of the European Parliament, the Commission mainly focused on its 
own position within the institutional framework of the EU. It identified five 
principles of “good governance”, three of which were directly related to the 
legitimacy issue: 1) openness: “The Institutions should work in a more open 
manner. Together with the Member States, they should actively communicate 
about what the EU does and the decisions it takes.(…)”; 2) participation, with the 
need to ensure wide participation of interested actors “throughout the policy chain 
– from conception to implementation”, because “improved participation is likely 
[to] create more confidence in the end result and in the Institutions which deliver 
policies”; and 3) accountability: “Roles in the legislative and executive processes 
need to be clearer. Each of the EU Institutions must explain and take responsibility 
for what it does in Europe.”52 
By stressing the issues of participation, openness and accountability, the 
Commission reacted to popular criticism about its own performance as a non-
                                                          
49  For a critique from the perspective of democratic theory, see Hauke Brunkhorst, „A 
Polity Without a State? European constitutionalism between evolution and revolution”, 
in: Erik O. Eriksen, John E. Fossum & Agustín J. Menéndez (eds.), Developing a 
Constitution for Europe (London: Routledge 2004. 
50  See Stijn Smismans, Law, Legitimacy and European Governance: Functional 
Participation in Social Regulation (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
51  COM (2001) 428, July 2001. For a critical review of the White Paper, see Ch. Joerges, 
Y. Mény & J. Weiler (eds), Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the 
Commission White Paper on Governance (2001), 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010601.html.  
52  COM (2001) 428, at 10. The other two principles – effectiveness and coherence – are 
related to functional aspects of output-oriented legitimacy; for lack of space they cannot 
be dealt with here in more detail. 
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transparent regulatory machine that seemingly runs on itself. In this regard, it was 
an intelligent move to use the concept of “governance” instead of “government” as 
a reference point; this shift in the nomenclature lowers the expectations to a 
significant degree: 
 
“Governance is not political rule through responsible institutions, such as 
parliament and democracy – which amounts to government – but 
innovative practices of networks, or horizontal forms of interaction. It is a 
method for dealing with political controversies in which actors, political 
and non-political, arrive at mutually acceptable decisions by deliberating 
and negotiating with each other.”53 
 
In order to prove that the commitment to participation, transparency, and 
openness is not merely lip service, the Commission later published a code of 
conduct for its interaction with civil society actors. This document contained the 
promise that civil society would be included in deliberations on legislative acts as 
soon as possible and as comprehensively as possible.54 Additionally, in 2001, a 
new regulation on access to EU documents came into effect, significantly raising 
the level of effectiveness of transparency rights.55 
 
b. Theory and Practice of Citizen’s Participation 
 
While the White Paper issues of openness and transparency were dealt with in a 
more thorough way through the introduction of a clearer legal basis for the access 
to documents, it’s commitment to participation did not bring about any satisfactory 
results in the following years. The Council and its Secretariat, which had, in the 
course of five decades, evolved into a second major administrative-legislative 
institution parallel to the Commission, was left completely out of the discussions 
about enhanced public participation. The above-mentioned code of conduct of the 
Commission, laid out in December 2002 in a “Communication of the 
Commission”, does not have any legally-binding force and cannot be used by third 
parties in court: the mere self-binding force of an internal Commission regulation 
does not entitle citizens to gain access to committees or other fora, nor does it 
contain other possible participatory rights such as the right to be consulted, or the 
                                                          
53  Erik O. Eriksen & John E. Fossum, “Europe at crossroads: Government or Transnational 
Governance?”, in: Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunter Teubner, supra note 
41, at 120. 
54  For further details, see the “Communication from the Commission: towards a reinforced 
culture of consultation and dialogue – General principles and minimum standards for 
consultation on interested parties by the Commission” from 11 December 2002, 
COM(2002) 704 final. 
55  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 
May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents, OJ 2001, L 145/43. 
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duty to take contributions of participants into account when delivering the grounds 
for a decision. Additionally, the document expressly exempts crucial areas of 
decision-making processes from the consultation process, especially “Decisions 
taken in a formal process of consulting Member States (‘comitology’ 
procedure)”.56 
In this respect, the Commission remains firmly within the ‘Community method’ 
of practising consultation according to its preferences and under its conditions. 
Under this classical method of decision-making, wide consultation is not a 
completely new phenomenon, on the contrary: as its Communication on 
Consultations correctly points out, the Commission has a long tradition of 
consulting interested parties from outside when formulating its policies. It 
incorporates external consultation into the development of almost all its policy 
areas.57 The underlying philosophy of this consultation policy – that consultation 
processes are initiated by the institution, participation is limited to non-decision, 
and only directed towards selected actors – did not change after the publication of 
the White Paper. Calling the White Paper approach to public participation and the 
subsequent policy as laid out in the Commission’s “Communication” a 
substantively new approach would, thus, be a misnomer.58 
In summary, in the light of the principle of participatory democracy, 
notwithstanding the first steps of the Commission towards a more inclusive legal 
structure, the current level of public participation in the norm-generating processes 
of the EU is still not satisfying: the basic assumption that all those affected by legal 
norms should have the chance to participate in the deliberation and decision 
making process regarding the said norms has clearly not been met by the current 
institutional and legal design of the EU. The 2001 Laeken Declaration of the IGC 
also underlined the fact that the legitimacy gap is still a serious issue, and the 
seemingly failed attempt to establish a formal European Constitution, with the 
referenda in France and the Netherlands turning out a vote against the Draft 
Constitution, has deepened the legitimacy crisis of the EU even more. 
 
3.3 The ECJ: The Guardian of “Good Governance” in the EU? 
If a new concept of participatory governance in the EU is only emerging and still 
underdeveloped59, then the ECJ may appear as the last resort of more effective 
                                                          
56  “Communication from the Commission: Towards a reinforced culture of consultation 
and dialogue – General principles and minimum standards for consultation on interested 
parties by the Commission” from 11 December 2002, COM (2002) 704 final, at 16. 
57  Ibid, at 3. 
58  For an evaluation of the White Paper approach before the publication of the 
Communication, see P. Magnette, “European Governance and Civic Participation: 
Beyond Elitist Citizenship?”, (2003) 51 Political Studies 144-160, especially at 148-150. 
59  For an assessment see Rainer Nickel, “Participatory Transnational Governance”, in 
Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and Social Regulation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2006). 
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control and supervision over the EU’s integrating administration. In the field of 
Comitology the ECJ has indeed delivered a number of important decisions on 
various issues. Only a small number of these decisions, however, focus not only on 
the outcomes of the deliberations, that is on the material committee decisions, but 
also on the process of committee decision-making itself.  
 
a. The right to be heard 
 
An important milestone in this regard was the 1991 decision in the case Technische 
Universität München vs. Hauptzollamt München.60 The case concerned the import 
of an electronic microscope from Japan by the applicant, a University. Its 
application for exemption from customs duties had been transferred to the 
Commission which, having consulted a committee of experts, rejected it on the 
ground that an ‘apparatus of equivalent scientific value’ was manufactured and 
available in the EC. The University questioned this quasi-scientific finding, but it 
was never heard in this matter by the Commission, the committee, or the 
competent national authorities who had transferred the case to the Commission. 
The court was confronted with the task to define the extent of a right to be heard by 
the authorities; in earlier case law, the court had minimised the extent to which 
procedural protections could be granted in the face of the exercise of broad 
administrative discretion. The opposite approach was taken here: the Court held 
that “the right to be heard in such an administrative procedure requires that the 
person concerned should be able, during the actual procedure before the 
Commission, to put his own case and properly make his views known on the 
relevant circumstances and, where necessary, on the documents taken into account 
by the Community institution.”61  
This ‘right to be heard’, however, is neither codified in the Treaties nor in a 
general EU procedural law; it belongs to a number of unwritten ‘principles’ and 
‘rights’ that have been acknowledged in the jurisprudence of the Community 
courts over the years.62 One consequence of this only vaguely defined status is that 
the extent and the limits of rights and principles are defined and redefined over and 
over again in the jurisprudence of the courts, and not by a democratically 
legitimised legislator. 
 
                                                          
60  ECJ, Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München vs. Hauptzollamt München-Mitte, 
(1991) ECR I-5469; for a detailed analysis of the case, see Damian Chalmers, Christos 
Hadjiemmanuil, Giorgio Monti & Adam Tomkins, European Union Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 444-445, also to the following. 
61  Ibid., paragraph 25. 
62  For an account of the development of these principles until 1999, see Hans Peter Nehl, 
Principles of Administrative Procedure in EC Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999). 
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b. Proceduralisation of committee deliberations? 
 
Punctual interventions of the courts have brought some light into the Comitology 
‘underworld’, but they do not add up to a system of administrative law. This holds 
true also for the issue of transparency in Comitology. While the ECJ´s decision in 
the Rothmans case can be seen as a major step towards a more transparent 
comitology procedure, transparency itself is not sufficient for an effective control 
of Comitology from outside of the governance network. It may grant access to 
information, but it does not lend a more active role to individuals or the civil 
society sector in the decision-making process.  
An additional starting point for a procedural approach to social regulation in the 
committee framework can be found in another decision of the European Court of 
Justice related to comitology. In the case Germany vs. Commission the ECJ 
declared void a regulation on construction products on the grounds that procedural 
rules had been violated – allegedly the draft for a decision had not been sent within 
a certain time frame to the Member State, and not in the right language.63 If civil 
society actors were entitled to such a procedural position as the Member States 
possess, and the Commission were responsible for the dissemination of draft 
regulations (and accountable for infringements of those procedural rights) the 
comitology system would loose a good part of its secretive character. This may 
lessen the effectiveness of the rule-making governmental network EU to a certain 
degree, but it may strengthen the system on the long run, and it will certainly 
enhance the legitimacy of EU law. The emerging concept of participatory 
governance in the EU64 points into this direction, but it must also be accompanied 
by an administrative law that explicitly defines the scope of civil society 
participation; it is not the task of the ECJ to invent such a procedural framework.  
A more comprehensive concept of participatory governance could be an 
additional means to gradually balance the democratic deficit of the EU. The 
correlation between the loss of democratic power in the national arenas and the 
growing material regulation in the supranational sphere has to be reflected and 
confronted within the existing legal structures of the EU. As the supranational 
processes of rule-making are dominated by public or private administrators, the 
law of supranational regulation coordinating these processes has to integrate 
possible functional equivalents to national legitimatory processes. One element of 
such a “constitution” of supranational regulation could consist of a procedural right 
of affected interest groups and civil society actors to comprehensively participate 
in regulatory processes. A reference point for this framework can be found in 
existing concepts of interest representation and participation that already form an 
integral part of many administrative law regimes throughout the world.65 This may 
                                                          
63  ECJ, Case C-263/95, Germany vs. Commission, decision of 10 February 1998. 
64  For a more detailed account, see Rainer Nickel, supra note 59. 
65  One prominent example is the US Administrative Procedures Act (APA). For a 
comprehensive overview over its development, see Richard Stewart, “Administrative 
Law in the Twenty-First Century”, 78 N.Y.U.L.Rev. (2003), pp. 437-460, esp. at pp. 
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not solve all problems of democratic legitimacy, but it will certainly lead to a more 
inclusive European legal community. 
 
 
4. Conclusion:  A bureaucratic nightmare – the inevitable 
future of Mercosur? 
„The general rule is that there is no rule.“66 This statement of Giuseppe Azzi, 
Director in the Secretariat-General of the European Commission, involuntarily 
characterizes the major problem with EU governance, its lack of a coherent and 
comprehensive legal structure. The fusion of legislative and executive functions, 
combined with a well-established, but widely invisible network of administrations, 
has led to a unique form of European governance that functions in the shadow of 
the law. Fragmented legislation on access to documents or on formal structures of 
Comitology committees misses the crucial point of civil society inclusion into the 
law-making processes of EU governance. The jurisprudence of the ECJ cannot 
compensate for this failure: it is a matter of ‘normative choice’ for the Community 
courts to decide, for example, that the right to be heard in relation to individual 
determinations is fundamental, while a similar right to participation or consultation 
in the context of regulatory activity depends on a clear legal basis in the Treaties or 
secondary legislation.67 European administrative law, and the concept of ‘good 
governance’, it seems, do not contain sufficient legal substance to determine the 
choices of the Community courts. 
If Mercosur decides to take the next steps towards an integrating administration 
– and there are signs that this is actually happening in some policy areas - it will 
certainly raise the efficiency of its institutions and instruments. The example of the 
EU shows, however, that there are high risks and costs68 attached to this model of 
functional supranationalism, especially if it emerges in the shadow of the law 
instead of on a sound legal or constitutional basis. The actual EU model of 
regulation and governance has incrementally grown over the past two decades, and 
with it its influence on important fields of social regulation. Its decisions affect 
                                                                                                                                      
441ff on the evolution of the interest representation model within the institutional 
framework of administrative agencies. Of course there are a number of problems 
attached to this model (e.g. the risks of agency capture, or neo-corporativism), an issue 
that cannot be broadened here.  
66  Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, “Comitology and the European Commission”, in Christian 
Joerges & Ellen Vos (eds.), supra note 5, pp. 51-57, at 52. Azzi’s sentence refers to 
participation in the ‘consultative committees’ set up by the Commission outside of 
Comitology, but with regard to civil society participation it holds true for all 
committees.   
67  Paul Craig, in: Jacques Ziller (ed.), supra note 46, at 27. 
68  See also the analysis of Deisy Ventura, “La gouvernance démocratique et l'intégration 
économique. Regards croisés entre le Mercosur et l'Union européenne“, in: 59 Droit et 
sociét ́e (2005), pp. 93-106. 
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more than 450 million people, but the mechanisms behind this regulatory machine 
and its fundamental legal basis remain widely obscure and unknown to the people. 
In the end the dramatic failure of the Draft Constitutional Treaty in 2005 made 
clear that Europe is still in search of its constitutional basis, and especially its 
social model.  
For Mercosur the alternative path is not to stop the integration process and to 
remain an intergovernmental organisation, but to decide upon the ways and means 
to build a ‘market without a state’ beforehand. Building an integrating 
administration after the EU model may prove to be the most effective way, but 
without a sound legal and constitutional basis Mercosur may also end up like the 
EU now: caught in a struggle between the efficiency of a class of ‘experts’ and 
bureaucrats, with their own preferences and interests, and its legitimacy; and 
finally risking that an expertocracy replaces the preferences of the wider public and 
what was once called “the general will”. 
 
 
 
From the ‚Nomos der Erde’ to a Unified 
European Defense System1 
Rüdiger Voigt 
“For humanity and especially for the peoples of Europe no other 
single event has been as important as the discovery of the new world 
[…]. It started a full change in trade, national power, customs, trade 
and the government of all people”2 
 
This is the beginning of „Histoire des Deux Indes“ by Guillaume Raynal. Pub-
lished in 1770 for the first time and reprinted – several prohibitions nonwith-
standing – several times and in several languages. This made it one of the greatest 
successes on the pre-Revolutionary book market of Europe. Almost two centuries 
later Carl Schmitt re-examined the subject in his book “Der Nomos der Erde”3. He 
is one of the most controversial, but at the same time undoubtedly among the most 
inspiring constitutional law experts of the 20th century”4. Of course he had his own 
point of view: “For four hundred years, from the 16th to the 20th century, the gen-
eral structure of the European International Law has been dominated by a single, 
fundamental happening, the discovery of the new world.” This quote speaks of a 
„European“ international law. Isn’t that a contradiction of terms? Shouldn’t he talk 
about a world-spanning, global international law? You have to consider the world 
view of Europeans in that time. The “old world” considered itself near the very 
centre of the world: ‘Jerusalem’. Everything European was seen as normal. This 
made everything outside Europe unnormal, sometimes frightening and monstrous. 
The pictures on world maps showing cannibals, monsters and antipodes give an 
indication for this thinking. 
The Christian nations of Europe, most notably Spain and Portugal, saw them-
selves as creators and keepers of an order for the whole world. 
 
“The division between the eras around the turns of the 15th to the 16th 
century marks the origin of international law that became the legal 
framework for the ‘discovery’ or rather the colonisation of the new 
world. Until the 20th century, when the imperialistic division of the 
                                                          
1  I am grateful to Karsten Voigt and Martin Seybold for giving me the benefit of their 
comments and helping me with the English proofreading. 
2 Raynal 1988, p. 9. 
3  Schmitt 1997, p. 69. 
4  Dreier 1999, p. 75. 
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world came to an end, it stayed in force and influenced the postcolo-
nial international law by handing down its most basic concepts.”5 
 
 
1. Partition of the World 
The discovery of the new world in the 15th and 16th century certainly caused the 
most important break in thinking about world and space. For the first time the 
world was seen as spherical and at least considering the surface, a as a whole. The 
surface was – more or less exactly – mapped and divided among the European 
superpowers. On May 4th, 1493 Pope Alexander VI, born in Spain, drew the line of 
demarcation in his edict „inter cetera“ between the Spanish and the Portuguese part 
of the world. In the treaty of Tordesillas of June, 7th 1494 the partition of the world 
was confirmed. A line, correlating with the 49th degree western longitude, divided 
the world. Spain obtained all territories westward of this line and Portugal all ter-
ritories situated east of this line. This applied mainly to the land and only in part to 
the sea. 
The treaty between two equal kings, the Catholic Majesties of Spain and Portu-
gal agreed upon the acquisition of territories of non-Christian princes and peoples. 
Within the scope of the medieval res publica Christiana this treaty was backed by 
the arbitral authority of the pope. Officially, the pope granted concessions for mis-
sionary purposes and nothing else. Later, in 1513, the Spanish crown substituted 
the papal mandate for a so called „Proclamation of the Indians“. The Indians were 
prompted to recognize „the church as master and ruler of the whole world“. Re-
fusal or silence, even if based on the lack of understanding the Spanish language, 
meant war. This proclamation was requirement for the legitimate taking of the 
land. 
 
 
2. Jus Publicum Europaeum 
The new division of the world in a ‘old’ and a ‘new’ world opened not only combat 
zones for the European powers. It also led to a amazing relaxing of inter-European 
tensions. Not every disagreement in the ‘New World’ had to heighten tension in 
the ‘Old World’. In the corpus of the European public law, the Jus Publicum Eu-
ropaeum, could be retained as a sphere of peace and order, even while combats on 
other theatres of war endured. Relating to public international law this exclusion 
finally served to foster the European-style war, that is its rationalisation, humani-
sation and – last but not least – legalization6. 
The process was furthered by the Thirty Year’s War (1618-1648). This allowed 
to build a equilibrium between the territorial states on the European continent. The 
                                                          
5  Paech, Stuby 1994, p. 16. 
6  Schmitt 1997, p. 68 f. 
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order created by the treaty of Westphalia cleared the relations between the sover-
eign and recognized states of continental Europe. As powers with central govern-
ment and administration were they the adequate subjects of a public international 
law. It first only applied to the nations on the continent but soon extended its influ-
ence on the maritime British Empire. With the appearance of the modern "territo-
rial states" the whole European life got secularised and referred to the spatial order 
"state". The public international law changed from a jus gentium to a jus inter 
gentes Europaeas. Hence, the "spatial core" of the new European regime was the 
"state", the very achievement of occidental rationality. 
 
 
3. Occupation of the New World 
From the 16th century till far into the 19th century the territories of the New World 
were considered to be free to occupy. Oceans, islands and continents outside 
Europe, if unknown to the Christian sovereigns, could be taken. The position of the 
discoverers was esteemed to be superior, spiritually and historically. This placed 
the discoverer above the natives thus found. On the one hand the territory was 
symbolically taken into possession by flying a flag. On the other hand they tried to 
fix their "owned" territory as accurately as possible in maps. These maps were kept 
back in Europe to document the ‘right’ on the land. 
 
3.1 Two different approaches 
In the 17. and 18. century two different schools of thought characterize the differ-
ent perceptions in public international law. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) repre-
sented the philosophic approach based on the law of nature (jus naturale). In his 
book “Allgemeiner Menschenstaat” (“Common State of Mankind”) he sees – in 
regard to the human beings – three levels of law7: 
- jus civitas, the law of the citizens; 
- jus gentium, the public international law, defined as law applicable to the 
relations in between the states; 
- jus cosmopoliticum, law applicable to human beings and states if seen in 
their position as members of the common state of mankind. 
The famous and probably most influential expert of public international law in 
the 17. century, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) as well as Samuel Pufendorf (1632-
1694) represents the positivistic-practical approach. For Hugo Grotius the treaty in 
between sovereign states plays the central role in the creation of a just world order. 
This view was based on the principles of the “Treaty of Westphalia”. 
 
                                                          
7  Kant 1795, p. 16. 
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3.2 The Right to Occupy? 
Francisco de Vitoria questioned in 1538, whether the non-European and non-
Christian peoples and countries could be considered as abandoned. This was no 
longer doubted by the legal theorists of the 17. and 18. century. They merely dis-
cussed the relationship between the European conquerors. As authorized and mili-
tary organized powers the European sovereigns could measure their strengths in 
form of a war between the states, ruled by the European martial law8. The interna-
tional law recognized each European ruler – independent on the size and strength 
of his state – as formally equal. The equity of he sovereigns made them to oppo-
nents of war with equal rights and duties under the international public law. In-
deed, this did not apply for colonial wars against ‘wild’ or "uncivilized" peoples. 
 
3.3 Thinking in global lines 
Since the Spanish-French treaty of Chateau Cambrésis in 1559, there was a new 
kind of agreements, the so called "amity lines". These lines defined the border 
between Europe and the "New World". Their impact can be determined by exam-
ining a edict of the French king Louis XIII from 1634. It prohibited the French 
seamen to attack Portuguese and Spanish ships on the European side of the tropic 
of cancer. Beyond the line the attack was expressly permitted, unless the Spanish 
and Portuguese would admit the French free access to their Indian and American 
territories and oceans. "No peace beyond the lines" characterized Sir Francis 
Drake this thinking in global lines (Carl Schmitt). Not until the peace of Madrid 
between England and Spain in 1630, the European peace regime got extended on 
the overseas territories beyond the lines. This was confirmed in the peace of West-
phalia in 1648.  
 
 
4. A spatial regime centered on Europe 
The era after the Thirty Years’ War was coined by a fundamental restructuring and 
transformation of the European states and a special legal view on war. “War is a 
steady companion and the deciding political instrument of the multipolar balance 
of power”9. The transformation of the European states was based on three 
fundamentals: 
- the modern territorial state was the organizational frame; 
- the absolutism was the type and form of government; 
                                                          
8  Schmitt 1997, p. 114. 
9  Nye 2003, p. 36. 
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- the mercantilism was the economic method10. 
As soon as 1582 three criteria emerged for the war between sovereign states 
(“Staatenkriege”): 
- From a legal point of view only a war fought between sovereigns, the carri-
ers of the summa potestas, was a war; 
- Each war fought between lawful enemies was a just war (Carl Schmitt de-
fines this as a non-discriminating term of war11) 
- The decision, whether or not a "justa causa" (just reason) is given is made 
exclusively by the sovereign. 
The theological criteria for a just war developed by Thomas von Aquin (1225-
1274) no longer carried weight. 
 
4.1 Balance between Land and Ocean 
The result of the restructuring process in Europe and the “New World” were sum-
marized by Carl Schmitt: “From the point of view of the Jus publicum Europaeum, 
all land of the earth is either territory of European or coequal states, or not yet 
occupied and therefore a potential territory of the state or a potential colony” 12. 
This was only true for the continents, while the oceans stayed outside of every 
specific "spatial regime". "For the first time in the history of mankind the contrast 
between land and ocean got the all-embracing fundament of a global public inter-
national law. 13" 
The often talked about “Freedom of the Sea” was neither obvious nor undis-
puted. It depended on the interests of a state. They differed greatly between a 
dominating sea power that wished to exclude everybody else from over sea trade 
and a state with a small navy that still was interested in trade with non-European 
countries. The scientific dispute about the freedom of the oceans was carried out 
between Hugo Grotius and John Selden. Holland was greatly interested in a free 
trade. It was no surprise that the Dutch scholar Grotius published its "mare 
liberum" (free ocean) in 160914. 26 years later the English scholar Seldon15 pub-
lished his counter-opinion "Mare clausum" (closed ocean). England was interested 
in keeping Holland and other competitors out of the over sea trade. This contro-
versy was not decided by arguing, but by further shifts of power between the Euro-
pean states16. In the peace treaty of Muenster in 1648 the Netherlands gained the 
                                                          
10  Wallerstein 1974, p. 122 ff.; Paech, Stuby  1994, p. 33. 
11  Schmitt 1997, p. 125. 
12  Schmitt 1997, p. 143. 
13  Schmitt 1997, p. 144. 
14  Grotius 1609. 
15  Seldon 1635. 
16  Paech, Stuby 1994, p. 38. 
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guarantee for trade and navigation for both (East and West) Indias. The wars over 
dominance of the seas finally ended with the undisputed maritime hegemony of the 
United Kingdom in the second half of the 17th century.  
 
“The classical regime that was generally accepted for the governance 
of oceans space and resources since the mid-nineteenth century can 
be loosely termed freedom of the sea. The high seas were treated as 
non-appropriable res nullus, and coastal state jurisdictional claims 
were narrowly restricted”17. 
 
From now on it was the rule that the coastal shore belonged to the states bor-
dering the sea, “as far as a cannon can fire”. In those times that meant three sea 
miles. This rule endured even as modern arms reached quite farther distances.  
The peace treaty of Utrecht in 1713 restored the peace and calmness of Christi-
anity by creating a just balance of power. The Spanish inheritance was subdivided; 
among other things England got the lucrative monopoly for the slave trade between 
Africa and America. Carl Schmitt deducted from this18:  
 
"Thus, the great balance between land and ocean emerged, on which 
the "Nomos of the Earth" could rely on for more than two centuries." 
 
4.2 Revolution and Restoration 
The order created by the Treaty of Westphalia lasted at least until the French 
Revolution in 1789. This revolution changed the world in many ways. The great 
usurper Napoleon Bonaparte shook the old order with his military successes. But 
concerning public international law, the French Revolution of 1789 was merely an 
episode. After Napoleon was banned to Elba, later St. Helena the Congress of 
Vienna restored the old order in 181519. In Vienna the five superpowers: Austria, 
Prussia, Russia and England and finally France created under the direction of 
Prince Metternich a regime of public international law based on the balance of 
powers and finally endured until the breakout of the First World war in 1914. Each 
state felt compelled to sign the Treaty of Vienna on June 9, 1815 to secure his own 
position. 
Since the “New World” had been divided already, the occupation of foreign ter-
ritory was almost complete. But meanwhile new territories had been discovered: 
Almost every European nation created colonies of greatly varying size in the Pa-
cific, Asia and especially in Africa. It was in the interest of the colonial lords to 
avoid conflicts. The last pan-European taking of land took place in Africa. Under 
the presidency of Chancellor Prince Bismarck the former colonial powers claimed 
                                                          
17  Keohane, Nye 1977, p. 90. 
18  Schmitt 1997, p. 153. 
19  See Kissinger 1994, pp 78-102. 
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their interests in Africa in the Conference of Congo (1884-1885) in Berlin. They 
legitimated their action with the necessity of a "crusade for the civilisation"20. This 
“crusade” never was more than a cover for the interest in power and profit. 
By means of mechanisation of war and the replacement of mercenaries by con-
scripted armies increased the destructive power of war21. The international humani-
tarian law was meant to limit at least the most brutal excesses.  
 
4.3 End of the European era 
Almost visionary seems the quotation of Prince Metternich about the relevance of 
America which he stated in autumn 1854 during the Crimean War (1854-1856): 
 
"…while the opposing powers fight a senseless, avoidable war, the 
United States of America grow in power and appetite to conquer, and 
are already today the Masters of the Pacific Ocean…" 
 
Largely unnoticed by the Europeans the US were the ascending power, getting 
ready to change the world order to further its own causes. In 1823 the US declared 
– without consulting the European powers – the famous Monroe Doctrine. The 
American president declared in this doctrine that every further creation of a colony 
in the new world by a European power, or every attempt to establish the European 
system in the new World would be considered as a unfriendly act. In return the US 
declared to stay out of European affairs. 
When the US took part in the First World War in 1917, this phase ended. The 
United States helped the side to win the war that furthered their causes most. Yet, 
they neither signed the peace Treaty of Versailles nor did they become part of the 
League of Nations. However, neither the Conference of Paris, which led to the 
Treaty of Versailles, nor the League of Nations were a European conference any-
more; in fact states of several continents participated, namely the US and Japan. 
The Soviet Union did not participate in the conference because of the civil war in 
its own country. As opposed to the Conference of Vienna, on which the aggressor 
France took part as an equal partner, the losers of the First World War had to ac-
cept a dictated peace. Germany was not accepted in the League of Nations. To-
gether with the Soviet Union it became the “Pariah” of Europe22. 
Art. 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations23 outlawed the war of aggres-
sion, but the right to self-defence was acknowledged. Not until August 27th 1928 
war as an instrument to solve international disputes was outlawed in the Treaty of 
Paris24. Since the nations victorious in the First World War were not ready to dis-
                                                          
20  King Leopold of Belgium, September, 12th 1876 to the Geographic Society in Brussels. 
21  Münkler 2002. 
22  A term coined by Lloyd George. 
23  Compare http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/www/league-covenant.html 
24  Also known as the Briand-Kellog-Pact. 
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arm, both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Paris were not 
able to prevent the wars between WWI and WWII. But why? Carl Schmitt is able 
to answer this question: without a “clear vision of a spherical Nomos” can be no 
comprehensive international order be build25. 
 
“The peace conference of Paris in the Winter 1918/1919 was sup-
posed to end a World War and create a World Peace” 26 
 
The League of Nations had no vision of the spatial regime which had to be cre-
ated. Europe could no longer serve as a reference point – it was not longer impor-
tant enough. The whole world was (still) too big. Thus, a universal world order 
could not be constituted by the League of Geneva, because the two modern conti-
nental powers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, were absent27. 
With the end of the First World War finally ended the “European era” 28. 
 
 
5. The American Century 
But not until the entry of the US in the Second World War in the year 1941 the 
"American Century" began. The US signalled powerfully that they were back on 
the European stage as a major player. The end of the war showed that the United 
States was the only country that became wealthier during the war. The US pro-
duced more than half of all industrial goods of the world and delivered one third of 
the world’s production of the goods. In contrast, the European countries were im-
poverished. 
It was no coincidence, that the Conference of the United Nations in June 1945 
took place in San Francisco on American ground. The victors of the Second World 
War agreed easily on one point; they all desired to safeguard what they achieved 
during the war. The Security Council of the United Nations included the super-
powers US and Soviet Union, as well as the other victors of the Second World 
War, Great Britain, France and China, as permanent members with the power to 
veto. Non-permanent members were not admitted to the power to veto. Japan and 
Germany were not even allowed to become members of the UN. From now on the 
Security Council ought to carry the main responsibility for the safeguarding of the 
world peace and the international security. Even those UN-members who had vir-
tually no influence recognized the right of the Security Council, to act on behalf of 
their names and bind them with resolutions. 
The UN placed restrictions on the abilities of its members of to act as they saw 
fit. They were acceptable to the US as long as they could assume that the other 
members with a right to veto shared similar goals. Goals that were made program 
                                                          
25  Schmitt 1997, p. 216. 
26  Schmidt 1997, p. 213.  
27  Schmitt 1997, p. 21. 
28  Paech, Stuby 1994, p. 194. 
  From the ‚Nomos der Erde’ to a Unified European Defense System 179 
of the UN in Art. 1 of the UN-Charter. The US seemed to be surrounded by 
“friends”. But now, that the enemies Germany and Japan were no longer a threat, 
the conflicts of interest surfaced. The Soviet Union contested the power of the US 
in every part of the world. France now followed its own interests instead of being 
thankful for the help of the US during and after World War II. Soon, the power to 
veto became a nuisance in the eyes of the United States. 
The centre of the global order was no longer the "Old World". On the other 
hand, neither was it the "New World". In fact the US and the Soviet Union became 
the poles of a new, bipolar, order. On one side of the “Iron Curtain” the American 
forces were stationed in Europe. The NATO was an instrument to both defend and 
dominate Western Europe. But on the other side of the demarcation line the highly 
armed forces of the Soviet Union along with satellite states, organised in the War-
saw Pact were equally powerful.  
The fact that both sides had so many nuclear warheads that they could kill the 
enemies several times (the so called “overkill-capacity”) led not only to a balance 
of fright, but literally to a division of the world. Both competing powers were like 
magnets. They forced almost all states to decide for one of them. Since a hot war 
had become too dangerous for both superpowers, the "cold war" began. This phase 
lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989/90. Since then, the US is the 
only superpower left, the French are even talking about a “hyper power”. The 
United States have become the center of the global order. 
 
 
6. The European Integration 
Due to the support of the US, known as Marshall-Plan, Western Europe recovered 
economically. In the shelter of the US-American dominance very soon after WWII 
a movement for European unification emerged. It led to the creation of the Council 
of Europe in 1949, first of all concerned with the enforcement of the human rights. 
The first step that led to the European Union was the European Coal and Steel 
Community (Montan-Union). It consisted of France, Germany, Italy and the 
Benelux-Countries (Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands). Founded in 1951 it 
was suggested by the French foreign minister Robert Schuman. Its main reason 
was the French security interests. France wanted to control the strategically im-
portant steel industries of Germany. 
After the outbreak of the Korean War a plan for a European defence commu-
nity was created in 1951. It was meant to solve three problems29: 
1. Counter the Soviet threat, 
2. Solution of the German status (Unification, Eastern Parts of Germany now 
under Polish administration), 
3. Creation of a new European constitution. 
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In the end the French were not ready to join this community. The European De-
fence Community failed. Instead, its task was given to the Western European Un-
ion by the treaty of Brussels. Its goal, however, was not the defence of a free 
Europe, but arms limitation and control. The military defence continued to be the 
task of the NATO, founded in 1949. Western Germany joined the NATO on May 
9th 1955. Thus, the link between Northern America (USA and Canada) and West-
ern Europe was institutionalised. The US from now had a say in the process of the 
European integration. The former world power Great Britain was both a member of 
the NATO and the WEU, but did not desire to take part in the European integra-
tion. Yet, the UK played an important part in the European integration. It had still 
stationed troops in Germany ("Rhine army"). It was also founder and member of 
the EFTA, the European Free Trade Association.  
 
6.1 Economic Community 
The British position changed as the European Economic Community was founded 
in 1958 as a customs union and the "Europe of the six" prospered. Meanwhile, the 
influence of the UK in the world decreased. It took only four years for the gross 
national product of the EEC (European Economic Community) to increase by 21,5 
% (UK: 11 %) while the industrial production increased by 37 % (UK: 14%). The 
French president Charles de Gaulle prevented a joining of the UK to the European 
Economic Community in 1963. He had good reasons for this. The “special rela-
tions” between the United Kingdom and the United States were prone to lead to a 
collision of interests. Great Britain saw itself still as a transatlantic sea power, not 
(yet) as a European middle power. It took until 1973, five years after De Gaulle 
retired from politics, for the UK and other members of the EFTA to join the Euro-
pean Community. Great Britain still did not consider it to be in its own interest to 
be tightly integrated into continental Europe. 
While the core of Europe grew together and the Community expanded into 
more countries, Europe as a whole stayed divided – just as the rest of the world – 
into East and West. A clear vision (from a spatial point of view) was limited to a 
few statesmen like Charles de Gaulle, who has as early as 1960 declared that 
Europe did not end at the “Iron Curtain”. The integration of Eastern Europe would 
be a long term goal for the European integration. For the time being the CSCE30, 
the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, was used as the vehicle to 
overcome the East-West- Division. 
 
                                                          
30  Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, since 1995: Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
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6.2 Monetary Union 
The collapse of the Soviet empire and the cutback of the frontiers meant a new 
challenge for Europe. De Gaulle’s vision of a unified Europe from the Atlantic to 
the Ural suddenly seemed to be very close. At the same time Germany has become 
bigger and more powerful because of its reunification, and therefore disturbed the 
old European balance. Until then the "big four": France, Western Germany, Great 
Britain and Italy, had been more or less equal in political power. Germany was 
already an economic giant, but – because of certain rights of the allies to declare 
reservations – politically a “dwarf”. 
To prevent Germany becoming great power in politics, too, the approval of the 
"Two Plus Four Treaty", with which the allied regime was brought to an end, was 
bound to certain conditions31. Germany committed itself to abandon its currency, 
the D-Mark and join a European monetary union. The Central Bank of Germany 
(Bundesbank), controlling most of the European currencies because of Germanys 
economic might, was substituted by the European Central Bank, also seated in 
Frankfurt/Main. 
 
6.3 Defence Community 
At the same time, the German government under Chancellor Kohl forced a further 
level of integration on the European Community. The Economic Community ought 
to be complemented by a political community. In the Treaty of the European Un-
ion32 of February 7, 1992, the member states agreed upon a common foreign and 
security policy (Art. 1733). The purpose of this policies is to ensure Europe's capac-
ity to act in case of civil and military crisis. It was the Western European Union, 
which (in 1997) is declared to be a "decisive element for the development of a 
European security and defence identity within the Atlantic alliance (NATO)", had 
been charged with its elaboration and enforcement34. The common defence policy 
is to be supported by a cooperation in armament. This has resulted in the Euro-
corps, consisting of German, French, Spanish, Belgian and Luxemburgian soldiers. 
It took over the command of the western troops in Afghanistan in Summer 2004 as 
its first deployment outside Europe. 
 
 
                                                          
31  See Voigt 1996, pp. 163. 
32  http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.000501.html 
33  Compare  the protocol on article 17 of the Treaty Establishing the European Union, 
 Läufer 2000, p. 182. 
34  Compare the declarations given after the conference of Amsterdam in 1997 (BGBl. 1998 
 II, p. 440 ff.). 
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7. Europe and the USA: Strategic Partnership or Open 
Rivalry? 
The US vision of a world order is based on an universalism that includes the abso-
lute American hegemony in every aspect. This view includes the whole world, 
including outer space, as can be seen in the attempt to create a space based anti-
missile system. The goals of the US are not only defensive (like the war on inter-
national terrorism), but also securing commodities, especially oil. Every attempt to 
create a new, area-based, system of order are to be prevented by the US. In some 
areas the Europeans and the US have similar goals, in other parts of the world they 
differ. The latter is the case in the Caribbean Region. The US is particularly inter-
ested in securing their dominance in their "backyard" or, in the case of Cuba, re-
storing it. The Europeans on the other hand see Cuba as an interesting partner in 
trade. Even the threat of US-sanctions has not been able to prevent them doing 
trade with Cuba. In the Near East the Europeans strive for a balance between Israel 
and Palestine, while the US seem to favour Israeli interests. The war on Iraq shows 
that the Europeans – with the significant exception of Great Britain – were not 
interested is a war as a solution. The US on the other hand viewed the Iraq as a 
model state for their plans to change the Middle East. 
The relationship between the European Defence Policy and the NATO is a dif-
ficult one. The USA view every effort of the Europeans to create their own ability 
to defend themselves with suspicion. The Europeans need the abilities of the 
NATO to manage their own missions. So far the EU is unable to launch their own 
missions without the support of the NATO. Especially the ability to plan missions 
is lacking. March 2003 saw a treaty between the NATO and the EU (“Berlin Plus”) 
that allows the EU to use the planning capabilities of the NATO without a con-
senting resolution of the NATO Council. The “European Capability Action Plan” 
coordinates the national efforts in the future. A European Agency for the develop-
ment of defensive abilities, research, procurement and armament was founded. 
The year 2003 saw four missions falling under the European Defence Policy: 
- The policing mission Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), since January 2003; 
- Operation Concordia, a military mission in Macedonia, March till Decem-
ber 2003; 
- Operation Artemis, a military mission in Congo, June till September 2003; 
- Police-mission Proxima in Macedonia (EUPOL), Decembar 2003. 
When the European Union launched its operation Concordia, 350 troops, as a 
“autonomous” military mission, it needed NATO capabilities for planning and 
transport. The operation was commanded by the German Admiral Feist, vice-
commander of all NATO troops. For emergencies NATO troops stood by to 
evacuate Concordia personnel. The first military mission without NATO participa-
tion was operation Artemis, based on the UN-resolution 1484 in Congo. During the 
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height of the Iraq war France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg suggested dur-
ing a meeting in Tervuren, a suburb of Brussels the establishment of a headquarter 
for autonomous military operations of the Europeans. This suggestion was harshly 
criticised not only by the US, but also Great Britain. 
Prime Minister Tony Blair would not accept a European Defence project that 
would endanger the NATO35. A compromise was found that allowed the EU to act 
more independently without reducing NATOs capabilities and responsibilities. 
Thus were 
- a workgroup of Europeans in the NATO headquarter SHAPE was build. 
SHAPE liaison officers were installed in the EU military leadership, 
- a workgroup consisting of military and civilian personnel was created 
within the EU military leadership to plan and lead EU missions. 
The plans of the Europeans were hindered by the US suggested creation of a 
NATO response force, decided upon on the NATO Meeting in Prague. The NATO 
response force was to be ready in October 2004 and is supposed to reach its full 
strength in October 2006 with 21.000 elite troops. Its made of highly modern, 
flexible and easily transferable units who have to be able to cooperate and sustain. 
Obviously the Europeans are neither able nor ready to increase military spending 
without risking social tensions. In other words: The money spent on the NATO 
troops hinders the creation of the European response force. 
The Europeans are oriented on an extension of public international law and its 
international institutions, e.g. the International Criminal Court. Furthermore they 
are also interested in a UN-Security Council serving as the beginning of a world 
government. The US, on the other hand, is less likely to accept restrictions of their 
sovereignty by international rules. They only choose this way, if it provides them 
with advantages like military or financial release or a higher legitimacy. 
The last war on Iraq (2003) shows clearly, that the European nations could not 
find a coordinated policy, even though the US started the war without a UN-Man-
date. The US saw in the Iraq a good place to start their plans on the change of the 
Middle East. The establishment of democracy was meant to influence the 
neighbouring countries, this would also secure the oil shippings of the US. The 
United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland and other nations were 
ready to unconditionally support the US. Germany, France and Belgium, the "Old 
Europe", opposed the war. Russia and even China followed that policy. The mem-
bers of the Security Council with the right to veto saw their influence threatened. 
Above that, both Russia and France had still their very own interests in the Iraq. 
 
 
                                                          
35  German newspaper „Die Welt“, Oktober, 17th 2003. 
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The Future of Latin America: Can the EU 
Help?1 
Agustín Gordillo 
Abstract: This paper: (i) assumes that a) corruption, patronage and clienteles 
imbedded for centuries in Latin America’s culture are at the root of Latin Amer-
ica’s economic, social and political problems, together with b) systematic failure to 
grasp reality. (ii) On those assumptions it discusses the creation of a supranational 
Inter-American State comprising those Latin American countries willing or in need 
to participate, with the added minority vote and participation of representatives of 
both the European Union and the United States. It is suggested that the two super-
powers join forces in helping us to achieve good governance. (iii) It would further 
be a step to a different world order in the distant future. 
 
 
1. The Ever Changing World Order 
POWER has been shifting away from the Nation State, in two opposite directions: 
first inwards towards local regions2 and second outwards, originally towards inter-
                                                          
1  The essence of this paper has already been delivered at the European Public Law Center 
on the occasion of their conference on Civilizations and Public Law, Athens, 2003, in 
press at the European Review of Public Law, who have kindly given me permission for 
this publication. The original title was “Civilizations and Public Law: a View from Latin 
America” and it was accompanied by a small book entitled precisely as this paper and its 
presentation in Sao Paulo. We believe the current title better to represent its contents. 
2  The United Kingdom with devolution to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, is a clear 
example. There are more, these are just some of the clearest. See ANTHONY, G. (2002): 
Public Law Litigation and the Belfast Agreement. In: European Public Law, 8(3): 401-
422; MORISON, J. (1999), Constitutionalism and Change: Representation, Governance, 
and Participation in the New Northern Ireland. In: Fordham International Law Journal, 
New York, 22(4): 1608-1627. “Globally there has been a trend for state governments to 
lose power also through devolution to substate, regional, provincial, and local political 
entities. In many states, including those in the developed world, regional movements e-
xist promoting substantial autonomy or secession”: HUNTINGTON, S. (1997): The Clash 
of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York, Touchstone: 35. 
BREWER CARÍAS, A. R. (2001): Regionalization in Economic Matters in Comparative 
Law. In: Études de Droit Public Comparé, Brussels, Bruylant: 139-159, esp. 140-1, 154-
9, concludes that economic regionalization is frequently linked to administrative or poli-
tical regionalization.  
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national institutions,3 then to the supranational state and beyond; towards greater 
international law4 (even applied by local courts5) and jurisdiction.6 In the mean-
time, there is greater national or bi-national7 foreign jurisdiction8 as part of a proc-
ess towards more international jurisdiction.9  
The world seems to be moving towards a new federalism,10 where the former 
Nation States will act as local intermediate entities.11 Most Nation States inevita-
bly suffer, in this process, “losses in sovereignty, functions, and power”. This 
                                                          
3  “International institutions now assert the right to judge and to constrain what states do in 
their own territory”: HUNTINGTON (1997): op. loc. cit. Some authors point out that there 
is also “cross conditioning”, when international lenders, both public and private, agree 
on conditions that the receiving country is to meet; even technical country missions 
sometimes are composed by member of different international lenders, such as the WB 
and the IMF. JIMÉNEZ CASTRO, W. (2000): Préstamos y programas de ajuste estructural, 
San José de Costa Rica: EUNED: XIX, tells of such “cross conditioning” by the IMF, 
WB, IDB, AID, “the Club of Paris” and other international private commercial banks. 
4  See ALTER, K. J. (2001): Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of 
an International Rule of Law in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, OX2 6DP. In 
another vein, some anthropologists ask “Does the proliferation of global agreements ini-
tiate a spatial order that represents an important shift form the territorial claims of colo-
nialism and nationalism –a «postcolonial» space?”: GUPTA, A. (1998): Postcolonial De-
velopments. Durham: Duke University Press: 299. 
5  Both phenomena are well examined in VOLPI, M. (1997): Le forme di Stato. In: 
MORBIDELLI, G./ PEGORARO, L./ REPOSO, A./ VOLPI, A. (Eds.): Diritto costituzionale 
italiano e comparato. Bologna: Monduzzi: 413-27. Sometimes the tendency favors in-
digenous people: see ANAYA, S. J. (1996): Indigenous Peoples in International Law. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 3: 75 et seq. 
6  The most interesting example of supranational jurisdiction is discussed in BROWN, N. L./ 
KENNEDY, T. (2000): The Court of Justice of the European Communities, 5th ed. Lon-
don: Sweet & Maxwell. 
7  As in the case of the NAFTA panels: see LEMIEUX, D./ STUHEC, A. (1999): Review of 
Administrative Action Under NAFTA. Ontario: Carswell. 
8  One example is that of the American FCPA. See CRUVER, D. R. (1999): Complying 
With the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. A guide or U.S. Firms Doing Business in the 
International Marketplace, 2nd ed.. Chicago: American Bar Association. 
9  See CRAIG, P. (2001): The Jurisdiction of the Community Courts Reconsidered. In: DE 
BÚRCA/ GRÁINNE/ WEILER, J. H. H. (Eds.), The European Court of Justice. New York: 
Oxford University Press: 6: 179. 
10  Or, in another perspective, “a new regime of discipline in which governmentality is 
unhitched from the nation-state to be instituted anew on a global scale”: GUPTA, A 
(1998) op. cit.: 321. 
11  In any case, the phenomenon is not new; “…global communities act across borders as 
more than citizens of their home status and identify to varying degrees with inherently 
universalizable norms”: BRYSK, A. (2000): From Tribal Village to Global Village. In-
dian Rights and International Relations in Latin America. Standford: Standford Univer-
sity Press: 5: 188 et seq. 
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“weakening of states” and the perception that there are “failed states”12 is a fact 
that cannot really be denied.  
This affects the whole of Latin America in a peculiar way. It stands in a world 
with many different kind of states, first resulting from the original clash of Europe 
vs. indigenous populations,13 but fundamentally in the very dissimilar development 
of the colonies respectively under British and Spanish empires.14 Such distinction  
is alive today.15 The trend to globalization requires good governance,16 yet that is 
not available in Latin America. Patronage and caudillismo17 are hereditary18 and 
thriving:19 “Accostumed to a patron-client relationship, they seem to have been 
                                                          
12  HUNTINGTON (1997) op. loc. cit..; “Argentina is widely perceived as a national failure”: 
SHUMWAY, N. (1993): The Invention of Argentina. Berkeley: University of California 
Press: X. 
13  An interesting reference is provided by DIAMOND, J. (1999): Guns, Germs, and Steel. 
The Fates of Human Societies. New York: Norton: 18: esp. 354-370. His data proves 
that confrontation could have had only one result. However, interpretations vary as to 
the meaning of each lifestyle. The traditional view “was that hunter-gatherers had to toil 
from dawn to dusk in the quest for food in order to eke out a life that was nasty, brutish, 
and short”; to which others confronted cases of where people “whose wants and needs 
were limited, like many hunter-gatherers, could achieve a comfortable life with little 
time and effort. Instead of working all day every day, these people spent much of their 
time simply lounging around”: BURCH, E. S., JR./ ELLANNA, L. J. (Eds.) (1996): Key Is-
sues in Hunter-Gatherer Research. Oxford: Berg: 147, Hunter Affluence?, Editorial. 
14  SERVICE, E. R. (1968): Indian-European Relations in Colonial Latin America. In: 
MANNERS, R. A./ KAPLAN, D. (Eds), Theory in Anthropology. Chicago: Aldine: 285. 
15  NEILSON, J. (2002): Clash of civilizations. In: Buenos Aires Herald, November 28: 16. 
16  “Globalization depends on effective governance, now as in the past. Effective govern-
ance is not inevitable. If it occurs, it is more likely to take place through interstate coop-
eration and transnational networks than through a world state. But even if national states 
retain many of their present functions, effective governance of a partially –and increas-
ingly- globalized world will require more extensive international institutions”: 
KEOHANE, R. O. (2002): Governance in a Partially Globalized World. In: HELD. D 
/MCGREW, A., (Eds.), Governing Globalization. Padstow, Cornwall: Polity Press: 16: 
325. 
17  The Spanish word has gained general acceptance. See LEWELLEN, T.. C. (1983): Politi-
cal Anthropology. An Introduction. New York: Bergin & Garvey: 79-81. 
18  In fact, it has always been the case, from the earlier times of colonial history: LUNA, F. 
(2000): A Short History of the Argentinians. Buenos Aires: Planeta: 19 and  25. 
19  NEILSON (2002) op. loc. cit. ROSENSOHN, N. /SCHNEIDER, B. (1993): THE CLUB OF 
ROME, Latin America, facing contradictions and hopes. Bilbao: BBV: 73: “the stratified 
system put in place by the colonizers –and essentially denied full citizenship to the in-
digenous peoples of the region—has continued up to the present.” Ideologically differ-
ent versions of history come to the same conclusion, on a different basis. The peripheral 
countries are “condemned to underdevelopment” or worse, to “the development of un-
derdevelopment”: FRANK, A. G. (1969): Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America. Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil. New York: Monthly Review Press: 55-
57. Both versions have in common the belief that nothing has changed in 500 years. Cu-
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specially willing, even eager to follow the new caudillo;”20 that is “the kind of 
leadership most […] seem to prefer”, “a bland mixture of nationalism, populism, 
and social democracy.”21 “The system was self-perpetuating.”22 This shows the 
way to the inference that “All ethnography is part philosophy, and a good deal of 
the rest is confession”. 23  
The original descendants of the European colonizers in Latin America were not 
much diverse than what they thought the indigenous population was. One chroni-
cler said of the gaucho: “that man lost in the middle of Nowhere or Nothingness, 
who does not either do anything to change his destiny: a kind of natural indolence 
that completely dominates time and space;” 24 determined to live without needs; 
                                                                                                                                      
riously enough, there are descriptions from far away countries that also fit the descrip-
tion: In 2003 we may rightly say, in Argentina, that we see agreements between local 
governors and the nation’s president that “Rather than an agreement between two, three, 
or a half dozen regional  […] (governors), these alliances involved an encounter or 
whole collection of separate, semi-independent, intensely rivalrous political figures 
joined at best in unstable blocks by ties of […] clientship”: GEERTZ, C.(1980): Negara. 
The Theathre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Uni-
versity Press: 43. 
20  SNOW, P. G. /MANZETTI, L. (1995): Political Forces in Argentina. Westport, Connecti-
cut: Praeger: 3rd. edition: 13. The salient characteristic is that in almost all cases, the 
chief, even if he is primus inter pares in a council, “controls the whole apparatus of 
government and is usually himself supreme judge, military commander, economic direc-
tor, and archpriest of his community.” “This form of comprehensive personal rule, in 
which there is no «separation of powers,» is one of the reasons […] why conquered 
groups can easily be absorbed by allowing their own leaders to continue directing inter-
nal affairs”: SCHAPERA, I. (1967): Government and Politics in Tribal Societies. New 
York: Schoken Books: 208-9. GASTON GORDILLO notes that “the most important leaders 
have also become well-paid members of the apparatus of the provincial government, a 
situation not free from internal tensions among the Toba”: (1999) The Toba of the Ar-
gentine Chaco. In: LEE, R. B. /DALY, R. (Eds.), The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hunt-
ers and Gatherers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 110-3. Different versions 
are given of different cultures. See for instance GLUCKMAN, M. (1984): Politics, Law 
and Ritual in Tribal Society. Oxford, UK: Blackwell: IUV: 123-168; LEACH, E.R. 
(1986): Political Systems of Highland Burma. London: The Athlone Press: 182-195. 
21  SNOW /MANZETTI (1995) op. cit.: 41. The citation is slightly out of context, but not 
enough that the reader should beware. 
22  Snow /Manzetti (1995) op.cit.: 13. 
23  GEERTZ, C. (1968): The cerebral Savage: On the Work of Claude Lévi-Strauss. In: 
MANNERS, R: A. /KAPLAN, D. (Eds), Theory in Anthropology. Chicago: Aldine: 551. 
24  KUPCHIK, C. (1999): La ruta argentina. El país contado por viajeros y escritores. Buenos 
Aires: Planeta: 66-7. As CALDCLEUGH, A. (1825) put it around 1821 (Travels in South 
America During the Years 1819-20-21. Containing an Account of the Present States of 
Brazil, Buenos Ayers and Chile. London. Later translated into German and Spanish), 
acording to KUPCHIK, op. cit.: 62, “I have observed something very general in all of 
America: people do not have any idea of time or space.”  Or, rather, the notion of time 
as circular or cyclic, in which archaic societies express fear of change and the new. The 
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content with his luck and in no need of money; surrounded by cattle, but with no 
milk; in a nice climate, without vegetables or fruits; seemingly always standing in 
front of his ranch, which is full of holes that he does not mend; women’s lives were 
similarly “indolent and inactive.”25 Similar observations are conjured by other 
foreigners in the next century. 26  
Fact accompanies perception. Just as poverty and indigent conditions are fast 
diminishing in developing Asia, they are increasing in Africa and Latin America.27 
In Africa, one element of the predicament is physical; in Latin America there is 
more subjectivity. Most of us view the world in our own way.28 And that seems to 
be getting worse, not better: in 2001-2003 we had three consecutive years where 
growth in Latin America has been lower than in Africa.29 
The tendency towards inwards regionalization is always weak in Latin Amer-
ica, where the tradition has been of continuous centralization.The first, inward 
shifting of power away from the Nation State is clear in Europe30 and the United 
States.31 Yet Latin America is only a part of that phenomenon, with emphasis on a 
premature loss of power of the Nation State, towards international organizations 
and other supranational bodies,32 but also towards other more powerful Nation 
States. This is not really new in History, just different.33 The attempts at suprana-
tional organization have also been historically weak; its loss of power at foreign or 
international hands is obvious. 
The case of growing foreign national jurisdiction as a step towards a not yet 
fully developed international jurisdiction is also present in certain international 
crimes that have not yet been fully ascribed to the ICC at The Hague: organized 
                                                                                                                                      
same happens with empty spaces: “enormous empty spaces”, “the enormity of the de-
sert”, as PAUL THÉROUX said.  (Cited by KUPCHIK, op. cit.: 295.) 
25  FRANCIS BOND HEAD,  as cited by KUPCHIK, op. cit.: 67. 
26  GOMBROWICZ says “They do not feel repugnance…, they do no get indignant…, they do 
not condemn… nor are they ashamed…as much as we are.” (cited by KUPCHIK, op. cit.: 
230).  
27  GUADAGNI, A. A. (2003):  Una nueva geografía de la pobreza. In:  La Nación, February 
5: 15. 
28  We should beware of that, because “The inverted ethnocentrism has to end in an anti-
anthropology:” SAHLINS, M. (1995): How «Natives» Think About Captain Cook, For 
Example. Chicago: The Chicago University Press: 151. 
29  FRAGA, R. (2003): La africanización de la Argentina. In: El Cronista,  February 18: 8. 
30  Where all nations are different: WILSON, J. Q. (1994): National Differences. In: SCHUCK, 
P. H., Foundations of Administrative Law. New Cork: Foundation Press: 323-338, esp. 
329. 
31  Some would debate this. I think Iraq clearly demonstrated that not even the United 
States can act without international formal backing. 
32  See ATKINS, G. P. (1999): Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System, 
4th ed. Colorado: Westview Press: 220 et seq. 
33  It is easy to prove that the international order was not established between equals, even 
at its genesis. See ALLOT, P. (1992): Mare Nostrum: A New International Law of the 
Sea. In: American Journal of International Law, October, 86: 764. I mention this fact in 
(2003) An Introduction to Law. London: Esperia Publications Ltd.: X. 
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crime and terrorism, money laundering, past cases of genocide and torture, etc. The 
tendency the world is now following is the grouping of states, with the direction 
shown by the ever-growing European Union. It would be fallacious, to point out 
how the apparently insoluble problems of Latin America, also appeared a couple of 
centuries ago in what today are developed societies. First, they did not all have our 
own troubles.34 Second, if some of them arose out of their own troubles without 
resorting to external integration, that was in the past.  
Today we cannot simply watch how continents go asunder, and wait for some 
miraculous internal change to happen; least of all, when those problems have been 
rampant throughout all of their history, 35 as is the case of universal and eternal 
rampant corruption,36 patronage, clienteles, and their consequences in bad public 
governance.37 Our assets38 do not play much of a role in such a local cultural envi-
                                                          
34  NORTH, D. C. /SUMMERHILL, W. /WEINGAST, B. R.: Order, disorder and economic 
change: Latin America vs. North America. Translated into Spanish by Joan Oriol Prats, 
IIG, Instituto Internacional de Gobernabilidad, as Orden, desorden y cambio económico: 
Latinoamérica vs. Norte América. In: Revista Institutiones y Desarrollo, 12/13: 17-12-
2002, available in www.iigov.org/revista  
35  “in 1883 […it ] was still plagued by corruption, personalism, and a general disregard for 
institutional rule”: SHUMWAY, N. (1993): The Invention of Argentina. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press: 140.  
36  Corruption has always been eternal and will always be universal. What matters is how 
strongly and effectively we fight it, or how much we let it flourish. See JOHNSTON, D. 
/ZIMERMANN, R. (Eds) (2002): Unjustified Enrichment. Key Issues in Comparative per-
spective. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. It has been said 
that “the social system of many of these countries also contributed to swell the debt: 
some of the loans benefited only the middle and upper classes, the money merely pass-
ing through Latin America before being placed in Europe or the United States”, op. cit.: 
31. See ROMERO PÉREZ, J. E. (1999): Derecho administrativo general. San José: 
EUNED: IX-X, who denounces at the same time corruption, “globalization” and “neo 
liberalism”: he considers all three to be interconnected affairs. He also denounces bad 
government and patronage in all emerging countries: X: 293-306; he is against every-
thing that the WB, the IMF and the IDB stand for: 299. In a different vein but from the 
same country, see also JIMÉNEZ CASTRO, op. loc. cit..  
37   Many writers have tackled the problem of our tradition of non-compliance with the law. 
I first dealt with it in (1982) La administración paralela. El parasistema jurídico 
administrativo. Madrid, Civitas: 4th printing 2001; NINO, C. (1992) also dealt with it 
later, in the nineties, in his Un país al margen de la ley. Buenos Aires: EMECE; many 
books have since been written on the subject, among them DE SOTO, H. (1987): El otro 
sendero. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1st ed.; PORTES, A. (Ed.) (1989): The Informal 
Economy. John Hopkins University Press. As for the relation between public reason and 
democracy, see RAWLS, J. (1996): Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University 
Press: 216 et seq. 
38  We should instead say, potentially rich, for all foreigners always posit the same observa-
tion: nobody does seem to work on it. SAINT EXUPÉRY said in 1929 that all he could see 
from the plane were infinite land, with no trees, only a barrack in the middle of the 
camps and a windmill. “For hundreds of kilometres you see nothing but that.” Cited by 
KUPCHIK, op. cit.: 22-3. LAWRENCE DURRELL, who visited us in 1947-8, observed the 
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ronment:39caudillismo, too strong executive powers,40 extraordinary indebted-
ness,41 etc. Change in corrupt practices has not happened from the inside of our 
countries. In my view, simply waiting for something new to happen in the future, 
all by itself, is rather suicidal. 
 
 
2. “Democracy” vs. “Sovereignty” 
Throughout history mankind has developed these two concepts as if they were 
compatible. They sometimes are not. One pull of the forces of gravity is towards 
the local autonomous region: many people in the world feel that if their region has 
more power, at the expense of the national sovereign state, then their kind of “de-
mocracy” will be better, because stronger, at the local level.  
                                                                                                                                      
spectacle of “unexploited richness” being savagely disputed by local chieftains: 
KUPCHIK, op. cit.: 23. No matter what century or which foreigner you pick, the observa-
tions are always the same. In 1837 DARWIN notes that when travelling, only from time to 
time a single ranch could be seen, lonesome, each with a single tree (Cited by KUPCHIK, 
op. cit.: 90-1.) That detail of the “single tree” for a lonesome solitary ranch has always 
struck me as pathetic. It did impress DARWIN.  
39  It is useless to remind us how many natural assets we have (as in THE CLUB OF ROME, 
op. cit.: 119), when we lack the capabilities that are needed to use them; the reverse 
happens with Japan, devoid of natural assets but with a culture that manages to over-
come those difficulties. 
40  This problem has been getting worse of late. Even in recent democratic times, the ten-
dency to obscure the role of Congress and enhance that of the administration is clear for 
all to see: FERREIRA RUBIO, D. /GORETTI, M. (1998): When the President Governs 
Alone: The decretazo in Argentina, 1989-93. In: CAREY, J. M. /SHUGART, M. S (Eds.), 
Executive Decree Authority. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press: 33-61. 
That seems to be the case in all Latin American countries: SCHMIDT, G. (1998): Presi-
dential Usurpation on Congressional Preference? The Evolution of Executive Decree 
Authority in Peru. In CAREY /SHUGART, op. cit.: 104-141; CRISP, B. F. (1998): Presiden-
tial Decree Authority in Venezuela. In CAREY /SHUGART, op. cit.: 142-171; POWER, T. J. 
(1998): The Pen is Mightier that the Congress: Presidential Decree Power in Brazil. In 
CAREY /SHUGART, op. cit.: 197-230. 
41  A former president said more than a century ago that we were “the great debtor of the 
South”: LUNA, op. cit.: 215, who adds: our country “has almost constantly been in debt. 
It has almost become a way of life.” It is a long tradition: “For reasons that have never 
been clear [… the country…] has always been capital-dependent and thereby beholding 
to loaner nations in ways that seriously compromise the country’s ability to run its own 
affairs.” (SHUMWAY, op. cit.: 156, footnote 3). That problem is not ours alone: “Of 
course, the external debt was not the only problem facing Latin American economies at 
the beginning of the 1980s, but it was the most acute and brought with it the most unfor-
tunate consequences.” (THE CLUB OF ROME, op. loc. cit.) In the nineties, various coun-
tries had external debts bigger than their GNPs, so it is only with a rather ingenuous look 
that the 1991 World Economic Survey could say that “Highly indebted countries may 
carry their debt burden for another decade.”(As cited by THE CLUB OF ROME, op. cit.: 
35.) Just one decade? 
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On the other hand, the pull of gravity towards a supranational state does not 
necessarily function on the basis of equality. Of course, words can be played with, 
and one would be able to say that international democracy means an equal vote for 
each state no matter how big (territory and economy) and populated or small and 
unpopulated it is. That is the way it works in the UN’s General Assembly, but it is 
not the way it functions in the Security Council and in the real world order. 
The European Union is a more interesting case. When you join small states (in 
geography, population and economy), with larger states (again in geography, popu-
lation and economy), the rules have been adapted. Varying sizes (territory, popula-
tion and economy) of countries change the scales of “equality” towards some new 
equilibrium of (implicitly different) “international democracy,” where not each 
state’s vote counts the same if it has very different population, economy and terri-
tory. In a sense, a new — still implied — concept of “international democracy” 
commences to be a counterweight to the absolute notion of “sovereignty.” Perhaps 
the notion of reciprocity will have to be reconsidered, as well. 
How do the EU and the US relate to Latin America today? The EU spends large 
amounts of money on trying to cope with some of the consequences of bad gov-
ernments in Latin America: natural or man-made disasters, that national govern-
ment cannot manage them on their own: famine, poverty and indigence, inequality, 
fiscal irresponsibility, over spending, over indebtedness, etc. It seems more expen-
sive and less efficient for the US and the EU to try to alleviate such problems 
rather than addressing their mismanagement in bad public governance. Also, at-
tacking the consequences is not of much use when you do not enter into the causes. 
The EU countries tried colonization in the past, and it did not work. 42 The US 
experimented with direct intervention, support for local coups d’État by military 
regimes, and they did not work either.  
Both the US and the EU now try to help solve the consequences of maladminis-
tration by going to the very governments that practice it and try to convince them 
to do it differently this time, when they are being helped from abroad. They also 
try to implicate civil society in these efforts, to avoid some of the problems of bad 
public governance, corruption, patronage, and so on. Does it work? I am afraid not. 
 
 
3. A Time for Nation Building? 43 
The case of Afghanistan is useful to look at the problem from the other side, that of 
the US and possibly Europe. In 1945 the US thought they could transform socie-
ties. They tried that in Japan and Germany, which trend fell later into disbelief. 
Afghanistan has brought the problem to the forefront of discussions: How do you 
                                                          
42  Except, notably, for the British colonies. 
43  We take the lead from DAO, J. (2002): Nation-building: back in style?. In: New York 
Times, republished in the Buenos Aires Herald, November 28: 17. 
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rebuild a nation that has not been functioning for years? Or do you try not to re-
build, but to build something new? 
Unless someone can help Afghanistan to put in place a government that can be 
a provider of public goods, “people will look for help to those who do provide 
those things  – which is the warlords.” 44 
 
 
4. What, a New Imperialism? 
It would be naïve to think that the great powers do not always exert their influence 
over emerging countries, even today. Countries exert influence over others in nu-
merous non transparent ways. 45 Small countries try to defend their interests in 
foreign countries, too. Their leverage may be smaller, but it is real nonetheless. 
In the case of the US and the EU and other big international organizations, too 
many individuals and institutions exercise some kind of influence in foreign coun-
tries, without the benefit of internal legal and social controls in their own native 
society. What I propose here is to make those influences transparent and overt, 
subject to public scrutiny both at home and abroad; to channel them through a 
single main course instead of the myriad ways in which it is now exercised by too 
many countries and international organizations.  
Many foreigners go to Latin America and do pro bono work, being commis-
sioned either by non governmental organizations from their own countries or by 
their own countries themselves, and most try to be fair, balanced and reasonable in 
their management suggestions; they believe what they say with all their heart. 
Other times, though, the politics are, often, nefarious. And there’s also the aptly 
named “policy du jour.” 
But if everything is cloaked in secrecy and there is no public control either in 
our countries or in their own foreign countries, then it cannot objectively produce 
good results. Control is more essential to public life when it operates under the veil 
of diplomatic secrecy than when it is done in the open. Now it’s a cloak and dagger 
business.  
I suggest bringing it into the open in the whole world, both the developing and 
the developed one. 
That cannot either be done by direct intervention in the affairs of each nation, 
as has already been suggested in some cases. Yet, even if that thought might be a 
logical implication of the premises on a country by country basis, it is really not 
feasible. Public resentment would be too strong. On the other hand, an indirect 
influence such as is exercised in the EU towards its composing countries may 
prove feasible. It is not going to happen by itself.  
                                                          
44  Alexander T., British Department of International Development, cited by DAO, op. 
loc.cit. 
45  An Introduction to Law: op. cit.:  IX. 
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Historians might want to point out that all this talk is reminiscent of the Em-
pire-Colonies relations of the past. That is an attempt to recreate the colonial past, 
without even the empires wanting it: which of course they don’t.  
The present situation allows them to exert whatever influence they desire, 
without facing the critiques of mal administration or malpractice in foreign public 
governance. As things now stand, they lobby their position and obtain their results 
without paying for the consequences of having to really participate in the admini-
stration of a failing or failed state.  
They also exert such influence in so many different ways and by so many dif-
ferent means that the results are often contradictory or at least inefficient. The 
criticism at the IMF for its role in giving excess credit to countries which were 
obviously under corrupt governments and prone to make inefficient use of the 
borrowed money, therefore ending by being unable to pay back the credits, is not 
really a criticism to its bureaucracy,46  for it in turn depends of the major contribu-
tors’ directions.  
So it is the bigger countries themselves that are not making an efficient usage 
of the money they give to the IMF to be lent to smaller countries. It is not that the 
money is given without caveats and conditions: it is that the caveats and conditions 
are not really working, not because the IMF’ bureaucracy is sometimes wrong, but 
rather because the international system itself is not sufficiently coherent. 
Such a situation is comfortable primarily for those responsible for government 
in the former colonies; it is doubtful to which extent it is also comfortable to bigger 
countries too. Those in the local power in Latin America can enjoy the comforts of 
power and the State and are not accountable because they can always blame the 
empire; as for public opinion or the common people in these former colonies, they 
either do not care to see reality, do not know about it, or know about it but prefer to 
keep silent.  
Those inclined to consider this but one modern version of the old “white man’s 
burden” might say they recognize that European or American control of the emerg-
ing countries is nothing new in history. It is now less evident to see, but no less 
powerful.  
 
 
5. The Resistance to Assume Further Responsibilities 
A pertinent question is whether the current governments of the US and the EU 
would care to take a more candid responsibility for the affairs of countries which 
are so obviously problematic.  
                                                          
46  Such as MUSSA, M. (2002): Argentina and the Fund: from Triumph to Tragedy. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics; Spanish edition, Argentina y el FMI: 
del triunfo a la tragedia. Buenos Aires: Planeta. MUSSA’s book, faithful to his own for-
mation, is that of macroeconomics: no place there for corruption, clienteles, patronage, 
or anything but numbers.  
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Egoism would naturally indicate them to just let things stand as they are now. If 
that is the answer, then it should come as no surprise that sometimes things get out 
of hand. And to then intervene in self defence is a late reaction, therefore more 
expensive in lives and money, in universal good will and cultural influence. 
The same thing that can be said of extreme inequalities within a single country 
can be said of extreme inequalities in the world order. I cannot live in peace and in 
luxury in my own country, yet surrounded by poverty and injustice. I then have to 
employ part of my resources in self defence. If I then suffer damage, in spite of my 
mechanisms of self defence, it is too late already. How do I change the system 
within my own country? I simply cannot, and I do not really want to lose democ-
ratic elections and representative governments, even if those that govern do not 
make a good job of it. Yet, I know too that sovereignty does not exist as it was 
thought it was going to be when the newer smaller states came into being. I just 
want to have a fairer world organization, where my own problems are better dealt 
with, where better public governance than ours is not a privilege of the EU and the 
US that Latin America cannot share.  
Some countries in the EU voice the opinion that the US has brought its current 
troubles upon itself. The same people would say that if I am living in almost luxury 
in my own country, but surrounded with peril, I am assuming a risk of unknown 
dimensions. But the same can be said of the EU as the EU says of the US; both 
individuals and countries are sometimes living in luxury yet surrounded by pov-
erty. The parallel is too obvious to miss, yet we get the criticism without the exam-
ple. 
We Latin Americans get progressively unhappy with our reality, and see a bet-
ter world in Europe or the US. It is almost unavoidable that a sizable part of our 
population is therefore tempted to go there, legally or illegally. It is just the reverse 
flow of when Europeans abandoned their continent, ravaged by wars or famine, in 
search of a better life in Latin America or other countries. That is also the point 
DERSHOWITZ makes, when he accuses Europe of being soft on terrorism.47 
Naturally, you have the option of deciding not to try to help those surrounding 
you in the world to overcome their problems (real managerial help, not just hu-
manitarian aid). Just as naturally, then the problems will inevitably come to you. I 
do not think that either the EU or the US can shut their eyes to world problems that 
they can help to be solved, and live happily and safely forever. 
Now and then the European Union or its member States, and also the US, like 
to extend their cultural influence on Latin America, be it by teaching the language, 
making cooperative relations between European Universities and Latin American 
Universities, launching special cultural projects, etc. 
I am not going to suggest that such money is misspent, on the contrary. Never-
theless, the fact that those countries or continents spend money to extend their 
cultural influence in Latin America proves precisely my point. You cannot have a 
                                                          
47  DERSHOWITZ, A. M. (2002): Why Terrorism Works. Understanding the threat, respond-
ing to the challenge. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
196 Agustín Gordillo  
lasting influence in that culture if you do not help it to get into is own feet in terms 
of reasonably good public governance. 
Of course, we might tempt the wrong people for the wrong reasons. That is 
why I suggest minority participation only. Too frequently foreign countries acting 
elsewhere do so in their own economic self interest, with utter disregard for the 
interest of the client country. That was clearly shown by European participation in 
Latin American privatizations. That is currently being shown by internal subsidies 
that go against the international opening of the markets that the same countries 
preach. 
Notwithstanding all that, I have enough faith in more developed societies so as 
to think that they will somehow manage to send their best and not their worst peo-
ple. I also have enough faith in Latin American countries to loudly complain if 
those foreign actions are addressed merely to enrich themselves or their countries 
further, again at our expense.  
I have faith in the developed countries to have people who will listen to these 
cries of complaint, it their country representatives are just lining their own pockets 
or just helping their own countries get richer and us poorer.  
I have faith in their enlightened understanding that in the end, it is also in their 
own interest that they should try to send good people with serious intentions. Oth-
erwise they will be like they are today, scared or furious at each new bully that 
decides to part ways with the civilized world. The copy-cat pattern is obvious to 
see and dangerous to ignore. 
 
 
6. Am I Idealizing the EU? 
It has been pointed out to me that there is scope to be slightly more critical of the 
EU,48 as they too have experienced difficulties.49 However, the gap between EU’s 
problems and Latin America’s problems is always widening.  
It would seem doubtful that the EU would ever accept taking up the responsi-
bility of having a minority vote in a new supranational state and thereby increasing 
its moral responsibility for the development of this continent. There is quite a dif-
ference whether you limit yourself to traditional forms of aid while at least in part 
maintaining the opportunity to blame local paternalism if the effects fall short of 
expectations, or whether you accept to directly participate in the decision-making 
                                                          
48  For instance, while corruption is rampant in our countries, it is not at all an unknown 
phenomenon in Europe. See for instance NIETO GARCÍA, A (1997): La corrupción en la 
España democrática. Madrid: Ariel; (1996): La “nueva” organización del desgobierno. 
Madrid: Ariel. 
49  ADAM T. (1999-2000): Transparency and the Emergence of a European Administrative 
Law. In: 19 Yearbook of European Law 217; HARLOW, C. (1999): European Administra-
tive Law and the Global Challenge. In: CRAIG, P. /DE BÚRCA, G. (Eds), The Evolution of 
EU Law. Oxford University Press: 261, etc. 
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in such an obvious way as is here proposed. That is a question only the EU can 
answer. 
One of the first problems also is, the EU seems to lack a clear focus on its poli-
cies towards Latin America.50 But the interest is undoubtedly there, as the budget 
allocations would indicate: between € 400 and 500 million/year 0,415 by the UE, 
plus € 1.900 from the Member States’ aid. The money goes primarily to humanitar-
ian aid: uprooted people or refugees, migrants, demobilized former soldiers, repro-
ductive health; those discriminated against or suffering from poverty or disadvan-
tage, children, minorities, prisoners, victims of torture, indigenous peoples; reha-
bilitation and reconstruction; also for developments in democracy, rule of law, 
human rights, justice, etc. 
This aid is channeled through regional international agreements with Central 
America, the Andean Community, and Mercosur, or bilateral agreements (Mexico, 
Chile), but there does not seem to be a continental scope in the efforts and aid. 
Also, since the budgets are made annually, there may be changes either in the 
amounts of in the operations that are approved each year. 
Spain and Italy are having the most important number of returnees in search of 
employment or a better life, much as their ancestors did centuries ago in the other 
direction; but the problem is no just theirs. Except for immigration these problems 
in the EU are considered on a common basis for Europe but individually for the 
countries of Latin America, precisely because these countries are not united in a 
supranational state or an economic union.  
The difficulty is common to all countries of Latin America, but since it appears 
with varying degrees of intensity according to the particular time and country being 
considered, it is considered as diverse or unique in each country.51 Moreover, some 
documents and resolutions stress the need for innovative immigration policies 
founded on the “sovereignty” of the countries concerned.52 That, coming from a 
European Union whose main starting point was precisely some abdication of sov-
ereignty for the common good, is not a good signal, even though possibly another 
message can read between the lines.53 
Instead of giving primary attention and money to single problems in individual 
countries, no matter how pressing and distinct they may appear to be on each occa-
sion, the EU should mostly try to devise a continental government of sorts in Latin 
                                                          
50  Some reports say it is a “thicket of regulations, resolutions, declarations and communi-
cations for which there is no road map,” OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, 
OJ L 287, 31/10/2001:  3 
51  Regulation (EC) number 550/97 of 24 March 1997 on HIV/AIDS related operations in 
developing countries, OJ L 550, 27/3/1997:  1 
52  See the European Parliament resolution on a global partnership and a common strategy 
for relations between the European Union and Latin America, 200/2249 (INI), minutes 
of 15/11/2001. 
53  The same resolution of 2001 suggest than an immigration “observatory” be established 
up with the responsibility for ongoing and thorough “monitoring” of all issues related to 
migratory flows between  Europe and Latin America. 
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America to be the recipient of those efforts and the primary object of help (indeed, 
not to give it money, but to try to improve public governance in the continent).  
It is curious that EU programs under these regulations may include the estab-
lishment of democratic structures and the promotion of human rights. Of course 
this is not bad at all in itself; it just misses the central point, which is the traditional 
culture of politics in the area. If this is not understood, then the trappings of de-
mocracy will be installed and the most blatant human rights violations will be 
addressed, but the same tradition of inefficiency and patronage will remain under 
the guise of elected governments. Democracy is necessary, but it is not enough to 
produce good public governance. 
Much the same can be said about EU Regulation 2258/96 concerning humani-
tarian aid for rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing countries. 
Article 1 declares that the final aim must be not just to permit refugees, displaced 
persons and demobilized troops to return home, but to help the entire population to 
resume normal civilian life in their countries and regions of origin. To “resume 
normal civilian life” in an underdeveloped society is to continue being subject to 
patronage, corruption, inefficiency, clienteles, and so on. To do things properly, 
something has to be done about that too. 
In turn, EU Resolution 1257/96 concerning also humanitarian aid, has covered 
around € 500 million/year, administered by ECHO, the Commission’ s European 
Community Humanitarian Office. The objective in this case is slightly broader, for 
art. 3 establishes that the objective is to cope with the consequences of population 
movements (refugees, displaced peoples and returnees) caused by natural and man-
made disasters and carry out schemes to assists repatriation to the country of origin 
and resettlement there, when the conditions laid down in current international 
agreements are in place. That includes institution building. 
A broader approach is also present in some agreements. In one of them54 it is 
established that Community support shall be focused on the preparation of coop-
eration activities with the recipient countries and with the International Conference 
on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA), as well as the implementation of pro-
jects with specializes partners such as UNHCR, government bodies and NGOs.55 
The same approach can be observed in a more recent agreement with Mexico56, 
which provides that the parties shall endeavor to preserve the benefits of the aid 
already granted to Central America refugees in Mexico, and shall cooperate in the 
search for lasting solutions.57 
While all these efforts are oriented towards preventing illegal immigration and 
resettling immigrants back in their countries of origin as a lasting solution, at least 
it is understood that the solution cannot be found in Europe, it has to be found in 
Latin America and other developing countries. Transnational crime, such as traf-
                                                          
54  The 1999 Framework Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, OJ L 63, 12/3/99:  39. 
55  Article 26. 
56  OJ L 276, 28/10/2000: 45 
57  Article 38. 
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ficking of migrants, women and children, has been added to the scope of these 
efforts,58 but the point remains, all this has to be done on a regional scale and with 
the express purpose of improving public governance in the area, in order to have 
really “lasting” solutions. 
My contention is, then, that the EU should channel its aid efforts first into im-
proving public governance for the continent and its components, because that is the 
real root of the problems which they try to alleviate with so much budgetary effort.  
Badly governed countries, because governed with a traditional culture of cor-
ruption, patronage and inefficiency, will always lead to inequality, poverty and 
crisis. The different crises do sometimes have natural disasters as its causes, but 
even then, they worsen when there is not reasonably able public governance to deal 
with them. If the first objective of having reasonable public governance were 
achieved, much better results would be obtained with whatever singular help were 
decided for specific needs in the poorest countries. 
 
 
7. Exports and Subsidies 59 
Fifty and more years ago we used to profitably export grain and beef, but then 
international prices went down and even more, developed countries chose to pro-
tect their own grain and beef from imports (farmers are quite powerful in most 
developed countries); we started to produce steel but now the United States is im-
posing tariff barriers on that too. (Some industrial lobbyists are also powerful 
there.) If we cannot profitably export our products, then some supernatural force 
drives us to export ourselves. It is nothing to be much surprised about, for Europe-
ans have in the past been very busy immigrants to both North and South America. 
It is now people in South America, of European ancestry, that are making the re-
verse trip. 
 
                                                          
58  However, not all forms of transnational crime are the object of European preoccupation. 
The crimes of bribery committed by many European countries and enterprises in the 
process of privatization in Latin America have not yet been dealt with appropriately by 
the European Union or its pertinent member states. The moral obligation is here at odds 
with the interests of the very governments and groups that are an integral part of the EU. 
It is a contradiction comparable to that of preaching liberalization abroad and maintain-
ing internal subsidies against imports from the countries that have been told to open 
their economies. Or to say that the European Development Bank has been established to 
provide loans to non EU-Countries, while in fact its loans are given in support of sub-
sidiaries or joint ventures of European companies and banks. 
59  See RESNICK BRENNER, M.: Globalize subsidies to pay foreign debt. In: Herald World 
Trade, January 13: 2: “Countries that preach the eminent virtues of free trade and free 
markets for resource distribution, are the first to heavily subsidize their own agricultural 
sectror”; according to an editorial of The New York Times, December 1, 2002, “The 
Hypocrisy of Farm Subsidies,” “the developed world pays out more than U$S 300 bil-
lion a year in farm subsidies,” which is “seven times what it gives in development aid.”  
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8. The Merits of EU Participation in Regional and World 
Public Governance 
We already have an international “web of multilateral agreements, global and re-
gional institutions and regimes, transgovernmental policy networks and summits”; 
that is “much more than a system of limited intergovernmental cooperation”, it is 
an “emerging global governance complex.”60  
My suggestion is to change the national States so willing into a new, suprana-
tional one with minority US and UE participation. Since we elect candidates that 
abuse power61 and heavily use patronage and corruption to govern, we have to 
devise a way by which our elected officials are more restrained.  
- Internal laws and institutions are notoriously unable to do that, even with 
foreign pressures to establish the rule of law, human rights compliance, ju-
dicial control, good governance, etc.  
- The conditional ties of foreign aid have been unsuccessful to surmount the 
problems of good public governance in my country.  
- The change does not seem to be achieved either by means of international 
treaties against corruption, and even international or foreign jurisdiction, for 
it has been tried that without success either.  
- What we need is a different kind of power structure where to put our elected 
leaders. 
- It might even be an early exercise in public governance foreign aid, instead 
of humanitarian aid, which is really not everlasting. 
What I propose is simpler than EU expansion: It does not imply much of a 
budgetary commitment, there is no immigration resulting from it, and it does not 
change the balance of your cultures. It proposes instead a strengthening of suprana-
tional bonds were the commitments I am asking for are EU participation, first in 
helping it to be born, and then in decision making at one new supranational state of 
underdeveloped or emerging Latin American countries. You can make a differ-
ence. You can regain some of the power and prestige you are losing in confronta-
tion with the US in other arenas. 
 
                                                          
60  HELD, D. /MCGREW, A. (Eds) (2002): Governing Globalization. Cornwall: Polity: XI. 
61  FERREIRA RUBIO, D. /GORETTI, M. (1998): op. cit.: 33-61. SCHMIDT, G. (1998): op. cit.: 
104-141; CRISP, B. F. (1998): op. cit.: 142-171; POWER, T. J. (1998): op. cit.: 197-230. 
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